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Theme Issue:

Education and Development: Past Lessons, Present Crises, Future Possibilities

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Raj Pannu and Toh Swee-Hin (S.H.Toh)

Guest Editors

Editorial

Over the past few decades, international education and development has emerged as a substantive focus among scholars and researchers worldwide, especially for those who are linked to the field of comparative education. As educational systems in the developing (Third World or South) countries has expanded to meet goals of national development, so has research and analysis endeavored to shed light on the complex issues and problems facing, indeed often besetting, policymakers, planners, administrators, and educators from the earliest to the highest levels and from formal and nonformal modes of education. However, as any scan of the literature shows, achieving consensus on how the realities of educational development are best understood or what might be effective strategies for improvement or change remains a challenging task. The issues are of access and equity vis-à-vis class, gender, and ethnicity; the meanings of quality education and what constitute appropriate North-South interactions; as well as the relevance of curriculum, education-economy relationships, and the social, cultural, and political purposes and outcomes of educational systems. The discourse on education and development will continue well into the new millenium.

In this regard a conference held at the University of Alberta in September 1995 was most timely and relevant. Convened in honor of the substantive lifelong contributions of M. Kazim Bacchus, one of Canada's leading scholars in international and comparative education, the conference provided a critical and dialogical space for acknowledging *lessons from the past*, understanding *present crises*, and exploring *possibilities for the future* in international education and development. The articles in this theme issue of *AJER* were first presented as papers at the conference. They reflect the work of international education scholars of diverse nationalities and/or academic sites from Canada, Brazil, Malta, Pakistan, Philippines, the United States, and Australia.

Individually, the articles help to illuminate particular dimensions of the education and development nexus. These include the vital role of teacher education; the impact of neoliberal agendas and global restructuring on educational systems in areas such as Latin America and Africa, as well on specific marginalized groups like women; the transformative challenges posed by adult education and people's empowerment movements, notably in one South context, the Philippines; and the complexities of educational aid and cooperation including alternative paradigms of partnerships. As a whole the articles are united by common themes of critical analysis that seek to deconstruct dominant understandings and strategies of education and development for South societies. More questions than answers may well arise from reading this *AJER* theme issue, but we hope that it will prompt further dialogue among both

North and South educators, dialogue that might enrich and enhance the theory and practice of international education and development.

In conclusion, we would like to acknowledge the following sources of institutional support for hosting the conference in honor of Professor M.K. Bacchus and the production of this *AJER* theme issue: the Office of the Dean, Faculty of Education; the Central Research Fund, the Centre for International Education and Development, the Department of Rural Economy, and the Department of Sociology of the University of Alberta; and the Institute for Education and Development, Aga Khan University, Pakistan.

At the same time, we appreciate the contributions of several other scholars to the dialogue and critical reflections during the conference as speakers, discussants, or panel chairs, especially Mathew Zachariah, Julia Kwong, Fred Judson, Marilyn Assheton-Smith, Daniel Schugurensky, Jerry Kachur, Wallie Samiroden, and Yatta Kanu.

M.K. Bacchus
Aga Khan University

The Role of Teacher Education in Development in South Countries

Although I began my work in education in the developing countries as a teacher for an all-age village school, my formal study of this field started later when I entered the University of London, Institute of Education, in what was then the Department of Education in Tropical Areas.

In those days there were two major concerns in this field of education, especially in countries that were part of the British empire. One concern was providing the masses with a type of education that would help them improve their moral and physical well-being—not their social mobility. Hence the Gospel and the Plough were symbolic of the curriculum content to which the masses were exposed. The second concern was to prepare a small group of more educated individuals for middle-level positions in the existing occupational hierarchy. Top-level positions tended to be filled by expatriates from the metropole (former colonizer).

To address this situation, a secondary education similar to that offered in the metropole was considered necessary. Underpinning this approach was an assumption about the universalistic nature of both the content of a “good education,” especially that offered after the primary level, and the instructional strategies used to transmit that knowledge.

As the colonies moved to independence, efforts were made to help them prepare more nationals for leadership roles through the establishment of local universities and other institutions of higher education. Higher education was seen as a means of strengthening the links between these educated nationals and the metropole, thereby maintaining the latter’s influence in the postindependence period. It is not surprising, then, that these universities were initially established as colleges of metropolitan universities (e.g., London University) offering in many cases a program of studies identical to that of the United Kingdom colleges. Although the situation was obviously different in Latin America and India, which had large European populations, it was generally true for the rest of the colonies.

Following independence, efforts were made to hasten the output of trained people for these colonies. Hence a fairly massive expansion of education took place, especially at the secondary and tertiary levels. With some slight modifications in the content of their courses, such as the inclusion of local

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history, no major changes took place in the focus of the education offered. For example, faculty members at the prestigious Delhi School of Economics in India pointed out that the teaching staff were rather reluctant to focus their research and teaching on local issues such as the rural economics of India. In fact this field of study and research was derogatorily referred to as "cow dung economics." For faculty members to move up the academic ladder, they believed they had to specialize in such areas as monetary theory, international trade, econometrics, or mathematical economics.

A major outcome of the educational expansion between the 1950s and the early 1980s was that although the economic returns to individuals who benefited from such education were fairly substantial, the overall contribution to the society, and especially to the masses, was much more limited. This outcome led to a substantial increase in the numbers of those living at a subpoverty level.

The next major step in the field of education undertaken by the developing countries (or South countries) evolved from the 1991 Jomtien Conference on *Education For All* sponsored mainly by the World Bank. The Bank and, through its influence, the developing countries and aid donors believed that because the available research evidence indicated the greatest social and economic returns for education at the primary level, all efforts should be made to universalize this level of education as part of a strategy for reducing poverty. As a result, the World Bank increased the percentage of its educational loans for primary education from 11% in the early 1970s to the current figure of 30%.

In addition to increasing enrollments in primary schools, especially among girls, the Bank also indicated a concern for improving the efficiency of the educational system and the quality of education as it defined these terms. For example, it saw educational efficiency being increased if:

1. class size were allowed to rise;
2. the length of time spent in the professional training of teachers were reduced, because it was said to have little effect on cognitive learning outcomes;
3. inservice teacher education were pursued more actively;
4. education were increasingly privatized, thereby reducing the pressure on Government funding;
5. education were decentralized, making it easier for communities to be involved in running their schools and therefore more responsible for helping to meet the cost of educating their children; and
6. higher education students paid a greater part of the cost of their education through increased fees.

Furthermore, the Bank argued that enhanced quality of education could be assessed mainly through the higher test scores of students. Based on this argument, the Bank's funds for the assessment of students' learning rose from 3% of its education loans between 1969 and 1973 to 29% between 1989 and 1993.

Many developing countries now seem to be directing their efforts to achieve the goal of education for all in the policy framework suggested by the World Bank. Many governments took advantage of the availability of funds for this level of education through loans or aid, especially as World Bank policies

tended to be followed by other funding agencies. Therefore, much of the focus of education in many developing countries in the coming years would continue to be directed at achieving universal primary education (UPE).

Here I wish to interject an observation that quantitative increases in the provision of basic education in developing countries—even if accompanied by enhanced students' performance at formal examinations—would not help such countries themselves achieve their goals of development. There are two main reasons for this. First, although education is admittedly an important factor in the development process, it is not enough alone to help the South countries achieve their development goals of attaining improved standards of living for all sections of their population, especially for the masses. I do not dwell on this point much except to reiterate the view expressed by Morales-Gómez (1991) of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). He observed that changes in education are byproducts of more basic transformations that must take place in (a) the sphere of the national political economy of each country, and (b) the unequal relationships between poor countries and those in the developed world. Although radical changes in education are needed in South countries, it is even more urgent to change the conditions that fuel the inequalities that ultimately produce educational failure.

Although agreeing perhaps with Morales-Gómez's point of view, as educators we still need to ask, How can education in itself help the developing countries to achieve their developmental goals of improving their living conditions, especially among the poor and marginalized groups? We must be realistic in attempting to answer this question, but we should not lose faith in the educational process and ignore the possible contribution of education to the development process, a point made by Dewey in his critique of the Marxist view that violent revolution was the only means of bringing about change.

Here I would like to share some thoughts about the preparation of professionally competent teachers. This is an area of education in which I have been actively engaged recently, and which I think can help to make an important contribution to development in South countries.

Teacher Education and the Quality of Education

The available evidence, for example, from Husen, Saha, and Noonan (1990), indicates that, contrary to the findings of the United States-based Coleman study (1966), teacher quality does have a strong impact on the level of academic achievement of students in the developing countries. Further, the poorer the countries, the greater the impact the quality of teachers seems to have on students' academic achievement. Hence the need for better teachers is becoming even more important as these countries expand their educational services in an effort to universalize primary education.

It is essential to note that teachers in these countries still tend to depend on conventional teacher-centered methods of instruction essentially involving "chalk and talk" as the main instructional strategy. This was evident in studies of teachers in Thailand (Office of the National Education Commission, 1990); of grade 5 science teachers in Nepal (Pfau, 1980); and of teachers in Botswana, Pakistan, and elsewhere. These studies strongly suggest the need to improve teacher competence as a major step toward enhancing the quality of education

in South countries, thus contributing to more effective development. I explore this matter below.

Educational Needs in a Global Context

Liston and Zeichner (1991) remind us that most teacher education programs are too narrowly focused because they give little attention to the social, political, and cultural content of schooling. Although the focus of these authors' concerns was the social context that teachers face in their day-to-day task of teaching, teachers also need to be aware of, and take into consideration, the broader national and global realities that are likely to have a longer-term influence on the effectiveness of education. Some of these realities in the developing countries include the following:

1. Increasingly, the leaders of the major industrialized nations share the view that the alleviation of abject poverty among the over one billion individuals in the developing countries is not a global but a local responsibility. This view partly explains the significant decline in the amount of official development assistance provided by the industrialized nations. It means that developing countries will have to assume greater responsibility for the alleviation of poverty among their own citizens.

The situation in Africa illustrates the challenges that some of the developing countries are facing. Africa's share of world trade has already declined by 50% between 1965 and 1986, resulting in a condition where "the number of Africans enduring absolute poverty grew by almost two thirds in the first half of the 1980s to constitute more than half the population" (Sandbrook, 1993, p. 97) of the continent.

2. In the developing countries themselves, inequalities in wealth are substantial and even increasing, with the top 5% of their populations receiving about 30% of the total national income. This disparity has contributed to the impoverishment of the more marginalized sectors of the population and to much of the unrest in these countries.
3. Wage employment in the private sector in these countries, excluding the Asian Tigers, is declining. Moreover, because the structural adjustment policies proposed or imposed by the IMF and the World Bank are aimed at reducing the size of the public sector, the number of jobs is also rapidly declining.
4. Not only is the situation deteriorating in many developing countries faced with less financial support from the advanced industrialized countries, the policies set by these industrialized countries tend to be in their own interests, usually without much consideration for the needs of the developing countries. This can be seen in the recently concluded World Trade Agreement, which was described as the greatest trade accord in history despite the fact that it focuses mainly on the interests of the industrialized countries. The poorest countries have largely been considered "the object of neglect" in the new trading order while Africa is seen as an "unequivocal loser." These observations have been reported in the popular press.

On this general point Reich (1992), former professor of economics at Harvard, and Kennedy of Yale University (1994) have both pointed out that with the scientific and technological developments taking place in such

fields as biotechnology, the nature of world production—including agricultural production—is likely to change. This will further deprive farmers, who form the largest occupational group in most developing countries, of their traditional livelihood. For example, products like vanilla, a major export of Madagascar, is already being synthesized in laboratories in the industrialized countries. This type of development is likely to continue.

5. Another issue discussed at the Twelfth Conference of Commonwealth Ministers of Education held in Islamabad in December 1994 is the growing threat to the legitimacy of the state. This problem is manifested by the increasingly negative attitude of the public toward their political leadership. Instruments of state governance are often held in low esteem. This threat has given rise to a number of special interest and subcultural groups that have strengthened attachment and loyalties among members, sometimes even in opposition to other groups in the society and the state. In pluralistic societies with different ethnic or religious groups, these tensions have often resulted in intergroup conflict leading to social instability that could be easily interpreted as a threat to the existence of the state and of civil society. Public authorities in some countries have largely lost control over, or have become ineffective in the control of, these subgroups. In some cases this has led to open conflict between the state and these particular groups and between the various subgroups themselves.

Rather than dealing specifically and comprehensively with these realities, my aim in this article is to attempt to justify the view that an improvement in the conditions of life for the masses in developing countries could partly come about from the quality of education that their citizens receive. To a large extent the quality of that education will depend on the professional competence of their teachers.

The education required to grapple more effectively with these realities needs to prepare students to play a more active part in improving the quality of life in their society, especially through their eventual role as active citizens, to use Giroux's phrase (1988). One ultimate outcome of this participation of active citizens could be a change in the traditional social order that continues to discriminate against and oppress the masses. For example, with the globalization of the world economy, farmers and other workers in developing countries will need to be more creative, to look for new opportunities or openings in the world economic system that they could exploit with the resources available to them. As Reich (1992) notes, every nation's primary assets will be its citizens' skills and insights, which must be developed if a society is to survive economically, especially as it enters the next century. Hence developing countries will need creative problem solvers who can broadly conceptualize issues and come up with new ways of dealing with them.

The growing gap in scientific and technical knowledge between advanced industrialized countries and developing countries (Japan, for example, has 3,558 scientists and engineers per million population compared with Africa's 53) already puts the latter at a disadvantage. It is therefore necessary for the population in the developing countries to be even more innovative in whatever they do if they are to survive economically in the 21st century. For this to

happen, teachers in the developing countries will have to make a large contribution. However, they will need to be well equipped professionally to be able to encourage in their students such practices as higher order thinking. Teachers will need to develop in their students an understanding of what they have learned rather than simply memorizing and regurgitating information; to facilitate students' acquisition of knowledge, experiences, attitudes, and outlook that will be useful to them outside the classroom; to provide students with the opportunity to be involved in their own learning; and to raise students' expectations of themselves, developing more confidence in their own abilities. Teachers should also be prepared to view their task primarily as one of developing the abilities of all their students, not just the "bright" ones, as often happens in most developing countries. They will have to assist their students to criticize constructively, make the process of education a challenging but enjoyable experience, and convert their schools into real learning communities. Finally, teachers will need regularly and systematically to inquire into their own professional practice with a view to continually improving their teaching skills.

Some Expected Outcomes

A number of positive outcomes might be expected from the instructional approaches mentioned above. Students would be better prepared to perceive reality, not as given or immutably fixed for all time, but as if it were problematic, challengeable, and changeable. This should encourage students to develop their own interpretations of reality as they look beyond the "facts" stated in the textbooks, newspapers, or other sources. In other words, students should be taught in such a manner that they will begin to see the world around them in different ways rather than simply unidimensionally.

The use of more appropriate instructional strategies would facilitate the development among students of such skills as hypothesizing, informed guessing, and estimating rather than searching first for the traditionally accepted textbook answers. Experimenting, questioning, challenging existing explanations, and taking into account their own experiences would also be encouraged. Further, students would be better prepared to cooperate and collaborate with each other while accepting individual responsibility for whatever views they might finally hold. In addition, the students will learn how to learn as an important step in preparing for change.

Preparing Teachers in Developing Countries for this New Role

Next I examine briefly the preparation of teachers for the roles suggested above. This will require teacher educators in these countries to be actively aware that learning to teach is influenced by many factors, all of which must be considered in planning and implementing an effective teacher education program.

1. Teachers must be more conscious that by the time students enter the teachers' colleges they have already developed deep-seated attitudes to and particular perceptions of teaching that are usually a product of their own 10-12 years of experience as students. These earlier exposures to teaching will have a strong influence on their own teaching strategies unless the

preparation they receive as teachers is effective in helping them overcome some of the more negative aspects of their own school experiences. Even before new methods are introduced to student teachers, they need to be prepared to critically examine their acquired conceptualization of the teaching process. Unless this is done, new approaches to which they might be exposed will serve only as an overlay on their preexisting knowledge and beliefs about teaching and will not substantially affect their teaching styles. Although this situation also occurs among teachers in the industrialized countries, it applies with even greater force in many developing countries where the relationship between the teacher (or the guru) and the student is not only a professional one, but often has deep personal and emotional links.

2. Another factor that affects teachers' performance is obviously their knowledge of the subject matter that they will be teaching, that is, their *content knowledge* that they are sometimes assumed to have acquired as part of their general education. But although efforts are being made in developing countries to increase teachers' content knowledge, this is not sufficient for effective teaching. Teachers also need what is referred to as *pedagogical content knowledge*, which will better prepare them to understand and explain more effectively to their students the major concepts in various disciplines. For example, teachers should be able to explain why, when dividing by a fraction, one upturns the divisor and multiplies. Teachers must be able to move beyond passing on procedural knowledge, which simply enables students to acquire information, techniques, or formulae to solve problems or answer examination questions, to increasing students' understanding of what they have learned.
3. The education that teachers try to provide for their students should help them develop a sense of cultural and national identity—a feeling of belonging to their society that transcends identification with their own subcultural groups. Teachers therefore need to be equipped to assist their students to work effectively in groups using, for example, some of the strategies involved in cooperative learning to help them develop greater respect for one another's points of view, assume responsibility for their share of a task, and become familiar with peaceful means of resolving conflicts. From the point of view of social cohesion, social stability and even development, this is important.
Kaplan (1994) has argued that, historically, societies did not become civil because they were rich but rather they became rich because of their civic nature. He also concluded on the basis of the historical evidence that a society that relies on cooperation, general reciprocity, and mutual assistance among its members tends to be more effective at improving the quality of life for the overall community than is a competitive and distrustful society.
4. A further influence on how student teachers will eventually teach is the way in which the faculty at the teachers' colleges themselves teach and supervise their students' work. The instructional strategies used by the faculty in many teachers' colleges in developing countries focus on knowledge trans-

mission through the lecture method. This simply reinforces the teaching methods that the students have earlier experienced in school.

Teacher educators in the developing countries should therefore be able and willing to reexamine continually their own perspectives and personal theories about teaching. Moreover, their conceptions of this process need to be shared and discussed with their colleagues and, if necessary, revised so that the faculty might develop a shared mission, or at least a compatible set of goals for the teacher education institution in which they work. This in turn requires a prior willingness on the part of the faculty to evaluate regularly the programs that they offer. The processes of attempting to clarify the goals of their teacher-education institution, of developing consensus about these goals and plans to achieve them, and evaluating progress in this direction can be valuable tools for fostering further professional growth among the faculty members and can have a direct impact on the quality of teachers they produce.

In addition, teacher educators have to move beyond paying lip service to the need to integrate theory and practice in teacher education. The two continue to be unrelated, and field- or school-based teacher preparation are ideas that are either unheard of or only of academic interest to teacher educators in developing countries.

Further, the programs of professional training for student teachers do not usually reflect the realities of the classroom situation in developing countries with their large classes of 70 or more students, multigrade classrooms, poor supply of instructional materials, and so forth. As a result even the practice teaching experiences of student teachers that could play a useful role in teacher development are not effective in achieving the goal of introducing better teaching strategies to teachers or changing the conceptual understanding of the teaching process that they have previously developed.

5. Yet another factor that influences the instructional strategies of teachers is the teaching environment and professional culture of the schools in which they work. This means that even teachers who are prepared to employ more effective instructional strategies can easily revert to the traditional knowledge transmission approaches to teaching with their emphasis on rote learning under direct or indirect pressure from their colleagues. This is particularly so in schools in the developing countries because of the virtual absence of others who practice more innovative teaching strategies.

It is therefore important for student teachers to understand how changes in classroom and school practices can be brought about. In addition, they should be provided with some of the skills by which they might become change agents in their schools, adapting their practices where necessary to the realities of local classroom situations without losing the essential elements of a more creative approach to teaching.

In recognizing the significant influence of contextual variables on teaching performance, teacher education institutions need to work not only with their students, but with entire schools—at least those in which their students do their teaching practice. This requires the involvement of head teachers, teaching staff, and where possible even the local education super-

visors in trying to ensure that their student teachers have a supportive environment in which to try out the new teaching strategies learned in college. This may require a reexamination and redefinition of the role of practice schools, as they are called, and of the relations between their staff and the faculty of the teacher education institutions in the supervision of practice teaching.

6. The impact of teacher education programs on the student teachers' self-image and the importance that they come to attach to their roles as teachers needs to be considered. Because of the low prestige of the profession in most developing countries, many teachers are also likely to have a fairly negative image of their role, along with an inadequate appreciation of the value of their work. To be more effective as potential change agents, they need to be provided during their training programs with opportunities to develop a more positive self-image, a belief in the importance of their role as teachers, in their own potential contribution to society, and in their ability to influence students to become effective learners and active citizens.
7. It is important that teachers' understand their students' experiential, psychological, and cultural background and how the prior experiences and developmental levels of their students can be taken into account in order to improve their learning outcomes. Most materials used by student teachers in the developing countries to study the psychological development of children are based on information from North American or European textbooks that deal with children growing up in those societies. Attempts therefore need to be made by the faculty at the teachers' colleges to allow their students to do field work studying local children so that they can begin to understand the behaviors and experiences of those who they will soon be teaching.
8. The effectiveness of teachers, even after they have completed their initial preparation, relates to the opportunities available to them to become continuous or lifelong learners. In many developing countries these opportunities are few, and once teachers have finished their formal preparation, especially in the rural areas, their chances to engage in additional professional growth-enhancing activities are limited or, in many situations, non-existent. Therefore, if teachers are to be encouraged to continue developing professionally after their initial training, the teachers' colleges might have to structure regular inservice programs for them by delivering courses even in the more remote rural areas.
9. Finally, teachers in developing countries are rarely, if ever, prepared to reflect on their own professional practice with a view to identifying their weaknesses in teaching and to engage in efforts to correct their deficiencies. Such reflection could provide the basis for improving their professional practice, especially if the teachers are also trained to engage in activities that can assist them with their own professional self-improvement.

Conclusion

I suggest that the increased effectiveness of teacher education programs in the developing countries could help improve the quality of education offered to their students. This in turn should eventually enhance the ability of the citizen-

ry—who have received the benefits of a more creative approach to teaching and learning as suggested in this article—to participate more effectively in the emerging global economy. This would help reduce the growing local and possibly even some of the widening global inequalities in the distribution of incomes and disparities in the living conditions both in their own countries and between the people in the North and those in the South.

One likely reaction to this position is to argue that it is expecting too much of teachers. However, as educators we need to accept the view, based on the experience of successful teachers, that they can and do make an important contribution in helping improve the lives of individuals in the developing countries.

The approaches to teacher education suggested in this article are being tried at the Institute for Educational Development (IED), Aga Khan University, which currently draws its students from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Tajikistan. The initiative at Aga Khan University is the beginning of an attempt to produce teachers who would eventually provide students in the South societies served by the IED with the kind of education described in this article.

It is expected that these teachers would better prepare their students to become more active citizens concerned with using their increasingly democratic political systems to ensure that the gross and growing inequalities and the marginalization of the poor are reduced. And although the faculty at the IED are not so starry-eyed as to believe that the teacher educators and teachers they graduate would solve the problems of development faced by developing countries, the goals that they are trying to achieve represent an expression of their continuing faith in the effective outcomes of more innovative approaches in education and their belief that teachers play an important role in that process.

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Neoliberal Project of Globalization: Prospects for Democratization of Education

Introduction

Since the early 1980s, neoliberalism has become the hegemonic ideology. Increasingly it has come to dominate and shape politics, economy, and public policy in general. Before its adoption as a guide to economic development and public policy in Thatcherite Britain or Reaganite United States, neoliberalism became a part of the ruling ideology of Pinochet's authoritarian regime in Chile. Its ascendancy expedited the process of globalization and gave it a powerful ideological edge. The ideological affinity between globalists and neoliberals has since become all but transparent. Both of these developments have proved to be powerful forces for structural transformations; starting first on both sides of the North Atlantic, they have now encompassed the whole globe. Are these transformations benign harbingers of a compassionate, humane, and just globalized society? Or, on the contrary, do they mark the beginning of colonialism in a new form and a different historical context? What does globalization of economies and the emergence of the market as the central organizing principle of social relations and collective life mean for the future of nationalism and the nation state? There has been an outpouring of literature in recent years that investigates these and other related questions.

In this article I first present a selected survey of the literature pertaining to the impact of these structural and ideological changes, particularly on the politics and economies of the Third World. Then I attempt to draw out the potential ramifications of these transformations for the future of public education systems in the developing world.

When one looks back over the past two decades, several economic and political developments catch the eye. In the West, the fiscal crisis of the state was soon followed by a prolonged crisis of capital accumulation. Multinational corporations grew rapidly, and capital and production were transnationalized. Concomitantly, neoliberalism in its Thatcherite and Reaganite forms rose and later was carried to the Third World countries by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as embodied in structural adjustment and monetary and price stabilization policies. The fall of the Berlin wall marked the end of the cold war in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union and allied Eastern European regimes. Regional alliances or free trade agreements

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emerged, and east Asia and the European Union rose to challenge successfully American economic hegemony. Perhaps of even more far-reaching significance are two other developments. The first is a set of structural changes in the global economy, including the debt crisis holding the Third World in its thrall and the associated process of *globalization*. The latter refers to “the process of gradual elimination of economic borders and concomitant increase in international exchange and transnational interaction” (Dolan, 1993, p. 259). The second development, profoundly ideological in character, is the emergence of the market (or capital) as challenger of the hegemony of the capitalist state, thus producing a kind of *crisis of hegemony*. This change in capital-state relations threatens to shift national control over political and economic developments to transnational forces. Globalization and the market’s challenge to the state hegemony are the consequence of, as well as a response to, the global crisis of the last 25 years, and they now condition its resolution.

What does it all mean for development in the Third World? This is the question this article discusses selectively and in no more than a schematic fashion. I focus on the impact of these worldwide changes on the structure of the Third World state. As well I consider the role and capacities of the Third World to respond to and incorporate popular needs and emancipatory social demands from the subaltern social groups into its development agenda. To conclude, I make some observations on what it all means for the future of educational development in the Third World context and for development in general.

State and Development

From the most ideologically charged variant of the discourse over state-versus-market debate, some advocates of neoliberalism have attempted to equate state regulation of capitalist economies to socialism by another name. It is difficult to believe, however, that they are serious, for the historical development of real capitalism cannot be understood without bringing in the crucial role of the expanding state in this process. Another element discernible in the current discourse of neoliberalism is the tendency to obscure the fact that the real debate is not about the role of the state in the abstract. Rather, it is about the role of the historically concrete state that has evolved as an integral part of the development of capitalism. In other words, at issue in this debate the role of the state in the era of globalized capital and global competition in the closing years of the 20th century.

The capitalist state that was consolidated in the 19th century and has since expanded considerably was until well into this century (1920s) a *liberal* capitalist state. Only subsequently did it change into a *liberal-democratic* state. Nevertheless, the tension between its *liberal* and *democratic* dimensions has never been fully dissolved; the recent rise of neoliberalism is an eloquent reminder of this fact. In the liberal state, full rights of citizenship—including the right to vote and to run for elected political office—were granted only to those in the civil society who owned property. This limit on the bourgeois democratic enfranchisement was justified on the grounds of a Lockian argument that only those who held property had a legitimate stake in the affairs of the state and, therefore, a legitimate claim to full rights. But the inexorable growth of capital-

ism produced large working classes and other social strata who did not, and had no chance of, owning productive assets or capital. The sole source of their livelihood was to be waged labor or salaried work. The internal contradictions of capitalism, the sheer growth in the numbers of those belonging to the nonpropertied classes, and the intensification of the class struggles that accompanied industrialization combined to result in universal franchise and full rights of political citizenship. But the development of capitalism did not naturally lead to the growth of liberal democratic state everywhere (Laxer, 1995b). The different trajectories taken by Germany and Japan should serve as a useful reminder, especially in the context of the debate over the “wave of democratization” that is ostensibly underway as a direct consequence of globalization.

Historically, the role of the capitalist state, whether merely liberal or both liberal and democratic, has been to guarantee and provide the necessary conditions for the orderly growth of capitalist enterprises and social relations. These conditions include full protection of private property and capital with the rights to its ownership and expanded accumulation; social stability and civic peace; and appropriate physical, social, and legal infrastructures. The development of public educational systems was part of this process of the production and reproduction of these necessary social and political conditions for capitalist development. Public schooling was an important piece of this infrastructure. Historically, schooling has been put to use by the liberal-democratic state to shape the subjectivities of its citizens. This has meant incorporating and installing therein elements of (a) respect and voluntary acceptance of bourgeois definitions of legitimate political authority, and (b) a routine acceptance of the normative validity of possessive individualism and the order of class relations in which it is rooted. Once developed in the context of a liberal-democratic state, public schooling tends to produce, as Carnoy and Levin (1985) have argued, a contradictory dynamic of its own: it is socially reproductive and democratizing at the same time. In this contradictory dynamic of schooling has lain its potential for social change. There is little doubt that this proposition is historically valid for the US, and can be deemed to be more or less so for other advanced capitalist societies. However, in the developing countries where the growth of the liberal-democratic state is more of an exception than the rule, an understanding of the transformations that are surfacing cannot be read off the historical experience of developed capitalist societies. In these cases the capitalist development (of both the state and the economy) is currently subject to the powerful impact of the twin forces of globalization and neoliberalism. Whether they are emerging state-market relationships, educational restructuring, or changes in civil society, their study requires systematic attention to the new context of globalism.

Thus far I have tried to establish two points. First, neoliberal rhetoric aside, capitalism, even the *laissez faire* variety, needs the state. Neoliberalism therefore argues for a state that can stand up to those elements of civil society that contest and challenge the rights that capital has always demanded, namely, to operate in completely untrammelled markets, that is, not necessarily a minimalist state. In the present context, then, neoliberalism does not demand the dismantling of

the state, but rather its *remantling* (Graf, 1995, p. 148) or, to use the language of contemporary managerial elites, its *reengineering*. Second, the development of capitalism has always required the agency of a strong state, whether liberal (democratic) or bureaucratic (authoritarian), as a necessary condition. Only the state can underwrite the provision of social and physical infrastructures and conditions needed for the growth of capitalism. In this regard, a crucial infrastructure facility needed for capitalist development is the universal provision of publicly organized education, to a certain minimal level at least.

Therefore, policies and attempts by supranational financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) that seek to restructure the state and to privatize its social sector activities (including education) in Third World societies may effectively impair the state's capacity to provide universal primary education for all. Such a generalized commitment at the level of policy to the privatization of social infrastructure on the one hand and, at the same time, an official commitment (World Bank) to pursue in a programmatic way the universalization of primary education on the other hand, draw attention to the inevitable contradictions and dilemmas that a neoliberal agenda of restructuring faces as it enters the contested terrain of development and of state-building and its remantling. The production of its preferred version of the possessive-individualist-consumer citizen requires the universalization of the primary level of schooling at least. Yet the World Bank promotes the withdrawal of the state from this arena when the state is the only agency that has historically been able to accomplish this task. Without the accomplishment of this "educational revolution," the success of the neoliberal project of shaping a market-dominated social order in Third World societies might be seriously threatened.

Recent Resurgence of Economic Liberalism

The rise to hegemony of neoliberalism in the West in general and its official adoption as the guide to policies of social and economic development as well as international trade seriously jeopardize the development prospects in Third World countries. The group of hegemonic industrialized countries (the G7), the most powerful international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF and the World Bank have relentlessly pursued the institutionalization of neoliberalism in the state and economy since the early 1980s. This pursuit has already resulted in devastating the poor, women and children, and the subordinate classes in general, and has increased absolute poverty. It has also radically altered the balance of class power, political relations, and alliances among various social groups. It has given rise to resistance to these changes from social movements involving women, waged workers, and peasants on the left to the religious fundamentalist groups on the right. Furthermore, it has been highly consequential in altering the role of the national state in development, poverty relief, and the provision of services related to human welfare in general. The immediate prospects for these countries—and especially for the poor, who constitute the majority of their populations—are bleak (Chossudovsky, 1991). Contrary to the expectations embedded in neoliberal discourse regarding the rapid strides in democratization that are tethered to its agenda of global economic transformation, these developments also threaten the future of

meaningful democratic political development in these countries (Bienefeld, 1994, 1995; Graf, 1995; Schmitz, 1995; Vieux & Petras, 1996).

Neoliberalism promotes and legitimizes increased globalization and the tighter integration of Third World national political economies into the international political economy. This integration is being aided and abetted by an international alliance of the IFIs and the G7 states since the early 1980s. What is the conceptual scaffolding that supports this ideology, the nature of the undergirding that shapes it and gives an internal coherence, if any? What is the overarching rationale? Drawing on Kabeer and Humphrey (1991), who address this question with particular reference to the development theory that is implicit in neoliberalism, I sketch out a brief overview of its theoretical and philosophical rationale.

Neoliberalism: Foundational Principles

What, then, are the main tenets of neoliberalism?

The neoliberal paradigm is a relatively recent offshoot of the broader and older intellectual tradition of economic liberalism. Several paradigms coexist within this tradition, sharing common methodological foundations, but differing in their enforced assumptions, derived results, and consequent policy prescriptions.... These differences bear on the status and significance accorded to states and markets in achieving economic development in the Third World.... Both the “trammelled markets” approach of earlier political economists as well as the weight given to market imperfections in neoclassical analysis permit considerable scope for state intervention in the development process. Neoliberal economists, on the other hand, favour the free market solution. They rest their case on empirical documentation of the high efficiency costs of bureaucratic intervention, including unproductive “rent-seeking” activities on the part of individuals, groups, and states. (Kabeer & Humphrey, 1991, p. 78)

It is clear that these economists advocate the *laissez faire* route to development in the Third World. That is, they assign a central role to market forces despite the imperfections of the market. They see private property and free enterprise playing an indispensable role at every level of society, from the individual to the global economy. In contrast, they envision the state playing only a minimalist role. To grasp fully the logic of a neoliberal position and make an assessment of the free market as a mechanism for achieving the twin goals of equity and efficiency in the development process, it might be helpful to examine the key methodological assumptions of neoliberalism and its implications for maximizing the social good.

Individualism, rationality, and self-interest are the three principal building blocks—the a priori assumptions—of the neoliberal paradigm. From these assumptions is

derived a particular view of individual behaviour that is then aggregated to build up a theory of society and the social order; in the process what sets out to be a positivist analysis of individuals and society—a description of what is—is transformed into a normative vision, i.e., private property and free enterprise are essential to ensure that individual decisions taken for private benefit can add up to the greatest good. (Kabeer & Humphrey, 1991, p. 79)

Two elements of this neoliberal paradigm are of particular interest in the context of this discussion: the normative nature of the neoliberal vision and the minimalist role of the state. The minimalist state argument is seriously flawed; it is ahistorical, as my discussion of the role of the state suggests. It needs no further attention here. But what about the normative aspect of the neoliberal position?

The normative status of this perspective is important to our argument. The neoliberal experts of development invariably justify their policy prescriptions in technocratic terms that tend to bestow “scientific” status on what is necessarily an ideological or political vision. The notion that neoliberalism embodies this fine fusing of the ideological-political with the scientific is important to understanding the claims to legitimacy that have been staked by the IMF and World Bank for their development policies (Samoff, 1992). Both these institutions have been irrevocably steeped in this perspective, at least since the early 1980s. The World Bank policy prescriptions for addressing the “crisis of development” in the Third World ostensibly rest on sound scientific research. Yet the research it commissions and consumes to make and justify policy bears the systematic imprint of the doctrinal, theoretical, and methodological choices that inform its overall agenda. The dominance of neoliberalism in the Bank’s policies or operations is no accident, nor is it inconsequential in shaping development thinking and/or agenda across the globe.

It is an institution whose basic policies are largely determined by the interests of a few affluent countries, whose lending is justified by the extensive research it commissions, and whose own analyses and development agenda have come to constrain and shape the entire development discourse. (Samoff, 1992, p. 70)

Why has the development agenda shaped by the neoliberal perspective already resulted in negative consequences for the developing societies over the past two decades? The answer lies, at least in part, in the concrete policies that most developing countries, crippled by international debt, have had to agree to adopt under the virtual tutelage of the IFIs since about 1982.

From Theory to Policy

Guided by the neoliberal paradigm, Western leaders have developed a shared vision of global transformation.

This vision has its roots in the Third World with the debt crisis that began in Mexico in August 1982, but it was greatly intensified in the wake of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that unfolded with stunning speed in 1989. By late 1990, a new world order had apparently arrived, only to be further certified by the demise of the Soviet state in August 1991. This vision of transformation is based on an alleged new consensus that has twin economic and political aspects. (Dolan, 1993, p. 261)

The economic aspect consists of the program of reform

with its stress on markets, competition, strong linkages to a world capitalist economy, and minimal role of the state—that will, with the help of the IMF and the World Bank, transform policy and bring development and prosperity to the Third and Second Worlds. (p. 261)

These economic changes will rest on “new globalized capital markets and a reborn trading order, so that the gap between the world’s rich and poor will not continue to widen” (p. 261). The IMF and World Bank emerge as powerful actors in this global drama. They assume a crucial role in the formulation of economic policies compatible with neoliberal directives, and, free to use all the instruments of compliance at their disposal, they take on a *proactive* role in monitoring and overseeing their implementation in the developing countries.

On the political side, the rapid spread of democratic political structures will bring freedom and dignity to formerly oppressed peoples around the world. These political changes will be supported by a reborn united Nations system, which will settle international disputes in a peaceful and orderly manner. (Dolan, 1993, p. 261)

In this vision, economic liberalization and political democratization are to take place simultaneously. Indeed, a mutually reinforcing synergy is posited between the two. In short, it promises emancipation, both political and economic prosperity, and freedom for all. But how true is this vision? How in touch is it with the economic and political realities of the world today? Might the state in fact have to play a more central role in economic transformation? Might this menu of economic reforms push the state and politics more toward authoritarianism than democracy? Might this agenda intensify impoverishment on a global scale, bring down the impoverished majorities in Third World countries to even greater state repression, and increase their powerlessness vis-à-vis the dominant institutions, social classes, and groups? Finally, might the citizens of the “freshly” democratized Third World nations find themselves even more disenfranchised while domestic and international elites “set their economic and social institutions right”?

These troubling questions notwithstanding, it is this vision and the underlying doctrine that are being promoted globally by the US and its allied states and by the transnationals. The promotion is effected through the well-coordinated set of macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment policies of the supranational institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. The IMF demands adoption and insists on the application of these macroeconomic policies by a large number of Third World debtor states, policies that bear the unmistakable imprint of neoliberalism. Furthermore, the mechanisms used to secure compliance approach market colonialism. Similarly the World Bank, which is also controlled by the major capitalist states, uses its enormous financial power, delicately fused with technocratically anointed and bureaucratically produced knowledge, to “persuade” in myriad ways developing country ruling elites to follow policies that are consistent with and rooted in economic liberalism. Infused with and energized by the neoliberal ideology, these two IFIs act as determined and consummate advocates and promoters of globalization. Indeed, the ultimate end these institutions appear to be pursuing is the rapid globalization of an international political economy that is dominated by market logic, and the concomitant marginalization of projects of national development that may express democratic choices and the political will of a Third World country’s own citizens.

Thus the Third World receives neoliberal doctrine not only in the form of textbook knowledge or as academic theory, but also as prepackaged policies they must follow in order to tackle the debt and balance-of-payments crises (Laxer, 1995a). What exactly are these policies? Were they really warranted? And what have been their consequences? Many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America faced these problems in the 1980s and still are saddled with them in the 1990s. The debt crisis itself was the product of a hot lending and borrowing spree that resulted from a combination of factors that included corrupt local or domestic elites, military dictatorships, and huge arms purchases from Western multinational firms often funded by bilateral aid agreements between recipient Third World countries and their First World counterparts. Other contributing factors were the two major oil price hikes between 1973 and 1982, economic recession and declining rates of return on investments in the West (Laxer, 1995a), and the consequent internationalization of financial capital in pursuit of higher returns elsewhere. In addition, the soaring interest rates that followed the unilateral abrogation by the US in 1971 of international arrangements for currency convertibility and the adoption by lending states of anti-inflationary monetary policies contributed to the dramatic growth of external debt burden of the Third World countries. The rhetoric of the vision and the stated intentions of the policy agenda aside, the policies appear to have served one supreme purpose, namely, they saved the international financial system from collapse and made international bankers feel more secure.

Financial transnational corporations (TNCs) and supranational trade agencies interested in promoting trade extended credit facilities. If poor countries would borrow from foreign commercial banks, western and Japanese, they could afford to buy more First World imports, thus providing badly needed stimulation to the economies of the latter. Lending institutions, in pursuit of profits, poured 15 billion dollars annually into Latin America alone between 1978 and 1981 (Laxer, 1995a). The lending boom halted when world oil prices slumped and Mexico, a major oil exporter, indicated it could no longer continue loan repayments. Subsequently, little new capital went to Latin America or other Third World countries. Since then the direction of capital flows has reversed. It is widely acknowledged that because of the massive burden of international debt, the Third World is now a net exporter (loser) of capital to the First World. Here are a few examples: Between 1985 and 1987, debt-servicing payments for 17 middle-income developing countries were approximately US\$345 billion (principal and interest) and the capital inflows, only US\$216 billion. For sub-Saharan Africa the situation was far worse: a net capital outflow of at least US\$40 billion annually was reported (Chossudovsky, 1991). Similarly, between 1982 and 1989, Latin America sent an average of US\$24 billion per year to the rich industrialized countries in the form of debt payments (Laxer, 1995a). All this has happened as a direct consequence of the deals worked out for repayment of debt by the US, the World Bank and IMF, and private banks with the debtor countries. These massive capital outflows not only produced more misery and impoverishment for the vast majority of the

populations of the South, but they also exacerbated the already serious debt crisis.

The growing debt crisis led to a decisive policy shift at the World Bank and IMF. This shift had characterized policy in the 1980s and subsequently became an integral part of the shared vision for Third World development that the Western leaders, as mentioned above, adopted from 1989 onward. The IMF-World Bank-sponsored macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment program (SAP) is an integral part of this vision.

What exactly is this IMF-sponsored framework and what is it supposed to accomplish? What are the real economic, social, and political consequences of its application in 70 or so different countries? The adoption of this program is explicitly tied into debt conditionality. In this context, it constitutes a powerful instrument of economic restructuring that adversely affects the livelihood of hundreds of millions of people.

Structural Adjustment: Two Phased Model

Structural adjustment invariably consists of two distinct phases. Short-term macroeconomic stabilization (implying devaluation, price liberalization and fiscal austerity) is usually followed by the implementation of a number of more fundamental (and so-called necessary) structural reforms. (Chossudovsky, 1991, p. 2529)

The short-term phase, concerned as it is with macroeconomic stabilization, has four components as follows:

1. Devaluation and unification of the exchange rate and the elimination of exchange controls and multiple exchange rates.
2. Curtailment of government expenditures in view of [sic] alleviating the budget deficit by resorting, if necessary, to the dismissal of public employees and drastic cuts in *social sector programs*.
3. Market liberalization within the national economy implying *inter alia* the elimination of subsidies and/or price controls.
4. Compression of real earnings through the deindexation of wages and the liberalization of the labor market. Whereas in most Third World countries wages are as much as forty times lower than in the advanced capitalist countries, domestic commodity prices are pushed up to (and in some cases above) their world market level. (Chossudovsky, 1991, p. 2529)

Adoption of these measures is a condition for the granting of bridge financing by the IMF and the rescheduling of external debt payments by the World Bank.

As to the second phase, the “necessary reforms” are often supported by the World Bank structural adjustment loans (SALs) and sector adjustment loans (SECALs). This package includes broadly the following:

1. Liberalization of trade and elimination of protective tariff barriers to “make domestic industry more competitive.” In reality, the liberalization of trade leads to the collapse of industrial production geared towards the internal market and the disengagement of real productive capital.
2. Liberalization of the banking system and the privatization of state development banks in agriculture and industry. The central bank loses control over monetary policy: interest rates are determined in the free market by the commercial banks.
3. Privatization of agricultural land through the issuing of land titles to farmers. This process supported by World bank SECAL in agriculture is conducive to the forfeiture

and/or mortgaging of land by small farmers, the growth of the agro-business sector, and the formation of a class of landless seasonal workers....

4. The streamlining of the state sector in view of eliminating "unproductive" expenditures, the introduction of cost recovery schemes in state programmes and the reorganization of state enterprises. These measures are marked by a massive dismissal of public employees. The process of streamlining invariably precedes the full-fledged privatization of public enterprises.
5. Privatization of the state enterprises including commercial, financial and industrial enterprises. The mechanics of privatisation differs [sic] widely. For highly indebted countries, it is often tied to the renegotiation of the country's external debt and the sale of the assets of public enterprises to foreign capital in exchange for debt. Foreign capital thereby obtains control over state enterprises with a minimal amount of actual investment.... In this context, the structural adjustment programme also constitutes a means for taking over the real assets of debtor countries....
6. The privatization of social programmes including health and education based on principles of *cost recovery* and the *withdrawal of the state from social sector programmes* [emphasis added].
7. Tax reform invariably including the introduction of a value added or sales tax and changes in the structure and direct taxation invariably implying a greater tax burden for the middle income groups. Included in the World Bank framework is the registration of small agricultural producers and units of the informal urban sector (i.e., the formalisation of the informal sector).
8. The development of poverty alleviation schemes. A social development fund is created to deal with the "social consequences" of structural adjustment. The poor are defined in this framework as "target groups." (Chossudovsky, 1991, pp. 2529-2531)

The all-encompassing and market-centered nature of these reforms notwithstanding, there is overwhelming evidence in the literature of their failure either to increase the rate of economic growth or to reduce the rate of inflation. The IMF's own research department is unable to refute the evidence that its economic medicine is not working. On the contrary, there is mounting evidence that it contributes to mass poverty, increases indebtedness, produces economic disarray, destroys the endogenous basis of economic development thus deepening dependence, and generates fundamental dislocations in the structure of the state (Bienefeld, 1995; Chossudovsky, 1991; Laxer, 1995a, 1995b; Schmitz, 1995).

These policies or programs constitute a powerful tool of economic and political restructuring that has further entrenched the process of accelerated global impoverishment, underway since the early 1980s. As a result, debtor nations lose national sovereignty and control over fiscal and monetary policy. State institutions, particularly in the social sector, are undone, whereas others (i.e., the repressive state apparatuses) dealing with social unrest and political dissent and instability win prominence. In effect, a parallel government that bypasses civil society is established by the international financial institutions with the cooperation of domestic elites. Intended or not, such restructuring has profoundly disturbing consequences. The social and institutional bases for establishing and exercising popular democratic control over state policies and instruments related to development policies and strategies, especially those with emancipatory and socially transformative potential, are systematically eroded and weakened if not irreparably damaged.

Because of their economic clout and success in reordering both the class relations in favor of capital and the propertied classes and the relative power of different branches of the state in Third World societies, the IFIs have emerged

as powerful actors in the political economies of these nation states. Governments that do not conform to the IMF's program targets, for instance, are blacklisted. When a country is blacklisted, investment and technology transfers are frozen, and export and import credits are often blocked. This encroaches on the normal conduct of international trade, the importance of which has grown even greater with the adoption of the policy package of export-led economic growth under the IMF/World Bank tutelage.

What do all these changes add up to in terms of the state-market relationship? How exactly do these forces *of* and *for* globalization and market liberalization impinge on the structure and future of the nation state and popular democracy? On the availability of, and access to, social services and the public provision of education in the societies of the Third World? Below I briefly turn to these questions.

Neoliberalism: Toward Remantling the State

As Graf (1995) points out, in the Third World the neoliberal

projects of globalization are experienced as the simultaneous processes of selectively dismantling all or part of certain institutions and functions of the state and internationalizing the political economy. But although all this dismantling and internationalization are accomplished more or less explicitly, the neoliberal project *implicitly* proceeds to remantle the state, as it were, in order to ensure its own realization. For instance, the institutions of the peripheral state ... that promote debt management, accumulation, structural adjustment, and surplus extraction have expanded considerably in recent years, while those concerned with popular rights and needs have clearly contracted. In addition to the military, the winners include state executive(s) ... bureaucracies, and departments of trade and finance, while ministries of health or labor and welfare institutions have atrophied. (pp. 148-149)

Insensitive to historical specificities and variations across societies, neoliberal remantling of the Third World state has been underway for a while. What specific changes has it wrought? Graf (1995) offers several propositions that sketch out the direction:

1. Markets, in a general and profound way, need states.
2. Markets in the Third World must be established for the most part with state power.
3. The local state therefore becomes, more than hitherto, a law-and-order state.
4. The neoliberal insistence on free trade, in particular, ensures the need for, not the rolling back of, strong state authority.
5. Neo-liberal solutions simultaneously create the need for a strong state while crippling the capacities that the state needs for carrying out these solutions.
6. The neoliberal project aims directly at discrediting and selectively dismantling the state in the Third World. (pp. 149-153)

It follows from the above survey that the current neoliberal transformations of Third World political economies are having three major effects. First, the changes "depoliticize" the national economic development projects in developing countries and place them out of reach of the popular will of their citizens. The purpose of SAP's conditions, after all, is to "free" from political intervention the vast arena of economic activity and power and to shrink the public sphere, not to encourage its democratic expansion. This amounts to rolling back the hard-won popular sovereignty of the peoples at the periphery

of the world system and, therefore, of democracy itself. At best, a formal liberal variant of democracy is what is envisaged. Such a democracy accommodates, first and foremost, the rights of domestic and transnational capital to operate freely across the economic terrain, or at least it is institutionally unable to intervene in, and exercise control over, that capital in the interest of the national community. Second, the neoliberal transformations remantle the state so as to restrict its functions to what the World Bank and such agencies prefer to see as merely problems of governance. The economic agenda is already defined and determined more or less externally by experts and agencies within the premises of economic globalization; the role of the state is to see that this agenda is carried out without courting excessive social unrest or political instability. On the social side, the state's essential role is limited to mitigation of the worst personal and social effects of the deepening class and power cleavages and antagonisms that are exacerbated by the neoliberal economic development agenda. Hence we see the creation of the "social safety net" fund and programs for the victims of the agenda's ugly but inevitable outcomes. Governance in this context of the reconfigured state comes to mean management by experts. This refers to the state's capacity to "successfully manage the prevailing capitalist economy of globalization, and notably to manage the resulting social tensions in such a way that the lid does not blow off and threaten the entire elite development regime of accumulation and legitimation" (Schmitz, 1995, p. 67). What is in the cards, at best, is the development of *low-intensity democracy* regimes. But the question is: will it work? Available evidence from Latin America to Africa suggests that it does not work. Adekanye (1995) insists that,

In a majority of the cases, SAPs have such a destabilizing effect on the governments concerned that the immediate reaction of most political leaders is to try to bolster their position through recourse to increased, rather than reduced, authoritarianism and militarization. The democratization upsurge on the continent (African) can be more accurately conceptualized as a continuation of the long-standing democratic struggle against the authoritarian state, which goes back to the anti-colonial times, or as a resistance to the new pauperizing conditions and problems generated by structural adjustment; or, most likely of all, the result of both. (p. 356)

Thus the assertions about democratization spreading as economic globalization paces ahead may be just that; they invite skepticism, not celebration. The third purpose of the neoliberal transformations is to weaken the sovereignty of the nation state and disarm it as an effective vehicle of social and economic development following an agenda constructed by national communities through democratic and open debate. To the extent that globalization alienates domestic capitalist classes from the national civil society and erodes state sovereignty, and there is considerable evidence that it does just that, it weakens the preconditions for the necessary link between capitalism and democracy (Bienefeld, 1995). It may even threaten the viability of the multiethnic, multilingual, postcolonial nation state (Patnaik, 1995). Ironically, although democratization is ostensibly moving apace, is *democracy* itself undergoing a hollowing out of its substance as its social-structural base shrivels?

Conclusion: Whither Education

I argue that neoliberal globalization is a class project. Its agenda includes transformations both in the economic and political spheres of national societies and in the international political economy. Decisive shifts in economic and political power in favor of the market (i.e., capital) accompany these transformations. In the context of the Third World societies, with few exceptions, not only have the majority of the citizens suffered a loss of power vis-à-vis the political authority, but the popular classes, the poor in particular, have experienced intensified impoverishment. The loss of political power is the result of the remantling of the state in a way that insulates and buffers it from any pressures from below, including segments of the middle classes. The intensified impoverishment is the consequence of a policy-induced decline in real incomes; the deregulation of essential commodity prices; the introduction of indirect tax levies; and the growing privatization of health, education, and other social services. In the name of controlling budget deficits, the costs of essential social services, which the poor can ill afford to pay, have been shifted to users by means of user charges and cost-recovery policies.

Specifically, how about the public provision of education? What changes are envisaged? Two distinct directions in which neoliberal policies for educational provision might move are discernible. The *dualization* of the public educational system is one. This refers to two parallel educational segments that are created in either a single publicly funded and controlled system or a combination of a public and a publicly subsidized private system. Of these, one would be poorly funded, offering education of marginal merit to the majority. The other would be well funded, offering superior quality education to the privileged minority. The *privatization* of education is the other possible direction, and this can take different forms: introducing cost-recovery policies but in a single public system; or combining cost-recovery with a policy that encourages the growth of private educational institutions alongside the public system. Ostensibly, the latter may be preferable because it permits "choice."

Longstanding fiscal resource constraints on the states in most of these countries, made worse by SAP's conditions in recent years, have generated new pressures for the full-blown adoption of these measures. The net effect of these policies, minimally, will probably be to annul whatever distributional potential education can have under conditions of equal access to all students, regardless of their class origins or family resources (Colclough, 1991; Samoff, 1992). Cost-recovery commodifies educational goods, thereby making access and use heavily dependent on the ability to pay. As a consequence, equity in educational provision is likely to decline sharply (Colclough, 1991). The World Bank has been for decades the preeminent international player in shaping educational policies at all levels of the educational system in Third World societies. It actively promotes these policy options (World Bank, 1994), using the obvious leverage it enjoys. Privatization, commodification, and unequal access to education—features that already mar the educational systems in question—will probably accelerate. They now enjoy a neoliberal ideological sanction and technocratic seal of approval from the intellectual-financial complex that the World Bank has helped to spawn and nurture.

The neoliberal project of globalization, it seems, will close off equal access to education not only for the growing ranks of the extremely poor, but also for a substantial segment of the middle class who are involuntary victims of the income squeeze. The neoliberal logic and policy agenda, rhetorically at least, is not indifferent to the issue of educational equity. But the available evidence offers little assurance that equity will be realized. Could this situation produce a "legitimacy deficit" for the state? For education everywhere is increasingly seen as an entitlement of social citizenship because of its putative link to productivity, nor is it valued less by neoliberals. But can the state get away with implementing this dispensation? Can it insulate itself enough from the political fallout and the rage of those unhappy with the outcomes? Will it listen? The answer depends on the accountability of the state.

The question of the accountability of the neoliberal state is ambiguous; quite possibly, in the dog days of the 20th century, the capitalist state in the periphery faces a neocolonial predicament. It must govern the society it is part of, but its policies are mandated by international forces. It must confront the question of legitimacy, of accountability. This brings me to Bacchus' latest book, *Education as and for Legitimacy* (1994). Because this article was originally presented as a paper in a conference organized to honor Professor Bacchus for his life work of scholarship, it is particularly appropriate to ask if there are any continuities at all between the theme of his recent work, which pertains to the latter half of the 19th century, and the questions raised here concerning the state and education at the end of the 20th century. The questions about the legitimacy, accountability, and autonomy of the state and how they connect with its educational policies are enduring and perennial. Striving to address them by situating them in specific sociohistorical contexts allows us the opportunity to learn some lessons from the past and explore some new possibilities for the future, which is altogether in tune with the theme of this issue of the *AJER*.

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The Impact of Neoliberal Restructuring on Education and Poverty in Latin America

*Preface*¹

The 1980s have been called the *lost decade* for the development of Latin America.² After high rates of growth since the 1950s, there has been a severe reversal in the past decade. In the 1960s the average annual growth rate of the Gross National Product (GNP) in the Latin American economies was 5.7%. During the 1970s this figure was around 5.6%, despite massive regional difficulties stemming from the problems of the international markets caused by the oil crisis. In the 1980s the growth rate fell to 1.3% which, given the rapid increase in the population, made the actual reduction in per capita income in Latin America almost 9%. In Argentina this negative turn was even more pronounced, with per capita income falling 22%, and in Brazil the reduction was around 5%. In 1990 the per capita income in almost all Latin America countries was less than the 1980 level, with the exception of Chile and Colombia where the figures were slightly higher (Comisión Económica para América Latina [CEPAL], 1990, 1991; World Bank, 1988).

The impact of the oil crisis in the 1970s was aggravated by several circumstances. First, it is important to remember the recession of 1981-1982 in the United States and the recession that characterized the industrial economies during a good part of the decade. In addition, increases in interest rates and the simultaneous fall in prices and demand for Latin American exports considerably worsened the region's economic situation. The external debt crisis that exploded in 1982 exposed the fragile underpinnings of the recent process of development that had been financed by imprudent external borrowing during the late 1970s. This resulted in the worst economic crisis in the region since the 1930s. This and the orthodox neoliberal policies made the increase of poverty in the region all the more evident. During the 1980s the per capita purchasing power of Argentines and Brazilians fell by about 30% and 6% respectively. At

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the same time, levels of unemployment rose and massive reductions were made in social expenditures.

More specifically, the *classism* and polarization of Latin American societies was considerably accentuated. In the metropolitan Buenos Aires of the 1980s, 25% of the poorest households lost 15% of their income, whereas 5% of the richest households increased their income by almost 20%. In the metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, 25% of the poorest households lost almost 13% of their income, whereas 5% of the richest gained approximately 25%. However, income losses were not experienced only by the poorest of the poor; 50% of households in the middle of the scale lost between 3% and 10% of their income (CEPAL, 1991). As a result, class structures in Latin America have become more polarized, with the gap between rich and poor growing wider. This is also true in Mexico and Chile where the ideologies of neoliberalism dictate the paradigms of structural adjustment. Despite the economic success of both Mexico and Chile, the poor are still becoming poorer and more numerous, while the gap between rich and poor is growing (Castañeda, 1993).

This dualization of class structure is not exclusive to Latin America. Rather, it is a generalized phenomenon found in all the varieties of capitalism that are inspired by the recommendations of the Washington Consensus. The same patterns with slight variations are found in the US under Reagan and Bush, and in the United Kingdom under Thatcher and Major.

In Latin America the gap between the rich and the poor has grown dramatically in the past 10 years. Despite its many defects, the post-World War II interventionist state proved capable of stimulating a vigorous process of import-substitution industrialization. The number of poor in the region was reduced slightly through policies that gave more people access to a minimum level of social services including health, education, and housing. Simultaneously, with the global demise of Keynesianism at the beginning of the 1970s, this inward-looking model of accumulation was exhausted. The resulting crisis led to adoption of the *orthodox catechism* promoted—not always for altruistic reasons—by international financial capitalists and allied classes. This situation translated into a stampede toward stabilization policies, structural adjustment, fiscal restraint, privatization, deregulation, and commercial liberalization. These policies were applied successfully by eager technocrats who believed that neoliberalism was the solution to Latin America's problems.

What the policies did without exception, even in the World Bank and IMF's so-called success stories of Mexico and Chile, was to cause a regressive transformation of class structure in Latin American societies. It is thus not surprising that between 1980 and 1986 the ratio between the richest 10% of households and the poorest 40% grew from 9:9 to 12:6 in metropolitan Buenos Aires, even before hyperinflation and the vicious adjustments imposed by President Menem. In Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo the gap grew from 21 to 26.6 during the same period, clearly reflecting growth of the Gini coefficients that measure inequality in the distribution of income (CEPAL, 1991). Detailed studies on Brazil show that 11% of urban households are indigent and 22.3% are poor. The situation in rural areas, especially in the Northeast, is much worse (Faría, 1992). On the other hand, estimates of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and the Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía (CELADE) indicate

that because there was no real per capita growth in the first half of the 1990s, approximately 60.5% of the population of Latin America, that is 292 million persons, are living below the poverty line. If this disturbing tendency persists, it is estimated that by the year 2000 the number of poor in Latin American will grow to 312 million (CEPAL, 1991). This situation is an overwhelming challenge as much for the intellect as for the practical life of our people and government agendas.

Thus to confront the regressive tendencies in the international economy and the debt crisis that began in 1982, the IMF, the World Bank, and the international financial community promoted adoption of neoliberal policies of stabilization and structural adjustment. In most cases these policies were not only suggested, but ruthlessly imposed on the weak and indebted countries of Latin America. Economic globalization, together with the policies proposed by agencies with international financial capital, profoundly and dangerously weakened the autonomy and self-determination of the Latin American nations. However, it is important to point out that the IMF and the World Bank represent and promote diverse yet complementary perspectives regarding the necessity to "modernize" Latin American capitalism. Whereas the IMF concentrates on financial flows and equilibrium of fiscal accounts, the World Bank is more concerned with assuring the irreversibility of certain structural reforms (Dehesa & Ruprah, 1985; Ferrer, 1985). Thus the short-term goals of the IMF policies are to reduce public expenditures and reduce or eliminate the deficit; apply strict monetary policies to control inflation; and maintain real interest rates and an "adequate" exchange rate.³ The medium-term objectives of the World Bank revolve around an ambitious program of structural reforms that lead to commercial liberalization; removal of trade barriers; deregulation of markets; reduction of government; privatization; an end to subsidies; primacy of a price structure free of state intervention; and growth created by the dynamic of the export sector (Bitar, 1988).

It has already been said in such supposedly innocuous sources as the document *Convergence and Community: The Americas in 1993. A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue* (Aspen Institute, 1992), that

The progress towards political democracy, hemispheric integration and economic growth will not progress unless parallel advances towards the goal of social justice are made. There cannot be an Inter-American community without strong national communities. This will stimulate the participation of all citizens in political life, provide a more equal distribution of economic opportunities and protect the rights of minorities, women, and the poor. Poverty and profound inequalities are interrelated problems which have been ignored for a long time. (p. vi)

Clearly the fight against poverty is a wide-reaching challenge that must be faced without delay.

The Troublesome Performance of the New Latin American Democracies

The accelerated impoverishment of large segments of Latin American societies has serious consequences for democracy and the implementation of plans for economic modernization and social reform. In fact few historical antecedents illustrate any likelihood of consolidating democratic political regimes where

poverty reigns. A high general level of poverty denies the citizens of the new democracies access to the minimal levels of social welfare that are in some cases—for example, in Brazil—constitutionally guaranteed both in the spirit and in the letter of the law. India is only one exception.

The problem of poverty in Latin America appears to be unsolvable given the onerous hegemony of neoliberal economic thought to which the ruling classes subscribe. Several studies have shown the dangerous contradictions that result from the juxtaposition of an excluding and marginalizing economic model against a democratic regime whose legitimacy rests on the expectations of political integration or effective citizenship in the masses (Boron, 1986, 1991). The contradiction between neoliberalism and democracy is far from a merely rhetorical problem. Rather, it is reflected in the great difficulties that face the Latin American democracies and their efforts to reconcile three fundamental aspects of democracy: equity, access, and representation. At the same time, these countries are faced with the crude realities that come from the desired and undesired effects of structural adjustment, especially where, almost without exception, the public sector is incapable of functioning at even a minimal level of administrative efficiency.

When the period of democratic transition began, there was great optimism in Latin America. Expectations were even higher in those countries that took significant steps toward democratic consolidation. The external debt was a formidable threat, but the governments that had enthusiastically embraced the new democracies of Latin America still had confidence in some type of miraculous solution to the region's problems. The military presence was underestimated, as were the continuous pressures from the establishment and from many corporate structures. Similar reactions tended to underestimate how difficult the constitution of a new civic culture could be in societies traditionally dominated by various types of authoritarianism. Thus poverty did not seem to be a problem with potentially serious consequences. "There has always been poverty in Latin America" was a commonly heard phrase, in disregard that in this region democratic governments were isolated and short-lived exceptions to domination by authoritarian rule. In fact it was not until the end of the 1980s that almost all the countries of Latin America could boast governments elected by universal suffrage. It is hard to forget the images of the riots in Venezuela, the dangerous social instability and growing urban violence in Brazil, and the precarious economic stability in Argentina. The seriousness of these situations is highlighted by recent economic studies about poverty and marginality. The interminable problems and the serious social tensions resulting from the stabilization and structural adjustment programs put in place in the region call one to profound reflection on the unjustified optimism of the early 1980s.

Studying the serious and abrupt geography of poverty in Argentina that occurred as a massive phenomenon in less than a decade reveals the extent of a process that can only have a negative impact on the consolidation of democracy (Boron, 1992; Gruner, 1991). Preliminary results of research in progress indicate that if the Argentine government abandons the neoliberal path that it has followed since Menem came to power, it will be forced to confront severe economic and political difficulties.

Three crucial problems stand out regarding the relationship between poverty and democracy, and each has direct consequences on the role that education can play in combating poverty. The first is a serious ethical issue, because the costs of stabilization and structural adjustment have fallen on the popular sectors. In spite of different styles, the basic premises of these policies have been similar in the different countries of Latin America: general reduction in social expenditures; taxation of income through increasing indirect taxes thus aggravating the regressive nature of existing tax structures; freezing of salaries, especially in the public sector; and more “flexibility” in labor markets, which is a euphemism for massive layoffs, unemployment, and underemployment until the percentage of unemployment in formal labor markets is greater than the percentage of employment (as in Nicaragua). The number of poor people is growing, poverty is reaching previously unknown levels, yet Latin American governments continue to demand more sacrifices from the poor (McMahon, 1995).

The second problem is economic. Is it necessary to force the popular sectors to reduce their income and patterns of consumption, as well as their expectations for individual and collective progress, in order to achieve the goals of economic reform and macroeconomic rationality? One need not subscribe to a catastrophic vision of the world to understand that an impoverished society will have difficulty expanding consumption. Such a society will also face serious obstacles to increasing its own competitiveness in the turbulent waters of international markets, where other nations’ competitive advantages stem from higher levels of education and health, and the quality of life in the work force. According to *The Economist* (1990), the successful cases of South Korea and Taiwan appear to confirm that equity and rapid economic growth go hand in hand. China is another example. Unfortunately, the neoliberal governments of Latin America subscribe to a doctrine that implies that growing social inequality is a necessary incentive for increased investment and the recuperation of economic growth. This belief has been completely refuted by the economic history of the past 50 years in countries that are in the center as well as on the periphery.

The third problem is related to the effects of orthodox adjustment on the ideological foundations of the new democracies. In Latin American societies, the principle of democratic legitimacy has not been as strong as in other regions. As recent events in Venezuela show, large segments of society have no great confidence in democratic regimes. At the end of Carlos Andrés Pérez’s term as president, almost 40% of a representative sample of the population expressed indifference regarding the future of the democratic regime. The respondents showed the same indifference regarding either the possible triumph of a rebel leader or the continued leadership of President Pérez. A related yet more pronounced tendency can be found during the first months of the presidency of Fujimori in Peru. The weakness and instability of the ideological foundations of democracy are a serious obstacle to its consolidation as a political system, especially as democracy requires a relatively high level of confidence in its administrative efficiency and a positive attitude regarding its capacity to represent the general interests of society.

Nevertheless, these dangerous tendencies will not necessarily lead to the collapse of democracy. The economic reductionism dominant in certain visions of the social sciences (on the left as well as the right) during the 1970s has been disproved by the permanence of Latin American democracies during the tumultuous 1980s. Some recent empirical research has shown convincingly that, at least in the short term, economic crises do not necessarily precipitate the disjuncture of democratic regimes (for a broader discussion of this point, see Torres, 1995). Furthermore, the Latin American democracies have demonstrated an unexpected strength. Although these observations may alleviate premature anxieties about the current situation, in the medium run democratic governments that remain indifferent to the urgent needs of the poor and to growing poverty may be digging their own graves.

Western political tradition speaks with one voice on this matter: The astounding levels of poverty are incompatible with the spirit and practice of democracy and freedom. Plato (1963) criticized oligarchic governments of the *polis* because of the coexistence of two cities in one: The city of the poor and the city of the rich, “a permanent conspiracy of one against the other,” the mother of all the disorder that abolishes liberty (paragraphs 551.d, 552.d). Almost 2,000 years later Rousseau theorized about the conditions that would bring about democracy and freedom. To achieve these objectives, he recommended the reduction of class differences so that society would reflect “a large measure of equality in rank and fortune, without which equality of rights and authority cannot long subsist” (1968, p. 55).

Are Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil reaching the limits of this condition that the Western political arguments consider antagonistic to the functioning of democracy? The response is troublesome. Many are looking to education—the great social equalizer—for an answer to the poverty and the growing dualization of Latin American societies. In the following section we discuss some of the theories about education and poverty.

Theories about Education and Poverty

Liberalism and Human Capital Theory

The euphoria of the post-World War II period fostered the spread of liberal options, and even more, social-democratic options as opposed to fascism and communism. These social-democratic concepts conveyed a vision of the world that placed great importance on the role of education in promoting equal opportunities. It is not surprising that both fascism and communism had proposed to reform the educational systems of the reconstructed democracies in Europe. Parallel and complementary economic doctrines such as the economic theory of Keynes paved the way to a mixed economy where the role of markets was counterbalanced by fiscal and monetary policies and planning. In the educational terrain, human capital theory helped to justify educational spending as part of a long-term strategy for economic growth.

Thus planning and tremendous educational expansion in the advanced industrial societies played a central role in the Keynesian welfare state. This state, which lasted for a quarter of a century, was able effectively to neutralize the self-destructive tendencies of capitalist development. On the other hand, the end of colonialism and the emergence of the postcolonial state in Africa and

Asia, the presence of a widespread global surplus of capital, and—in the discursive arena—the diffusion of theories of modernization and human capital all reinforced the unprecedented expansive tendencies of public education worldwide (Carnoy, 1977; Carnoy & Samoff, 1990; Fagerlind & Saha, 1983; Russell, 1989; Selowsky, 1980; Torres, 1990).

Liberal (progressive) educators proposed the idea that educational systems had three main functions: moral and cognitive socialization; the acquisition of skills and *destrezas*, or training, for the workplace; and certification. These functions contributed to a rational assignment of resources and social mobility (Banks & McGee Banks, 1993; La Belle & Ward, 1994). The education of individuals with universal cognitive skills was considered essential, and the functions of economic and political socialization were deemed necessary for the welfare of individuals, as well as for communities and societies as a whole.

Human capital theory suggests that educational systems fulfill an important distributive function in preparing individuals for different roles in the social divisions of work and facilitating the efficient assignment of talent through competitive selection of the most skilled. The idea of this economic function of education is based on its capacity to produce human capital. Many arguments of neoclassical economic theory rest on the presupposition of marginal returns: Higher levels of education would generate higher levels of productivity in the work force and, consequently, greater income for the workers. Finally, the role of the school in political socialization is seen as indispensable for the integration of society and social control. With the notion of social differentiation, ascriptive status is legitimized through academic accomplishments and converted into acquired status.

Critics of this theory suggest that because of the social policies implemented by the welfare state planners, the transmission and legitimation of inequality may have been a latent function or unwanted consequence of schooling, resulting in particular teaching practices and curricular content. For example, the debate in the US about tracking, or differentiated teaching-learning tracks, shows that school experiences vary according to the social class of students and that the curriculum promoted by the segregationists' policies negatively affects students of color, women, immigrants, and working-class students (Oakes, 1985).

Many of the liberal (progressive) policies in the US had an influence in Latin America. One of the best examples is the War Against Poverty. Its programs were based on a series of assumptions that proposed that (a) the elimination of poverty in the US simply required helping children who were born into poor families to escape from their situation, assuming that it was not possible to fall back into poverty; (b) the main reason that children did not escape from poverty was that they did not acquire the basic competences and cognitive abilities necessary for economic and social success; and (c) the ideal, efficient mechanism for breaking the vicious cycle of poverty was educational reform based on compensatory programs for families and communities who needed them, thus helping them to maintain a minimum level of income (Jencks, 1972).

Through educational planning and social engineering, the liberal-functional theories of educational reforms strengthened programs for the advancement of individuals and the Civil Rights movement, promoted the

equality of educational opportunities, and secured a better distribution of resources. In the US, in particular, the problem of inequality was related to the effects of race and ethnicity in the educational sphere. Returning to the functionalist theory of stratification, liberalism justified the rationality of a hierarchy of compensations and rejected the notion of absolute equality. Meanwhile, paradoxically, liberalism placed equality of educational opportunity at the center of the civil rights movements and of the proposals to increase the efficient use of human resources. The defeat of the functionalist theory was a result of its inability to explain the lack of educational opportunities and to suggest plausible alternative strategies for achieving those opportunities.

Neoconservative and Neoliberal Perspectives

The overall disillusionment produced by the inadequacies and failures of North American educational liberalism led theorists toward a more pessimistic and neoconservative position. The recent book *The Bell Curve* by Herrnstein and Murray (1994) is a good example. On the other hand, radical critics of liberalism have held various positions that, even though they may be marginal and divided, are close to a democratic left in education (Morrow & Torres, 1995).

The neoconservative state is an ideological response to the social welfare state and is a model of public policy opposed to the supposedly ideologically bankrupt liberalism (for a more in-depth discussion, see Torres, 1995).

Two themes that tie together education and poverty stand out in the neoconservative ideological agenda, as well as in the related agenda of neoliberal economics. The first is the issue of minimal government, which considers the question of citizens' choices about how their taxes should be spent in education. The model of choice, that is vouchers, implies that education should be submitted to market laws and mechanisms, thus limiting the regulation established by the state. The privatization of education appears simultaneously as an intent to relegitimize state actions in the provision of services. In addition, privatization transfers the costs of these services to users, borrows administrative and managerial techniques from the private sector, uses cost-benefit analyses and "management by objectives," and ignores the bureaucratic disagreements that do not lead to any type of accountability or control of substantive accounts.

Because the market and the state are no longer considered as two diametrically opposed social systems or as two moral options for the exercise of interests and passions, all the educational programs of the welfare state that confront the issue of poverty are now considered part of the problem. In the first place, the educational programs supposedly produce dependencies, encourage people to look for donations and handouts, are a disincentive to look for work, and discourage individual responsibility. Second, because these programs are expensive, they contribute to the increased fiscal deficit of the state. Although the neoconservative solution to poverty lies in education, it is a certain type of education that leads to discrimination based on the role of the market discriminating between unequal talents. Constraints of space make it impossible to discuss here the enormous repercussions this has for discussions about multiculturalism.

Privatization and choice, the neoconservative solutions to the problems of poverty and education, lead to a dilemma. First, how can individual autonomy be promoted simultaneously with public obligations to defend the democratic pact? In the end, the defense of social spending on public obligations limits individual autonomy, which is the source of all solutions to social problems. A second contradiction, associated more with neoliberalism as a political and economic version and intimately linked to neoconservatism, is that between individual preferences and the notion of rational public or social choice. In capitalism there is an emphasis on the individual who orders his or her preferences with total autonomy. Is it, then, possible to believe in the existence of a state where individuals and groups negotiate their autonomous preferences? In programs that attempt to eliminate poverty, autonomous preferences are often neglected as a function of a rational public choice. The programs contradict the philosophy of possessive and rational individualism advocated by neoconservatism, and to a certain extent by neoliberalism. A discussion of personal preferences linked to mechanisms of social solidarity here would lead away from the central objectives of this article, although such a discussion would open a fertile and relevant debate about the link between poverty and education.

The Liberal Social Democratic Perspective

The reception and appropriation of functionalist theories was widespread in the industrialized countries during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In many of these countries there were strong political parties (*importantes partidos*), social democratic governments, powerful labor unions, and in some cases important communist parties. In Europe the existence of a conservative tradition in education and in politics facilitated the combination of progressive education (the “new school”), comprehensive and egalitarian secondary schools, and a higher education system with open admissions policies (e.g., the Open University). Because of this combination, the functionalist educational theory, which was born from the heart of liberalism, came to be associated with the radical educational reforms promoted by social-democratic forces. This is ironic because labor parties and social-democratic parties were promoting policies based on functionalist theory from North America and on empirical analyses of social mobility that were part of the research on status attainment. These policies in turn were used to oppose the demands of the defenders of traditional elitist education (Morrow & Torres, 1995).

One of the most significant examples is the case of Great Britain, where the roots of the sociology of education can be traced to the work of an eminent German sociologist who fled the persecution of the Nazis. The influential thesis of Marshall (1950) about the social welfare state and his questioning of the concept of citizenship permitted a new reconciliation of the notions of liberty and equality in a democratic society. These notions were also complementary with Mannheim’s social planning perspective (Marshall, 1950). Thus the existence of a powerful labor movement helped place equality of educational opportunities at the top of the governmental agenda while problems related to efficiency and waste of human resources also became central topics (Jerome & Halsey, 1977).

However, this curious amalgam of social-democratic policy, technocratic functionalism, and empirical educational research omitted certain central considerations. For example, it did not include the idea that schooling and society are greatly influenced by cultural mediations that would later be developed as “cultural capital” by the distinguished French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. It also ignored the fact that there were serious contradictions, some the same as those inherent in capitalist development, embedded in the attempt to impose radical educational reform in an interventionist social welfare state. Thus this liberal social-democratic perspective on education was not able to resolve the troublesome relationship between poverty and education because the “policies based on a sociological understanding did not produce the expected results of removing or eliminating inequalities. On the contrary, they seemed to produce, with monotonous regularity, the same or similar educational results” (Boron, 1991, p. 130).

Concluding Comments:

Eight Theses about the State, Poverty, and Education

Poverty is affecting more and more people each day. In Latin America now “new poor” are joining the traditional poor: those who belong to rural, oppressed, marginal, or indigenous groups. The new poor include, in disproportionate numbers, female heads of households, street children, retired persons and senior citizens, and unemployed youth. All of these people have incomes that are irreversibly marginal, segmented, and vulnerable, especially in the context of peripheral capitalism.

The problems of the quality of education, access, retention, and relevance continue to be central and problematic issues for education even with the deceleration of the growth and “massification” of educational systems. However, the problems of education cannot be resolved except by dealing simultaneously with the problem of poverty and the segmentation of the Latin American societies that it is causing.

A corollary to the preceding thesis argues that, contrary to the predictions of the World Bank, the provision of education regardless of the type or level does not decisively contribute to reducing poverty. High unemployment in the popular sectors, which also have a relatively high level of education, appears to be endemic to Latin America. Even if one believes that education will by definition reduce poverty, the next question is how to reach the more and more unreachable populations. For example, how do we reach and provide educational services to street children in Brazil?

The theoretical model of rational choice theory is not useful for solving the problem of poverty. First, promoting the equality of educational opportunities does not guarantee a true equality of choices. Second, it is inconceivable that poverty can be reduced without ameliorating the quality of education. The dilemma is the following: How is it possible to provide quality education to children who, even if they are included in the educational system, suffer from malnutrition, come from homes without material resources, and have serious limitations in terms of symbolic resources and cultural capital, especially in comparison with children who attend “good” schools? Furthermore, these children have limited existential time to progress in the educational system, because sooner or later

they must incorporate themselves into labor markets, nonformal or informal, without finishing their education.

Third, it is not possible to make gains in the far-reaching provision of free, quality, and relevant education if there is no serious commitment on the part of the state in collaboration with the institutions of civil society. In addition, the state and the institutions of civil society should advocate for the continuation of massive, compulsory, free education in spite of the skepticism expressed by our third thesis. The dilemma can be rhetorically restated thus: Education cannot resolve the situation of poverty, and poverty continues to be an impediment to achieving quality education. Still, education must be provided to the largest number of children, adolescents, and adults as possible. Contrary to the affirmations of neoliberal thinkers, *education is necessary, yet insufficient for eradicating poverty*. Instead of simply educating people to be better citizens and better producers, it is necessary to attack the roots of the economic structures of capitalist societies, its relations of production, and the forms of the classist distribution and appropriation of surplus and profits. This is where the true battle against poverty should be directed.

If the foundations of the state are altered by policies that reflect an instrumental rationality or by an educational system that reflects only market mechanisms, educational budgets will be drastically affected and the causes and consequences of a general process of impoverishment will worsen. The notion that education can combat poverty (individual more than structural) was part of a project of the state based on a democratic pact and a consensus (e.g., the constitution, the wars against poverty, the extension of social services) that legitimized the liberal democratic state of the post-World War II period. Furthermore, from a strictly neoliberal perspective it is possible to question the hypothesis implicit in this discussion, that it is necessary to use the educational system and educational resources to fight poverty. After all, goes the reasoning, schools should teach those who have the ability to learn, and the dynamic of the market allows for optimal distribution of resources and a satisfactory matching of talents and compensation.

A corollary to this thesis concerns the coexistence of an unstable and precarious democracy and of poverty, such as in the case of India and the experience of Brazil, leading to the phenomenon of *Belindianization*. Belindianization occurs when some citizens enjoy goods and services as if they lived in Belgium and coexist with others who suffer the hardships of life as if they lived in India. The Belindianization of Latin American societies has repercussions at different levels. On one hand, there are issues of social and political stability at minimum levels of social welfare resulting in sporadic social upheaval; on the other hand, there are regional considerations. Given the nonhomogeneous globalization of capitalism, certain regional economies are temporarily or permanently disadvantaged with regard to international competition. They are also excluded from the national, regional, and international circuits of accumulation, production, reproduction, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. Finally, widespread *Belindianization* will affect the ethical-moral level of societies by severely challenging the principles of solidarity and community.

Legitimate consensus presupposes a sovereign and autonomous state with the capacity to control the variables that affect poverty, such as prices, salaries, unemployment, inflation, health, and education. Globalization affects the autonomy of the state and makes the economies and governments of the Third World more dependent. As subordinate countries are drawn into the international capitalist economy and the regulations established by powerful institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs), the accountability of the technocratic sectors that manage national processes of development is also affected.

By subordinating the national state to the dynamics of the international market, the theory and practice of democracy as developed from the origins of the nation states in the 16th to 18th century are affected. The possibilities of fighting poverty with mechanisms other than social control, the invisible hand of the market, or charitable “assistentialism” are also limited.

One of the central themes to resolve in the relationship between poverty and education is the need for community solidarity as opposed to the development of possessive individualism. Education and its role in the construction of a civic conscience can be crucial in helping to reduce poverty. Technical prescriptions for education simply seek to adapt education to the mechanisms of the market through individual selection. They advocate an education that helps the winners in society, for example, Reich’s (1991) highly educated symbolic analysts, to be more competitive and to produce a surplus that can be distributed through taxes. Surely the educated civic conscience would find other ways.

Notes

1. See Boron and Torres (1994).
2. The 1980s are considered lost in terms of economic growth, especially with the reduction in the overall gross national product and growing disparities in the distribution of income. However, it was also during this time that certain sectors of the Latin American financial and industrial bourgeoisie, especially those associated with the businesses and investments of the Latin American states, took substantial advantage of investment contracts and state protection through fiscal incentives for market protection. We point this out to avoid the commonsense version of a systematic drop in income when in reality this drop was not uniform for all sectors of the Latin American populations as the use of the term *lost decade* seems to imply. Groups of the economic and political elite became much richer and diversified their businesses in a disproportionate way.
3. The economic thinking about structural adjustment is diverse. It is possible to find the rationalist analysis of supply and demand (a synthesis between structuralism and post-Keynsianism), best represented by the work of the World Bank. There is also a more pragmatic and more radically neostructuralist approach represented by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). Finally, there is the so-called tendency toward “adjustment with a human face,” dominant in UNICEF and the Society for International Development. See, for example, Ffrench-Davis (1988).

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Economic Liberalization and its Impact on Women and Women's Education

There is an ongoing debate about the probable positive and negative gender impact of newly introduced economic liberalization programs in several Third World (South) countries. In this article I discuss the implications of those policies on the lives and education of women. I attempt to address the social and economic implications of such macro economic restructuring for women in India.

More empirical research needs to be done to investigate women's education and employment opportunities as a result of economic restructuring. There is an urgent need for data about the impact of liberalization policies on women's social status; access to education, training, and employment opportunities; and institutional protection (harassment and legislation). There are, for example, implications not only for countries of the South, but also in the North because of the effects of structural adjustment policies such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

What is Economic Liberalization?

Economic liberalization refers to economic and industrial restructuring along the lines of capitalism, in which private ownership, profitmaking, and a market framework regulate activity. In countries of the South it has taken the form of neoliberal packages of adjustment measures associated with financial support from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). The current economic strategies attempt to combine stabilization and structural adjustment under an overall umbrella of liberalization. Whereas stabilization is the short term attempt to stabilize the economy in a balance of payments crisis, structural adjustment refers to the medium- and long-term changes in the productive structure that would make an economy internationally competitive.

Evidence from Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia (Bourguignon & Morrisson, 1992; Cornia, Jolly, & Stewart, 1987) indicates that these policies have adverse effects on the vulnerable subgroups of society, such as women. India has undergone changes along these lines over the past two decades. Although economic liberalization programs have been viewed as essential for economic reasons, there is much debate in India about how the negative impact on society, in terms of barriers to equality, can be minimized.

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Conceptual Framework

Neoclassical and structuralist economic theories consider only the paid economy. They are not concerned with the processes by which people are sustained and reproduced, nor with how the labor force is brought into being and maintained. For example, the United Nations Development Program Human Development Reports emphasize consumption of food, health care, and education as essential inputs of productive human capacity.

Although it is not deliberately designed to favor men, the design of economic liberalization policies and liberating market forces considers only the productive economy (paid labor) and does not take into consideration the reproductive economy or unpaid labor. The policies and forces are, therefore, structurally biased against women, as it is women who undertake most of the unpaid work in society.

Economic liberalization brings vitality and competition, but the profit motive in market forces puts women in a vulnerable position. The power structure puts women at a disadvantage because it encourages traditional roles such as reproductive work—cooking and cleaning, managing households, caring and nurturing family members. This structure limits women's ability to undertake other forms of work and skill training, and restricts the education and achievements of girls.

In liberal feminist theories, gender inequalities tend to be explained in terms of traditional attitudes and socialization. The role of the state in creating and reproducing gender relations through modernizing policies is ignored. Hence solutions are sought in terms of education and empowerment that ignore the position of women in relation to the national and global economy.

Feminist critical perspectives, however, concentrate on the micro level in order to examine and uncover processes at the level of the family and the individual. Specifically, there are five concepts to consider. First, women's unpaid labor is implicitly regarded in macroeconomic policy as elastic, able to stretch to make up for any shortfall. However, women's unpaid labor is not infinitely elastic and may reach breaking point (Elson, 1993). Second, the problems concern the sexual division of labor and the social construction of male/female work and relative monetary rewards. This means that the burdens of the reproductive economy (population, health, nutrition, education, development of skills) fall mainly on women. Third, the family is an area of cooperative conflict, inequality, and mutuality where conflict and inequality are structured along gender lines, because women tend to make concessions for the good of the family. The resulting subordination of women constrains their choices (Sen, 1990). Fourth, relationships that are not in themselves intrinsically gendered nevertheless become "bearers of gender" (Whitehead, 1979). For example, monetary and commercial relations are not gender ascriptive, but gender inequality permeates the institutional structure. Similarly, education is no longer gender ascriptive, but inequality is obvious in educational relations. On the other hand, family and kin relations are gender ascriptive.

The Situation in India

In India the aspects of liberalization that began in the 1980s have been consolidated since 1991 with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund

requirements for Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). India, which accounted for 844 million people in 1991, has vast natural resources and a large domestic market. It has had a market-oriented, mixed economy since achieving independence in 1947, low per capita income and life expectancy, high mortality rates, and an economy characterized by industrial development. Literacy is still low: female literacy was 32.6% in 1991. In 1991 India's economic growth was 4.5%, and the rate tripled by 1994. The democratic structure makes India the world's most populous democracy, giving more freedom to people but resulting in high income disparities. An article entitled "Now We Are on Our Own" (1994) reported that 40 million Indians have annual incomes of US\$600,000 (in terms of purchasing power). In addition, 150 million people have incomes equivalent to US\$20,000. This group of 190 million Indians offers a great market for consumer goods such as color televisions, electrical appliances, and cars.

India is trying hard to provide a stable environment for foreign investment despite various social and political problems. Multinational corporations look not only for huge local markets, but also cheap production bases. Local scientific infrastructure—a large pool of educated and technically well-trained people—also attracts collaborative ventures. For example, India is now the world's second largest computer software exporter, and the stock market index has risen by 100% since 1991.

Women's Status

A number of constitutional provisions relate to the rights and status of women. These include equality provisions, health services, maternity care and benefits, employment protection regulations, and equal pay for women. Since India's independence, education has been an essential component of national development.

Evidence suggests that although widespread changes in women's position (especially in higher education) have taken place since independence in 1947, inequality in education and employment is still pervasive. As in many other Asian countries, there is a strong preference for boys over girls. Although there are no visible constraints, social norms, role conflict, and discrimination in the home and employment (often subtle) prevent equality of opportunity to women and girls. Modernization creates conflict and commodification lowers the value of women, which results in female infanticide, increased dowries (forbidden by the constitution), and trafficking in women.

The Impact of Structural Changes on the Lives and Education of Women

A considerable amount of literature examines economic liberalization policies in some developing countries from a gender perspective, but not in relation to education. Most studies are at the broad societal (macro) level (Elson 1991; Moser, 1989; Palmer, 1988, 1991). There is general agreement in the literature that although there are increased job opportunities due to the feminization of the work force, during the liberalization period it is women who bear the cost of the transition. The dominance of market processes undervalues anything that is not directly calculable in terms of money.

Evidence from countries that have had structural adjustment policies for some time (Bourguignon & Morrisson, 1992; Cornia et al., 1987) indicates that several policy elements affect women and education. I discuss five of these elements below.

A sharp reduction of budget/fiscal deficit. This requires a reduction of subsidies for activities not valued by the market, leading to cutbacks in formal sector jobs, especially in the short run. The result, first of all, is a decline in the waged employment of male members and feminization of the work force leading to a decline in total household income and a double burden of work for women. Second, restructuring the public service transfers work from the paid to the unpaid economy. For example, cutbacks in health and education shift the burden of health care and pre-elementary education to the community and household. Recent research done in Zambia, for example, indicates that women could not “afford” to be ill because of the time they spent caring for other household members. Thus the social obligations of women constrain and sharply reduce their ability and availability to undertake education, training, and other forms of work. Overwork for mothers restricts the educational achievement of their children, particularly of girls, because they have to help with household activities and earn more income. The overall effect on women has implications for the production and maintenance of human resources (children), and the intrinsic value of human resource development is ignored.

Third, in education budget cuts translate into fewer resources. This results in differential access to opportunities, which in itself affects the quality of education. In addition, teachers’ salaries are further reduced. Recent policy trends in India show that budget allocations to education have decreased. This is conspicuous in the reduction of the education budget by almost 50% from 7.86% in the First Plan (1951-1952 to 1955-1956) to 3.5% in the Seventh Plan (1985-1986 to 1989-1990). In fact, after Bangladesh, India ranks among the lowest in the funds it allots for education as a percentage of the GNP (115th in the world, UNDP, 1993). More importantly, the percentage allocated for elementary education in the overall education budget has decreased from 56% in the First Plan to 29%. This affects girls more seriously than boys because girls decrease in number at the higher levels of education.

Over a 33-year period (1950-1951 to 1987-1988), the number of primary schools increased by two and a half times, whereas other educational institutions increased in number by nearly 10 times. Of the 543,677 primary schools, 2,628 functioned without a teacher and as many as 148,033 had only one teacher. Nearly one third of the total number of primary schools had only two teachers each (Jolly, 1992). With the implementation of SAPs, these trends may increase, thereby widening the socioeconomic gap and negatively affecting both the quality and the quantity (measured in human and physical resources) of education. Scarce resources result in less education for women because of the focus on the education of male children.

Opening domestic markets to competition. The role of education is reduced in favor of market prices because competition turns education into a consumer item. Competition inherently favors men who are socialized to the required behavior. Although a market-oriented approach opens opportunities for

women, it also tends to make new demands on women and to increase their work. Increasing stress and greater independence for women have resulted in rising divorce rates and have implications for children's education.

The "magic of the market" also leads to a sharp increase in consumerism. In addition, Western values and norms conveyed through the media are redefining what is "desirable" in women, resulting in a huge increase in cosmetic-related production and business. The emphasis with respect to the means of achieving success is on physical rather than educational standards.

Privatization. Privatization typically reduces the individual social rights of employees (also because employment shifts from the formal to the informal sector), and certainly reduces the collective rights of citizens because of reductions in social services such as education. Privatization reduces women's social as well as institutional protection, due to the withdrawal of government intervention, thus allowing unbridled profit to prevail as the driving motive. The privatization of education polarizes groups because it favors money over merit. It is particularly disadvantageous to females because the costs involved result in restricted opportunities, more emphasis on traditional roles for women, and segregation in education. The use of capitation fees, for example, for professional colleges has tremendous implications for women's professional training in India.

Devaluation of the national currency. Inflation and devaluation of the national currency (usually a component of economic restructuring) results in rising prices, especially for food, making daily living more difficult for the majority of women. The distribution system puts pressure on the availability of food in households. High prices affect the nutritional levels of people, especially women who keep the worst for themselves and their daughters. Increases in food prices also result in added pressure on women as they spend more time shopping for lower prices. Economy in the preparation of food requires more labor because it is cheaper to make food (such as bread) than to buy ready-made foods.

In terms of education, an increase in school fees means that girls tend to drop out in greater numbers and join the labor force, paid or unpaid.

Global economy. Finally, greater economic integration of the global economy is changing the structure and conditions of employment. In India there is increased reliance on part-time, nonunionized labor. There are significant shifts in the occupational composition of employment across all sectors of the economy, especially in professional, technical, clerical, and other specialized occupations. The use of more technology puts women at a disadvantage because they are least likely to be technologically literate. Moreover, the globalization of commodity trade and the emergence of new technologies such as biotechnologies are likely to affect the women's lives more than they do men's.

Conclusion

The combination of measures involved in liberalization has specific effects on women in particular, because the dominance of market processes undervalues anything that is not directly calculable in terms of money. Two immediate educational outcomes of economic liberalization are privatization and budget

cutbacks, both of which affect women more than men because they result in differential access to education as well as affecting the quality of education. Overall, the effects of such policies on women's roles are said to lead to increased demands on women's already overstretched time and have adverse effects on women's nutrition and health, education and training opportunities (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989).

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African Education and Development: Crisis, Triumphalism, Research, Loss of Vision

At present the starting point for aid to African education is a pervasive sense of crisis. Education in Africa at all levels and in all its forms is in dire straits. Few observers disagree that, with rare exceptions, both schools and learning have deteriorated, and the situation is continuing to worsen. Recently completed education sector studies¹ reflect both critique and lament.

The universities of Africa are in crisis. Enrollments rise as capacities for government support decline. Talented staff are abandoning the campuses, libraries are outdated, research output is dropping, students are protesting overcrowded and inhospitable conditions, and educational quality is deteriorating. The need for action is urgent. (Serageldin, 1992, p. vii)

The quality of primary education is at present unacceptably low.... The physical conditions of most schools are unacceptably poor. (DANIDA, 1993, p. 1)

Great shortages of qualified and trained teachers ... a generally poor and non-stimulating learning environment. (DANIDA, 1991, p. 4)

Not only is there crisis, but national authorities, these studies assert, are unable to deal with it effectively.

Most of the Sahelian countries do not have qualified personnel or adequate facilities for planning, administration and management of basic Education. Where these facilities exist, rational working methods for the release of viable statistics and data on education are inexistent. Up to date, none of the member States is capable of correctly planning and evaluating its basic education programmes. (UNESCO, 1992, p. 12)

From the early days of Africa's independence to the end of this century, Africa's leaders have seen education as a powerful, often the most important, vehicle for social transformation (for an early and a more recent example, see Nyerere, 1967, and Government of Namibia, 1993). But the expected rapid postcolonial social transformation and improved standard of living have yet to materialize in most countries. Even worse, the education systems that were to initiate and sustain that transformation by developing new skills and technologies, innovative ideas, and enduring new values in practice most often still do not reach all of the school age population and are unable to provide sufficient schools, teachers, and textbooks for those they do reach.

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Where schools are failing and the demand for more and better schools far exceeds available resources, the common recourse is to foreign assistance. Indeed, in many African countries it is assumed that education initiatives and reforms, even building new schools and rehabilitating those damaged by wind and rain, require external aid. In some countries foreign funding supports recurrent education expenditures as well, for example, students' workbooks, texts, and other instructional materials, and inservice teacher education.

Times have changed. Recourse to foreign assistance in the 1960s was generally optimistic, both about what education could accomplish and about the positive role of external aid. By the 1990s, however, pessimism had supplanted the earlier optimism. As I note, schools are widely perceived to be failing. With adequate funds their major problems might be addressed, but with few exceptions the expectations about what education could achieve have sharply declined. Similarly, while the older rhetoric remained, few in Africa genuinely regarded foreign aid as a partnership for progress. Although regarded by a few radicals as limited reparations, aid was largely seen as charity provided by affluent countries to impoverished Africa. Although aid was important, even essential, and may have contributed to a national development strategy, it did not represent cooperation among essentially equal partners. All involved understand that aid both manifests and entrenches dependence.

At the same time as African education has become increasingly reliant on foreign funding, there have been fundamental changes in the world system. Especially dramatic have been the arrogant triumphalism and expanded roles for international financial institutions. As the World Bank becomes a source of advice as well as funds, it also becomes both a consumer and an initiator of research. Studies of African education and those who conduct them, indeed social science research more generally, thereby function to disseminate a particular understanding of development, which in turn undermines the optimistic vision of education and its role as articulated in Africa over the past three decades. To explore the interconnections of this educational crisis, aid dependence, an ideology of triumphalism, a particular policy role for education research, and a loss of vision, let us begin by considering briefly the common perception of the current African condition. Then, we turn to the global restructuring and its consequences for African education and development. Earlier versions of parts of the argument developed here appeared in Samoff (1993, 1995a).

The African Condition

The picture—widely displayed, only sometimes sympathetically—is bleak. Like the televised images of starving Somalis, emaciation is the African condition.

The number of Africans enduring absolute poverty grew by almost two-thirds in the first half of the 1980s to constitute more than half of the population.... Per capita agricultural output has stagnated or declined. Industrial output has fallen. Deforestation and desertification have reduced the productive land area. Rising food imports, declining terms of trade, and capital flight have produced a massive jump in the external debt, which in 1990 was roughly equivalent to the

sub-Saharan countries' gross national product and required half of all export earnings to service.... Drastic reductions in social expenditures since 1980 have made everyday life for many a constant struggle. ... budgetary cutbacks and declining incomes in the 1980s devastated many educational institutions, raised infant mortality rates, and worsened nutritional levels.... most Africans in 1991 were as poor or poorer than at independence three decades earlier. (Sandbrook, 1993, p. 5-6)

In living standards, Africa is falling farther behind the rest of the world. It is now the only continent where most poor people are getting still poorer and where health and education are deteriorating.... More than four million children born this year will die before the age of five. Nearly one-third of children are severely malnourished. One in three goes without primary school education. (Darnton, 1994)

How can this horror be explained? From the perspective of major spokespersons or agencies of the advanced industrialized states, the crisis is attributable to deficiencies in African countries. For example, according to the World Bank (1994a), poor policies were the primary cause of the 15% fall in Africa's GDP per capita between 1977 and 1985. Even those countries that have done relatively better can expect poverty to persist for the indefinite future. "Countries that have come the furthest in implementing good policies particularly good macroeconomic policies have enjoyed a resurgence of growth" (Bruno, 1994, p. xi). But the level of per capita growth, even among the countries that have adjusted best, is still below what is needed for rapid poverty reduction.

What, then, is to be done? Based on the foregoing perspective, the solution lies in following the advice of those who know best, most of whom turn out to be lighter skinned and living farther north, and many employed by the World Bank and other institutions that provide development assistance. Sometimes the outsiders themselves need to make the important decisions as "some states are not yet fit to govern themselves" (Johnson, 1993).

However, an alternative understanding of the African condition requires a firm sense of context as the links among aid, education, and development are explored. Necessarily, the setting for this discussion includes the persistence of poverty in many South regions, the triumphalist orientation of most of the more affluent countries, especially the United States, and the altered roles of major organizations in the United Nations system.

Global Restructuring

Several changes at the global level significantly affect Africa and the Third World generally and—more to our point here—contribute to the transformation of the education policymaking process. As noted by several analysts, despite political aspirations for national autonomy, major education developments over this century have a strikingly international character. But the world has, of course, changed. Because this is not the place for a capsule world history, I limit myself to a schematic outline of what I take to be the most important of those changes, drawing comparisons with the developmental optimism of the 1950s and early 1960s.

Socialist Disarray and US Triumphalism

Not so long ago, alternative strategies of development featured prominently in university course catalogues and internationalist bookshops. Currently, however, that notion of alternative approaches and the scholars who employ it have become anachronisms, heirlooms that may be interesting but are no longer considered to have much utility.

The 1992 US presidential election was instructive in that it highlighted the many themes on which the candidates agreed. "We've won," the then president of the US regularly reminded his audiences during the national electoral campaign. Not only have we won, he insisted, but we are the standard against which others measure themselves. The *we*, of course referred to "true Americans," what US politicians like to describe as the "patriotic, God-fearing, loyal citizens of this country." Mostly very white or at least thoroughly assimilated, this *we* is counterposed to a poorer and generally darker skinned *other*, some of whom live next door. In the early 1990s, perhaps the most visible of the *other* lived in Europe, the pitiable but not unsympathetic victims of communist rule. But the most extreme *other*—the measure of the unchanging "primitive," the disease, the disarray, the disorder, the decay to be avoided—were African. It was there that one found evidence of decivilization, regression toward "barbarity."² That *other* is not white.³

In its early stages this triumphalism is seemingly boundless. The precipitous dissolution of communist rule is interpreted as the inevitable victory of the US over the USSR, capitalism over socialism, the market over planning, indeed good over evil. Capitalism prevailed because it is inherently better. What better proof could there be than its unequivocal victory? Everything that can be linked to socialism, however tenuous the link, is clearly flawed precisely because of that link. The arrogance of US triumphalism is palpable and unceasing. "We're the only country complicated enough, sophisticated enough, big enough to lead the human race" (Gingrich, 1995a; 1995b).

There is a grand and instructive irony in a triumphalism that is politically and ideologically centered in the US. As Przeworski (1992) puts it,

Neoliberal ideology, emanating from the United States and various multinational agencies, claims that the choice is obvious: there is only one path to development, and it must be followed.... Yet if a Martian were asked to pick the most efficient and humane economic systems on earth, it would certainly not choose the countries that rely most on markets. The United States is a stagnant economy in which real wages have been constant for more than a decade and the real income of the poorer 40% of the population has declined. It is an inhumane society in which 11.5% of the population some 28 million people, including 20% of the children lives in poverty. It is the oldest democracy on earth, but has one of the lowest voter-participation rates in the democratic world, and the highest per capita prison population in the world. (p. 46)

Where socialism can provide neither useful ideas nor instructive experiences and where only one strategy of development is worth considering, the lessons are clear. Third World poverty is a Third World phenomenon. Contemporary Africa makes that especially apparent. Africa and Africans are poor because their governments have made a mess of things. Poor policies and failures of governance have turned the hope, even promise, of decolonization

into the corruption and misery of the century's end. Rwanda, where slaughter and destruction are popularly perceived as the ugly but not unnatural consequences of tribal conflict, is the archetype rather than an aberration.

This triumphalism has at least two powerful consequences for the relationship between aid and education, especially the policy process. Those who have triumphed need no longer listen. Because they *know* what is right, and because it is their power, rather than negotiation, that secures their interests, they can instruct rather than learn. As well, because the triumph proves the "correctness" of their perspective, they need not feel reticent or guilty about telling others what to do.

Reorientation of United Nations Organizations

During this period, key United Nations organizations have also changed roles. In the post-World War II mood of reconstruction, education was understood as the principal vehicle for remaking the world. Capitalists and socialists agreed. Education had to be central to rebuilding and social transformation, whether in the countries shattered by war or in those recently decolonized, or where socialism was to become the ideal to be achieved and the engine of development. In many minds there really was no alternative. Education was an essential antidote to the horrors of the experiences of the recent past, the Holocaust, trench warfare, and nuclear devastation.

Countries were policymaking domains and educators were to be the critical education policymakers. The newly fashioned international system had a distinctly developmental thrust. International economic organizations were to stabilize currency flows and thus both international trade and national growth, and they were to support the reconstruction and development of Europe. Special United Nations councils were charged with economic and social development and with overseeing what were increasingly clearly the final days of the colonial system. For education, science, and culture, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was to provide technical expertise and assistance. As well, UNESCO was structured to be responsive to its member states, less constrained by the major power vetoes of the Security Council and the rich-country dominance of the financial organizations. All this was especially apparent in the optimism that greeted African independence in the 1950s and 1960s.

As this century is about to end, much has changed. Whereas 30 years ago it was powerful nations that sought to impose the will of the international system on former colonies, by the 1990s the international financial institutions had become the principal enforcers of global dictates. With surprising speed, *structural adjustment* became both the description and the content of this externally imposed control. Effectively, structural adjustment offered access to capital in exchange for the adoption of externally specified national policies and the surrender of some national autonomy. For impoverished countries and dysfunctional economies, structural adjustment was stick as well as carrot.

At the same time the international financial institutions also began transforming themselves into development advisory services. To some extent they had always done that for the more affluent countries of the North. By the 1990s, however, they sought increasingly to play that role for the poor countries of the

South. In the process the funding organizations—not only the World Bank and the national development aid agencies, but also the United Nations Development Programme—effectively eclipsed the technical assistance institutions like UNESCO. This is not the place to review or debate what has happened to UNESCO, but it is striking that the UN organization perhaps most directly responsive to the majority of its members is regarded by much of the world as less able to provide effective education advisory services than the World Bank.

Modernization

During this period exciting debates about alternative paths to development have been replaced by a heavy developmental orthodoxy and resurrected modernization.

We are witnessing today a revival of colonialism, albeit in a new form.... There is a moral issue here: the civilized world has a mission to go out to these desperate places and govern.... The only satisfaction will be unspoken gratitude of millions of misgoverned or ungoverned people who will find in this altruistic revival of colonialism the only way out of their present intractable miseries. (Johnson, 1993, pp. 23, 44)

Although several prominent orators have offered eulogies for the analytic orientation commonly termed *modernization*, and although some of its proponents are now less extravagant and arrogant and more cautious, even defensive, in their claims, the reports of its passing have remained premature. Its theoretical precepts have proved to be strikingly durable. This ideology has several major components.

The initial—and generally unstated and undefended—premise of the ideology of modernization locates the sources and causes of Africa's problems in Africa.⁴ Contemporary poverty, for example, is to be explained in terms of the distant past (an historical legacy of rudimentary technology and small-scale societies), or the climate (the abundant tropical bounty stimulates neither hard work nor invention), or the missing factor(s) of production (insufficient capital/technology/skills to develop local resources fully), or early socialization (maternal dependence, subjugation of self to group), or attitudinal orientation (a stoic passivity, even fatalistic submissiveness, in the face of adversity), or psychosocial mindset (low need for achievement), or inefficiency and corruption, or some variant or combination of these themes.

Second, in the ideology of modernization, development is largely a technical-administrative process. In this understanding, development is fostered by rationalizing the use of scarce resources, supplying requisite capital, skills, and technology at critical junctures, and using state power to reward those who engage in desired behaviors. Reliably applying knowledge and manipulating inputs is deemed to require well-oiled machinery and smoothly meshing gears or, in the parlance of politics, relative stability and manageable conflict. On the other hand, society-wide popular mobilization and the sharp clash of competing programs, the energetic confrontation of incompatible interests, or conflict among antagonistic classes are neither required nor welcome.

Third, the managers of this technical-administrative process are expected to be a modernizing middle class.⁵ Only this class, imbued through its education with the requisite skills and socialized to value individual economic and social

mobility, can shoulder the burden of national reform. Acting in its own interests, it can initiate, and more important, manage broad social transformation. The elites of the old order lack the combination of competence, vision, and drive necessary for the construction of a new order. Peasant political mobilizers, trade union militants, radical critics of imperialism and neocolonialism—like politics in general—are all regarded as obstacles to progress.

From these two tenets comes a fourth theme: the preferred political form is liberal democracy in which citizen participation is indirect and limited and expertise reigns supreme. Unlike other societies where education is much more widespread and where groups critical of public policy can advance their own experts, the base of education in most of Africa is narrow. In Africa, then, to favor expertise is to exclude the masses from serious policy debate and decisionmaking. As Fanon (1963) perceptively predicted, however, where the new postcolonial African leadership failed to become a modernizing middle class, authoritarian rule would prevail over pluralistic politics. In practice only a few efforts to maintain liberal democracy in Africa have survived. Elsewhere it decayed as the postcolonial leadership thought they no longer needed it, or it crumbled as its facade of participation failed to generate the political legitimacy necessary to sustain it. In other cases it succumbed to those who proclaimed the necessity of centralized direction and control as they discarded the constitution and seized power.

Empowerment, democratic participation, and collective liberation have for the most part been regarded as inimical to the agenda of modernization, at least in the short term. With changing circumstances, however, the practical benefits of democratic practices now seem to outweigh their increased burden on African governments, at least for some modernization advocates. Despite being shaken by theoretical and empirical critiques, modernization has proved resilient and durable.

As during the earlier bloom of modernization, explanations for poverty in Africa still focus on factors of production, ethos, mindset, cultural values, and the like. The causes for Africa's poverty are to be found in Africa, with apparently some minor input from the global setting. Remedies for the current problems are also to be found in Africa: better planning, more rational economic decisionmaking, governmental or other institutional reform, multiparty elections, privatization. Much of the writing has returned to offering advice to Africans. Admittedly the corpus of commentators now includes a few Africans, nearly all educated and socialized in North Atlantic institutions. In its tone, however, that writing still speaks to Africans who are deemed incapable of adequately analyzing their own situation and converting analysis into action. These incapacities are assumed to be logically prior to issues of physical capacity, resource deployment, and capital investment.

Furthermore, although the powerful critique developed by the dependency and world-systems literature noted above is widely known, it is commonly ignored. The international order is a given, a background condition like the laboratory bench hood in which the experiment is conducted. In practice, however, the international order is part of Africa's foreground, not back-

ground; an energetic chameleon, not an immutable landscape. To continue the analogy, closer inspection may reveal that the laboratory bench hood itself harbors disease or creates an airflow that draws in contaminants. The ill health of those who ingest the experiment's products may then stem more from those toxins than from anything they do or fail to do. Even as the situation worsens, what happens in that container may shape its form and rearrange its structure. To take as given what are potentially primary causes is to exclude them from the policy and research discourse. What is unseen and undiscussed will surely not be the focus of policy attention or public action.⁶

Structural Adjustment, or Economic Reorganization

In recent years, *structural adjustment* has become the generic term used to refer to a more or less extensive economic reorganization stimulated by severe economic problems of varying causes; it is frequently required as a condition for receiving external assistance (Samoff, 1994b). As described by its major proponents, structural adjustment policies are primarily concerned with addressing economic crises the origins of which lie in governmental mismanagement, sometimes combined with internal or external shocks to the economy. The immediate task is to balance income and expenditures. For countries that are heavily dependent on exports, the task is one of reducing the gap between imports and exports. Over the longer term, the stated objectives of structural adjustment policies envisage modifying resource allocation and economic incentives (especially wages and prices) to increase competition and reduce inefficiency and waste.

Although the specific mix of policies varies from one setting to another, this economic reorganization generally includes several features. Among them are the devaluation of currency; the reduction of public expenditures; and the reduction of subsidies, especially to consumers, which is intended both to reduce government expenditures and to modify production incentives so as to favor goods for export. As well, structural adjustment involves the reduction or elimination of price controls, which is intended to bring domestic prices closer to world market prices; the revision of trade policies, which is intended to encourage exports; and the revision of fiscal—especially tax—policies, which is intended to increase government revenue. New or increased user charges for public services, the privatization of both enterprises and social services, and the institutional reforms that are required to implement all these policies form part of the structural adjustment package. Nearly everywhere in Africa the implementation of these policies has meant new or increased fees for social services (e.g., for medical treatment) and increased prices for consumer goods (often through the elimination of subsidies for staples).

Although the World Bank differentiates among stabilization, structural adjustment, and adjustment policies, it acknowledges that the general use of these terms is often imprecise and inconsistent (World Bank, 1990b). Adjustment itself is a misleading term in this usage, because to adjust—that is, to make small or incremental changes—is what people do to the radio volume when they find it too loud. The widespread meaning of structural adjustment, however, is closer to fundamental economic reorganization than to incremental modification. At least partly in response to the controversies generated by

structural adjustment programs and by the role of the international financial agencies in them, World Bank personnel have recently referred less to structural adjustment and more to economic change or economic reform.

The literature on structural adjustment is by now voluminous, and a summary overview is beyond the scope of this article. Amid divergent perspectives, however, there is a strikingly common premise: poverty is largely the result of poor national policies. Where poverty is the result of poor policies, policy reform—structural adjustment—is the essential remedy. The prescription follows from the diagnosis: “getting macroeconomic policies right,” especially “reducing budget deficits, increasing tax revenues, eliminating barriers to international exchange,” “taxing agriculture less,” “putting exporters first,” “rationalizing import barriers,” “privatizing public enterprises,” and “financial reform,” especially reducing financial repression, restoring bank solvency, and improving financial infrastructure (World Bank, 1994a).

Adjustment is working, concludes the World Bank’s recent assessment, claiming the support of extensive and critical research. With that triumphant reaffirmation and with some country-specific variations and adaptations, structural adjustment remains the principal development advice offered to Africa, especially by those who control the foreign aid that most African countries desperately seek (World Bank, 1994a). Shorn of its details, structural adjustment for Africa means in practice integration into the global economic system on terms set largely by outsiders. Together with the ideology of modernization, the reinvigoration of this perspective constitutes the core of late 20th-century developmentalism.

The ahistoricism and decontextualization of this perspective is, or at least ought to be, shocking. The approach, assumptions, analyses, and advice of the 1990s are strikingly similar to what Africa was offered in the 1950s and 1960s. Then, too, explanations for the African condition were sought in things African. Then, too, Africans were urged to heed the advice proffered by the affluent, importing their ideas and institutions. The continuities are striking. Over a long period the outsiders have thought they know what is best for Africa and how to achieve it.

The original Dutch, Portuguese and British traders who came to the African coasts in the early modern period [had] the aim of doing business.... They could not trade without stability, and to get stability they had to impose it. (Johnson, 1993, p. 43)

Democratization?

I turn now to the current focus on democratization in Africa. Recent years have witnessed the reassertion of the importance of politics. For much of Africa, effective politics secured independence and then came to be regarded as threatening. The leadership that was borne to power by a mobilized populace began to fear that mobilization. Political competition was regarded as an obstacle to national unity. Any alliance between a technocratic-administrative elite and whoever held power (in many countries, the military) felt especially vulnerable to a politicized public. In this rediscovery of politics, both in Africa and among students of African politics, the key term has been *democracy*, usually taken to mean multiparty competition. Surely a step forward. Or is it?

In practice, the widespread focus on democracy supports and often cloaks efforts to dismantle the state in the Third World and then reconstruct it in the pattern deemed preferable by the dominant forces in the world system. Not so long ago, democracy was deemed destabilizing. The major task of Third World governments was to restrict popular demands that could easily overwhelm the limited capacities for government action or public policy. Authoritarian governments were, and for many and in many places still are, preferred because they can hold popular passions in check and get things done. Why, then, the current willingness to jettison old allies, to risk the unmanageability of the masses, even to press entrenched leaderships to yield or at least share power?

One lesson from recent African experience is that governments that are not regarded as legitimate by their citizens are unable to implement the modernization agenda. The difficulties in fulfilling the conditions that are attached to specific loans and technical assistance projects have made the need for civic legitimization painfully clear. In this regard the role played by external assistance is crucial. As the quality of life deteriorated for many Africans during the 1980s, their governments ever more energetically sought external aid. By the 1990s the experts of the major transnational financial institutions, especially the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, were convinced they understood clearly what had to be done. The confidence of their assertions is astounding. Despite a rich history of failed initiatives and subsequent trenchant critiques of earlier advice, the World Bank continues to insist that it, and thus we all, know what is right: for example, getting macroeconomic policies right and getting the incentives right for farmers (World Bank, 1994b).

It is important to recall what is involved. Special foreign aid not linked to specific projects and increased foreign assistance in general became available on the condition that African governments adopt a series of economic policies that are often termed *liberalization*. Nearly all African governments found at least some of these policies unpalatable. Some found them impossible to implement.

The lesson seemed clear. A government with an insecure popular base could not successfully restructure the national economy. Restoring legitimacy thus became central to the modernization agenda. This in turn broadened the support for multiparty competition, elections, and other popular initiatives. I do not mean to suggest that all those who advocate and study democracy are simply modernization instrumentalists. However, it is clear that modernization advocates, who earlier sought to limit popular initiatives because they overwhelmed government capacity and rendered more difficult the imposition of unpopular policies, are now convinced that the absence of popular support is even more problematic. Certainly some democratic movements in Africa have a genuinely popular base. Indeed, the outsiders' fixation on the institutional requisites and forms of democracy creates both maneuvering room and shelter where those movements can organize, mobilize, and challenge those in power. Kenya offers a clear example. What is not yet clear, however, is how the external democracy experts will respond when they find among the new parties socialists who call for more, not less, government role in the economy, or

populists who reject outright major elements of the structural adjustment program.

My concern here is not Africa's popular democratic initiatives. Although they are important, instructive, and transformative, they are also beyond the scope of this article. Rather, in the largely external development business, my focus is on the convergence of structural adjustment and democratization. Perhaps what is most perceptive in this recent attention to parties and elections is the recognition of the role that politics play in establishing and maintaining the legitimacy of both the system of government and those who hold office.

What is at issue here may be legitimacy more than participation. If so, then the risk is great that elections will be a facade to obscure and shield continued governance by a small elite. Democratic elections may be staged in an effort to restore a legitimacy undermined by sluggish growth, increasing unemployment, and their consequences for nutrition, health, and the quality of life. Ultimately the legitimacy of the African state and its officials is dependent on improving the standard of living. If that improvement continues to be heavily dependent on circumstances and events largely beyond Africa's control, a renewal strategy—indeed any development strategy—must envisage reforming that relationship. Elections may, but do not necessarily, move in that direction. An authoritarian regime may be able to retain power if its political base sees an improving, or at least not deteriorating, standard of living. Where that standard appears to decline, elections may confer the legitimacy that prosperity no longer provides. But unless elections are accompanied by the sort of participation that enables citizens to control their state, voting will quickly become a facade. Perhaps fashionable but not functional, it will do little to fulfill the promise of Africa's development. Put somewhat differently, the international system still requires relatively strong states in the Third World in order to implement unpalatable policies, manage mass reactions, and mobilize labor and other resources on favorable terms. From this perspective, structural adjustment, democratization, and decentralization do not in fact envisage dismantling the state and relocating authority at lower levels. Rather, they seek to replace dependent states that were born 30 years ago with dependent states that are better adapted to current circumstances.

African Education and Development: Reflection and Reassessment

The final decade of the 20th century is a period of reflection and reevaluation for both African development and development assistance, including education. The optimism generated by the decolonization of the late 1950s and early 1960s has been displaced by a deep dismay at persisting poverty and a profound pessimism about the viability of any strategy for social transformation. For many the objective is no longer modernization, but simply survival.

The thinking about education has experienced a similar transition. Earlier, formal and nonformal education was expected to be the principal vehicle for social change, both helping to define the new society and enabling its citizens to function effectively within it. Not only would the illiterate be able to read and write, but they would also foster innovation, accelerate the generation and diffusion of ideas and technologies, and monitor and manage a responsive

political system. Education was also to be the vehicle for redressing discrimination and inequality, both in daily practice and in popular understanding.

Although there has been progress, and in some countries substantial achievements, still in much of Africa many children get little or no schooling. Illiteracy rates have ceased to decline or have begun to rise, school libraries have few books, laboratories have outdated or malfunctioning equipment and insufficient supplies, and learners lack chairs, exercise books, and even pencils.

Nearly all observers characterize contemporary African education as being in crisis. Many observers, both inside and outside Africa, are pessimistic about the ability of national authorities to address the crisis effectively. As this crisis has unfolded, external aid agencies have increasingly come to provide development advice as well as finance. Notwithstanding its critical role, their funding provides only a modest portion of total education expenditures. Consequently, their influence may be far greater than the absolute value of their aid suggests. Indeed, some agencies, and especially the World Bank, currently assert that their development expertise is even more important than their funds. "Thus the World Bank's main contribution must be advice, designed to help governments develop education policies" (World Bank, 1995, p. 14). It is therefore crucial to explore the increasingly important connection between foreign aid and national education policy. As is seen, influences are both direct and indirect with both research and researchers playing a central role in the process.

Influencing Education Policy, Directly

Clearly foreign aid influences both policies and policymaking in recipient countries. Sometimes the relationship is aggressively manipulative. Assistance may carry any number of explicit conditions. Aid agreements may require the purchase of products and services from the providing country or agency. The funding agency may make the provision of support conditional on the adoption of specific policies, priorities, or programs. Support for vocational schools, for example, may be contingent on the implementation of a strategy designed to increase female enrollment in the technical curriculum. Occasionally influence may move in the other direction. A country's leaders may mobilize public support to bring pressure on the funding agency to secure support for a preferred program. Direct influence can also be rather less assertive. A funding agency may, for example, finance research intended to support its preferred programmatic orientation. Or Third World educators may tailor their requests, more or less explicitly, to fit in the funding agency's agenda. Occasionally these paths of influence are far more circuitous. A desire to win support for a high-priority goal in one project may promote a willingness to accommodate a low-priority goal in another.

Aid dependence also gives the external agency a seat in policy discussions.⁷ Indeed, it is not uncommon for assistance agency personnel or their political leaders to assert that they use conditions not only to restore economic stability and promote growth, but also to protect the poor and disadvantaged against their own governments (see also Samoff, 1995b).

Although it has a long history of conditional lending, the World Bank is currently sending a mixed message. Sometimes it claims to be moving away from conditions and imposed expectations and toward greater African auton-

omy and decisionmaking. Edward Jaycox, Vice President for Africa, indicated in 1993 that the World Bank would no longer dictate development plans to African countries and would stop imposing foreign expertise on reluctant African governments. (*News from the World Bank*, 1993). Calling current technical assistance to Africa a systematic, destructive force, Jaycox said future programs would be aimed at building Africa's capacity to help itself. Acknowledging that the World Bank has been unable to devise effective solutions to Africa's economic problems, Jaycox said that the World Bank would help fund African governments to write their development plans and would use the bulk of a \$20-million research fund to support studies commissioned by Africans themselves, rather than to pay for studies by World Bank professional staff.

On the other hand, the World Bank defends conditional lending and presents itself as the ally of the disadvantaged, protecting them against their own governments. Interviewed in 1994, Jaycox defended conditionality (Jaycox, 1994) from which the quotations here are taken. The World Bank, he argued, is more effective in addressing poverty and discrimination than African governments.

Now how many African governments put a top priority on alleviating poverty? I can't even think of three. When has the military given up its toys? When has a diplomatic mission been closed in the interest of poverty alleviation? When has the role of women been enhanced in any of these countries, without outside interference? ... [If the World Bank had less conditionality] we'd be looking more and more like the governments. Our programs would look more and more like the priorities that African governments actually have. Conditionality is what makes them a little different. How do you get girls educated in the Sahel, except through conditionality? (p. 9)

The World Bank is, of course, not the only assistance agency asserting that it knows best. According to Carl Tham, then Director General (1985-1994) of the Swedish International Development Agency and presently Minister of Education,

the poor countries' governments are often less interested in the poor than we in the industrialized countries are. We mustn't give way on this. The countries we cooperate with must take alleviating poverty seriously! Power issues are extremely important. Aid focusing on poor women often collides with the interests of important power elites, but that mustn't stop us. (Isaksson, 1994, p. 59)

Influencing Education Policy, Indirectly

Foreign assistance also has powerful indirect influences on education policy-making. Where new initiatives and major reforms are dependent on external funding, the providers of those funds—more or less intentionally and more or less consciously—constrain and often set the education agenda, both content and process. Aid may function to limit the roles of local educators and decision-makers and to identify particular individuals as acceptable to or preferred by the assistance agency. They in turn may acquire increased influence in the context of aid dependence. In this way external support may effectively undermine local capabilities, because the skills required to deal with foreign agencies may be quite different from the skills required to create new programs and

successfully shepherd them through the national political arena. Ironically, the preference for technical solutions and the effort to depoliticize decisionmaking may make it harder to get things done.

As I have noted, external influence on education policy is not limited to direct interactions between aid providers and recipients. Other patterns of influence may be embedded deeply in the relationship between those who seek and those who allocate funds. Overseas education and training, for example, may involve an intellectual socialization that has a far-reaching impact. Those who have studied overseas and assume positions of authority on their return home may approach problems, specify relevant factors, and delimit solutions in terms of a particular understanding of development or economics or education. This understanding subsequently influences the initiatives and reforms that are proposed. There may be no request to support student-centered learning, for example, not because the funding agency explicitly opposes it, but because the training and socialization of Third World educators has never addressed student-centered learning as a serious alternative to the teacher-centered classroom. Alternatively, every request for assistance may refer to learner-centered pedagogy, because in their overseas education this was deemed the only reasonable way to organize schools.

One path of influence combines both direct and indirect elements. Increased reliance on foreign assistance has led to expanded roles in education policy-making for the finance ministry and the aid providers. Generally, the finance ministry represents the government in negotiations with the IMF, the World Bank, and other external agencies. Not surprisingly, that role enables the finance ministry to become much more directly involved in policy and programmatic details, which may suit the external agencies well. Especially concerned with reducing government spending, those agencies are likely to see the finance ministry as their ally, in contrast with ministries of health or education whose general mandate requires them to be more concerned with spending than with saving. The alliance between an external agency and the finance (and perhaps planning) ministry may be a powerful lever for influencing national policy.

Another consequence of the aid dependence of education has been a dramatic transformation in the process of setting the education and training agenda: it is a transition from planning to marketing.⁸ As countries have become more dependent on external funding to support new projects and even recurrent expenditures, planning has acquired an increasingly external focus. Economic and financial crisis energizes the search for additional revenue sources. As manufacturers look for new customers, educators seek benefactors. The benefactors have preferences. Marketing may be a reasonable and reasonably successful coping strategy in an adverse setting. It may provide a vehicle for securing additional resources at times of economic distress. It may even permit national elites and their foreign partners to put off confronting major problems and undertaking serious economic, political, and social transformation for a bit longer. At the same time, when marketing is the prevailing orientation, innovation is limited to whatever the funders will finance.

My recent research has been especially concerned with a particular set of indirect influences on educational policymaking, those that emerge in the ostensibly nonpolitical research setting.⁹ Externally commissioned and sponsored research—surely now the major portion of contemporary research on African education—has several powerful consequences.

The manifestations, consequences, and problems of this conjunction of funding and research are multiple. I wish to outline several of the most visible and significant of those outcomes. I have identified the outcomes as (a) insisting on a detached, clinical perspective that devalues the local role; (b) influencing and constraining the education and development discourse; (c) legitimizing weak propositions; (d) entrenching flawed understandings by according them official status; (e) seeding and fertilizing theoretical and analytic fads; (f) treating education primarily as technique and administration; (g) mystifying knowledge and power relations; and (h) promoting orthodoxy at the expense of critical inquiry. Although it is analytically useful here to distinguish between these outcomes, they are of course fundamentally interconnected. To address any of them requires considering them all. I touch on each briefly, noting how they privilege a particular understanding of education and development, thereby diverting attention from and often precluding alternative understandings and perspectives. My concern is not to resolve the major debates on the nature and role of education in contemporary Africa. I wish to identify the often subtle and frequently unnoticed ways in which what ought to be the subjects of policy debate come to be regarded as the normal, unexceptional, and largely unalterable features of the policy environment.

The Outsider's Perspective

The education research done by and for the external agencies generally assumes the perspective of an outsider looking in, with the common effect of limiting the roles and muting the voices of many who are most directly involved in the education system, for example, the teachers. Those who conduct the education sector studies generally assume the posture of expert diagnosticians who can determine both the nature of the illness and the appropriate medication after little or no consultation with the system that has been deemed ill. Confident of their diagnosis, the writers of these studies assume an interventionist posture, ascribing to themselves the authority, sanctioned by research, to prescribe remedies and insist that recommended courses of action be followed. Finally, education sector studies commonly address education as something that is done to or on students, making the policy terrain inhospitable to notions of learner-centered education and cooperative learning.

Words Matter

The close links between project support and applied research function to structure the education and development discourse. A standardized authoritative terminology emerges, promulgated and reinforced by the World Bank's prominent role as research manager and publisher as well as source of funds. In this terminology are embedded particular conceptions, orientations, prejudices, and policy preferences. Important issues that ought to be the focus of policy discussion are treated as part of the environment, as what is given and there-

fore not requiring explicit justification or critical attention. The terminology obscures important issues and too frequently misdirects the search for understanding.

Examples abound. The agencies regularly refer to themselves as donors, as in Donors to African Education, though the principal donor is in fact a bank that offers loans, not grants. *Efficiency* generally has to do with how quickly students move through the education system and what is spent to achieve this rather than with how much they learn and what it costs. *Wastage*, referring to those who begin but do not complete an education program, is often identified as one of the most serious problems in African education. Surely no one finds high dropout rates desirable. Resources allocated to students who do not remain in school might well be better used elsewhere. Yet, because most students in Africa who do not complete their schooling are pushed out rather than drop out, a high attrition rate is a normal feature of the education system, not an unexpected or abnormal or even avoidable waste. Note how the words direct attention. Concern with *wastage* focuses on individual motivation and achievement and on the quality of instruction. Concern with *attrition* points to the basic assumptions and organization of the education system. Addressing attrition also requires discerning which students are not permitted to proceed. Are females or students from a particular region or religion or socioeconomic stratum more likely to be excluded?

Another example is *cost recovery*, referring to direct payments by students and their parents for education. Where government resources are sorely pressed, understanding education as an investment in human capital provides a clear rationale for higher school fees, because additional years of schooling are expected to lead eventually to higher incomes. Observers and some national leaders agree that Africa can no longer afford free education. Those who benefit should pay for it. This usage, however, obscures who does pay for education in Africa. In nearly all African countries the largest source of government revenue is the taxes on traded commodities, especially exports. That is, the mass of the citizenry pays the cost of education through direct and indirect taxes on production rather than through direct taxes on incomes. Imposing school fees is thus not cost recovery; rather, it raises the portion of education costs paid by students and their families. The policy issue has to do not with charging for what was previously free, because it never has been free, but rather with determining which segments of the population are to bear what portion of the costs of a public service. Put somewhat differently, schooling in most societies has a redistributive role. To the extent that the tax burden falls more heavily on those with more wealth, tax-supported schooling that is widely accessible effectively collects money from the more affluent, including those with no children in school, to pay for the education of the less affluent. To secure a larger portion of the costs of education through direct assessments on students and their families is therefore likely to reduce the redistributive effects of public schooling.¹⁰

These few examples make the general point: Words matter.

What Is Tenuous Becomes Certain

A third consequence of the integration of project funding and development research is to legitimize poorly supported propositions. Project managers regularly find it necessary to base decisions on findings that they know have rickety foundations. This weaker validity standard may occasionally be unavoidable in an operational setting, where the pressure for prompt decisions exceeds the demand for high levels of confidence. Still, where research findings are at best a tenuous guide to action, project officials and decisionmakers ought to proceed cautiously. The conjunction of project management and research in the financial-intellectual complex, however, functions to obscure the caveats that were or should have been attached to the original research.

This process of legitimizing weak propositions by granting them official sanction and ignoring their tentative or conditional character is especially clear in the use of quantitative data. The pressure for certainty combines with the influence of economists and the premises of contemporary behavioral science to demand quantitative data wherever possible. Careful scrutiny of much of the reported data, however, often reveals that the variation from one period to the next is smaller than the margin of error. In such circumstances it is impossible to be sure that any change has taken place. A careful researcher will say precisely that. Project managers, however, may be willing to ignore or discount the data problems in order to have a clear finding that will support a particular decision.

The cumulation of research that has employed divergent approaches and methodologies in widely differing settings poses a similar problem. On the face of it, multiple studies with similar findings should be convincing. But the results of six or 60 seriously flawed research projects are surely no more persuasive than the results of a single study that is especially well done.

There are two related problems here. First, although the claims that "research shows that ..." and "an extensive review of the literature reveals ..." are common, the ostensibly supporting studies are generally difficult to identify.¹¹ Hence we cannot assess the basis for the claim. Second, notwithstanding the apparent similarity of their findings, the studies may not be comparable in important respects. Precisely because of these problems, researchers have fashioned standards to be used in such metacomparisons. Yet rarely, if ever, are those standards or any others applied the situations I have investigated.

It is, of course, quite reasonable to claim that the bulk of relevant research supports a particular understanding or course of action. Skeptics can consult the original research and attempt to demonstrate that it does not support what its interpreters assert or that combining different studies obscures research problems and inconsistencies. In the financial-intellectual complex, however, it is frequently impossible to identify the original research. Even when cited, this research may have had restricted circulation, precluding effective access and assessment. Again, the possible becomes probable and the reasonably likely is transformed into a certainty. As it officially certifies particular perspectives, the process stymies scrutiny.

Entrenched Misunderstandings

A fourth consequence of the strong connections between providing funds and conducting research is to accord legitimacy and international sanction to approaches and understandings that are at best partial and at worst wrong. Misunderstandings are entrenched. Thus documents commissioned by the World Bank to guide its lending operations and to present a coherent programmatic perspective to the representatives of recipient countries acquire the status of standard references in the academic arena.¹²

As noted above, one example of the entrenchment of (mis)understandings is manifest in the current resuscitation of modernization theory, which insists now, as it did a half-century ago, that the causes of Africa's problems are to be found in Africa. This analytic framework is seductive and often assumed uncritically. Just as poverty is to be explained by the characteristics and (in)abilities of the poor,¹³ so the explanations for problems in African education are to be found in and around African schools. The financial-intellectual complex institutionalizes this fundamental misunderstanding in the centers of financial, industrial, and academic authority, entrenching it against the challenge that the primary sources of contemporary problems are to be found in the process by which African countries have been incorporated into the global economy. The international relationships are acknowledged and at the same time treated as part of the policy environment. They are the furniture, the paint on the walls, the air in the room, a part of the setting, and so not a principal concern for policy attention. As normal and largely unexceptional features of the structure of international interactions, those relationships are assigned a low priority in the search for explanations and strategies for change. Thus what may matter most warrants little explicit attention. The explanatory framework and research agenda of the financial-intellectual complex largely exclude from active consideration the analytic perspective that emphasizes global integration, directing attention instead to things African.

Development Fads

The amalgamation of funding and research presses for certainty, both in specifying the problem and in recommending an appropriate solution. This pressure for certainty in turn nurtures an intense but usually ephemeral fixation on a particular understanding or strategy. Decisions in this environment require not only clarity, but also simplicity. To ask, What is *the* problem? calls for *the* solution, which in practice becomes a succession of solutions, each proffered as definitive (or nearly so) and each ostensibly supported by unimpeachable research. This faddishness in education and development is fostered by the centralization of communication and the antipathy to the tentative, the uncertain, and the conditional in the financial-intellectual complex. Consequently, periodic fads flourish in an environment that regards "what works" as more important than understanding why it works, that emphasizes relatively rapid tangible outcomes at the expense of attention to the quality and consequences of process, and that prefers technical-administrative to social-political explanations and solutions.

The process is striking. A new insight, perspective, or approach that captures the attention of the major funding agencies is quickly communicated to

their principal consultants and African associates, who in turn disseminate it more widely. For a moment, often a brief moment, it acquires extraordinary visibility and influence. It may even be enshrined as a guiding principle for particular projects. Complex problems, however, are rarely amenable to simple solutions, notwithstanding the preference for uncluttered and unencumbered understandings. New evidence is collected, new objections are lodged, new personnel assume responsibility, and disenchantment sets in. The successor to the current fad is already emerging. Yet acknowledging that their confidence in the previous approach was misplaced does not seem to make the advocates of its successor any more reserved or cautious in their enthusiasm. We were wrong before, they say, but *this time we are sure*.

As the fascination with a particular understanding peaks and wanes, it is not uncommon to find complete reversals in recommended policies. The assertion a decade ago that it was desirable to introduce some vocational curriculum in all schools has apparently now been succeeded by the equally ardently articulated assertion that vocationalization of that sort is far too expensive and yields far too few benefits for most countries to undertake.

Education as Technique and Administration

A sixth consequence of the integration of education and development funding and research is the pervasive treatment of education as technique and administration. Again, the common terminology is revealing. Policy oriented research is more likely to talk about delivery systems than about learning, about efficiency than about the realization of human potential, and about returns on investment than about nurturing curiosity or encouraging innovation and the creative expression of ideas and insights.

How, though, will Africans overcome their dependence on external intellectual leadership and standards if learning and creativity are not the central focus of education and development initiatives? How can there be learner-centered instruction if education is something that is delivered by those who have knowledge to those who do not? How will assessing Africa's schools in terms of efficiency and productivity fortify a new generation to criticize and to risk departing from received wisdom? Who is best served by regarding the improvement of education largely as another of the development tasks to be organized and managed, thereby relegating it to the status of byproduct, for both the youngest and oldest learners, the intrinsic excitement and self-regenerating dynamo of learning?

For research and researchers, two additional consequences are especially troubling.

The Mystification of Knowledge and Power Relations

The financial-intellectual complex not only consumes and commissions research, but also specifies the types of research that it will regard as legitimate and capable of generating valid results. As should be clear from the discussion thus far, it is the behavioral science mainstream that is preferred, especially studies that seek to test hypothesized relationships through the analysis of quantitative data. This orientation has a broad reach. Beyond its influence on project proposal, specification, assessment, and approval, it is often employed

in the evaluation of research proposals that address topics of particular interest to the development business in other, even quite distant, settings.

One result of this process is that research, or rather claims about what research shows, elevate to the pedestal of *fact* what often turn out on closer examination to be limited, tentative, and partial findings. Conditional conclusions become generalizations that are legitimately employed to influence major public policies, both directly and indirectly through decisions about what is funded. In the conjunction of funding and research, scholarship becomes a proprietary process. The investors have the determining voice in the selection of topics, researchers, and methods; they limit access to source materials and often control the dissemination of findings. Consequently, the *process* of knowledge creation is obscured, mystifying the power relations embedded in the research and thereby in the programs it supports. Perhaps not entirely aware of their own role, scholars become advocates not only for particular understandings of development and underdevelopment, but also for a particular sort of global order.

A second result of this process is that a large percentage, in some countries nearly all, of Africa's senior education researchers become at least part-time employees of the funding agencies. Especially where several agencies have active programs, their demand for local scholars with appropriate credentials may exceed the supply. Researchers can generally earn substantially more than their regular salaries by serving as part-time and short-term consultants. Researchers cannot be faulted for seeking to supplement their incomes, particularly where their salaries are insufficient to support a family's basic needs. For whom, then, do the researchers really work? This recruitment of the national research capacity poses questions of divided loyalties and conflicting obligations, with consequent threats to objectivity and critical distance that are beyond the scope of this discussion and that warrant investigation in their own right. It is important to note here, however, that as African researchers are integrated into the financial-intellectual complex, they are less likely to be able to provide alternative perspectives and a critical vantage point.

Knowledge *is* power in this setting. Education initiatives and reforms—even maintaining the schools—require resources. Securing funds requires research findings. Those who can provide research findings gain influence, often control, over decisions and programs. Those who determine the sorts of research that are acceptable secure even broader influence and control. More troubling, this systemic ability to constrain and set agendas and priorities is barely discernible and thus generally inaccessible because it is embedded in ostensibly apolitical, neutral rules and procedures of research. How are peasants to challenge *the* scientific method? Are their teachers, or their teachers' teachers, any more likely to do so? Power relations that might be regarded as profoundly problematic, if they were clearly discernible, are so enmeshed in ordinary everyday practices that they become invisible. Research that is intended to clarify education instead functions to mystify power and authority.

Orthodoxy and Critical Inquiry

Externally sponsored research emphasizes, often insists on, a particular sort of research that privileges hypothesis testing over, for example, sustained

dialogues. This research orientation also emphasizes quantification, which in turn helps to erect a facade of precision. Researchers regularly use flawed and inconsistent data series and often ignore substantial margins of error. As a result, small, possibly random, differences come to be interpreted as major changes. Ostensibly large differences that may in practice be little more than defects in, or misunderstanding of, the data become the basis for sweeping policy recommendations.

Related to this methodological orientation, externally sponsored research increasingly favors the uncritical adoption of economics as the modal social science. Too complex to address fully here, this tendency fosters the uncritical application of constructs such as efficiency and rate of return to the field of education. All too often, this inclination toward economics ignores the origins and multiple meanings of key terms like privatization. It commonly confuses costs and expenditures. And frequently it asserts tradeoffs, for example, between quality and quantity, or between growth and equality, where some policymakers and analysts see complementarity, not alternatives.

Equally corrosive of innovative, thorough, and reliable research is the absence of critical review and peer scrutiny in the financial-intellectual complex. Little of the research that provides the foundation for broad analyses, general policies, and specific projects is examined critically and publicly by scholars with relevant expertise. This is especially problematic in the social sciences. Unlike the chemists and physicists intrigued by the claims about low-temperature nuclear fusion, skeptical social scientists cannot attempt to replicate the original results of development initiatives in their own laboratories.

To highlight these problems is not to argue that empirical research is undesirable in general or inappropriate to the aid setting in particular. The argument is that, notwithstanding its formal deference to research and its allocation of significant research funding, the financial-intellectual complex often obstructs and misuses empirical research. At the same time, by insisting on a particular kind of research, the financial-intellectual complex devalues or entirely ignores research that is sensitive to history and context; that is interactive; that is participatory; that is locally owned; and that is attentive to ambiguities, weak linkages, and large margins of error. Hypothesizing takes precedence over listening, counting over consulting, and regression over interaction. Pursuing unachievable certainty marginalizes research that, however flawed, is likely to prove most developmentally useful.

Aid officials must operate within their agencies' timing and pace. As I suggest, this inclines them toward short-order research based on lightning visits that generate instant wisdom, often with undesirable consequences. But they need not accept policy-relevant research simply because it is applied research if its findings would otherwise be rejected for methodological reasons. Misunderstandings and confusions are just that, however quickly or slowly reached. They cannot provide a solid foundation for useful policies or programs. Nor is there reason to believe that academic research, as contrasted with applied research, will necessarily lead to better development policy. Certainly there is no dearth of academic researchers and research projects that are intentionally or unintentionally irrelevant to major policy decisions. Studies with

long-time horizons that produce results comprehensible only to the researchers and their primary colleagues may be no more useful to project managers and national decisionmakers than the findings from superficial and uncritical studies by foreign experts. *More* academic and more *academic* research are not necessarily preferable in development settings. What this review suggests is that much of development research as currently conducted and used does not contribute to more effective policies and funding and that many of the problems with that research can be addressed within the context of development assistance.

Education Reform Initiatives: Ownership and Accountability

An effective crisis resolution strategy can itself become an obstacle to moving beyond the crisis. When fire breaks out, neighbors who lay on a heavy wet blanket may put out the flames. But left in place and considered a long-term solution, that blanket may also extinguish the sparks of imagination and innovation that every society needs.

Responding effectively to crisis and managing adjustment require skills of several sorts, ranging from technical expertise in budgeting and administration to political perspicacity. Adversity may, of course, stimulate skills development. The World Bank and other agencies have supported capacity-building initiatives. Yet the combination of crisis and adjustment seems to have reduced local capacity, especially in those countries that have become increasingly dependent on foreign assistance to operate and develop the education and training system.

First, continual crisis distracts attention from broader issues and more distant time horizons. When each month's payroll is in jeopardy, education decisionmakers and administrators find it difficult to devote the time that is needed to create, refine, and implement a radically transformed approach to teacher education.

Second, when simply maintaining necessary activities consumes all available resources, even educators find it difficult to invest in long-term skills development. Completing formal education programs and acquiring valuable experience may not yield demonstrable benefits for some time. When schoolchildren do not have sufficient books, or pencils and paper, or even chairs, long study leaves and professional internships for senior staff appear to be unsupportable luxuries.

Third, increased reliance on external assistance is itself an impediment to the development of local capabilities. This happens in several ways. The skills required to deal with the foreign agencies are quite different from those required to create new programs and successfully shepherd them through the local political arena. Those who are the most capable in negotiating with the foreign agencies and who are considered by those agencies to be the most technically competent local staff may be quite inept at assessing the local political situation and mobilizing needed local support. They may lack sufficient legitimacy to organize local and national constituencies and overcome resistance to change. That is, the increased influence of the external agencies may elevate the status of individuals whose apparent technical abilities are not accompanied by the political skills needed to respond effectively to crisis and to

oversee and administer adjustment. Over time this external orientation becomes incapacitating, as the skills that are developed are neither solidly rooted nor well tuned to the local setting. Ultimately, responding to crisis and managing adjustment require not only a sense of what is to be done in general, but also of how this is to be done in specific settings and, most important, how to get people to do it.

It is increasingly understood that effective implementation of development programs requires what has come to be termed *ownership*. People everywhere are much more likely to work for the success of programs that they consider to be their own, rather than initiatives imposed on them by someone else. Despite this understanding, nearly all agency-commissioned research on African education remains generally inaccessible outside a limited circle. Most often those charged with implementation see themselves as consumers, not owners.

As I have noted, education sector studies reflect both a medical metaphor and an outsider's perspective. Again, the terminology used is both instructive and formative. Reforms are termed *interventions*, that is, insertions from outside rather than initiatives from within. How are African educators to become owners of these reforms when they are the objects of the surgery, not the surgeons? Education is termed a *delivery system*, not an organic process in which learners are the doers rather than the receivers. How do recipients become owners?

Much of the writing on African development in the 1990s focuses on transparency and accountability. Education sector studies, however, remain largely opaque, more accountable to parliaments and program officers in the North Atlantic than to educators and other learners in Africa. This orientation of the commissioned research on African education reflects the broader environment for reform initiatives. Dependence on aid entrenches policy and programmatic change as something done *to* rather than *by* African education. As well, it dresses the politics of education reform in the clothing of research-guided improvement strategies, thereby obscuring who benefits and who pays. Externally funded, externally guided, and often externally managed reform projects are rarely directly responsible to the settings—whether teachers, students, or the local community—in which they function. In practice, this combination of the outsider's perspective (whether national or foreign) and limited accountability generally proves fundamentally disempowering.

Accepting their designation as the objects rather than the subjects of the learning process and disempowered by the institutionalization of aid-dependent reform, most Africans also lose any vision of what education was to accomplish.

A Vision for Education and Development

In a recent paper, Bacchus (1995) outlined a vision for education and development, reminding us of the optimistic and fundamentally sound agenda outlined in several African basic policy statements, including those of Tanzania and Namibia noted above. His starting point was *access*. Education for all is not a luxury, but a fundamental right of citizenship and a requisite for development, however defined. Increasing the number of school places is necessary but not sufficient. Both *quality* and *equity* are also essential. Neither learners nor the

society benefits when classes are too large for instructors to teach effectively, when textbooks are unavailable or outdated, when there are fewer pencils and notebooks than students, and when the learning setting crushes curiosity, precludes interaction and cooperation, and replaces the excitement of discovery with rote repetition. Nor is the society served when the education system functions to entrench the inequalities and injustice of the larger society. Indeed, if schools do not play a central role in confronting inequality, which other institutions will? And as Namibia has stressed, *democracy* is the necessary complement to access, quality, and equity. To prepare young people to become effective citizens in a democratic society, the education system itself must reflect democratic values and practices and institutionalize participatory decisionmaking and broadened accountability.

International institutions, including the World Bank, also shared a vision of what was problematic, what was possible, and what ought to be done. "The extremes of privilege and deprivation are simply no longer acceptable. It is development's task to deal with them" (McNamara, 1973).

Who goes to school, which learners are promoted, the quality of instructional materials, teachers' level of preparation, and the accountability of principals all matter a great deal. But as Bacchus (1995) stresses, the general learning environment also matters. Do teachers see themselves as learners as well? Are successful students better at framing questions, organizing inquiries, and applying their skills to unfamiliar situations? Do students have higher expectations of themselves and of their society? Are they both competent and self-confident? Do they understand reality not as given or immutably fixed for all times, but as if it were problematic, challengeable, and changeable? Is learning fundamentally empowering? Does it prepare students to be better able to challenge some of the acts of injustice and unfairness in their societies that are often still directed against the masses, especially the poor? Does it equip them to be active participants in democratic society, aware of the fragility of democracy, and able and ready to protect it?

A broad and hopeful vision for African education has been articulated by educators and national leaders. At the end of this century, however, it is sadly clear that rather than being translated into practice, the vision can barely be perceived.

Economic crisis makes it difficult to look far ahead. Scarcity justifies shortsightedness. Although a learner-centered instructional program might in practice prove to be particularly imaginative in dealing with strained material resources, most often those who manage the education system assert that the shortage of funds requires focusing on pencils and notebooks, not on the broader vision.

If crises have dimmed the vision, the triumphalism of the North Atlantic has regularly rejected it. Africans need to choose between growth and equality, the external advisers assert, clearly favoring the former. Examination results, not girls' specialization in science, the reorientation of the relationship between teachers and learners, or the development of cooperative working strategies are the appropriate measures of the quality, utility, and societal value of the educa-

tion system. Africa needs masons, not architects or creative and speculative imaginers.

Much of the education research contributes to this rejection. The focus on finance eclipses attention to learning. The outsider's perspective (where outsider does not mean foreign, but rather external to a particular initiative or project) alienates learners and instructors rather than securing their cooperation and reinforcing the intrinsic rewards of successful learning experiences. Disempowered, they become apathetic or antagonistic, and sometimes both. Specific objectives—say, increasing the availability of textbooks—become ends in themselves rather than elements of a coherent strategy designed to work toward a broader vision. Frequently the production of a larger number of textbooks matters more than what they contain.

The challenge for African education, then, is to refurbish the vision and recapture the initiative. The challenge for scholars of African education is to support, not obstruct, that process. For this they will need to become much more self-consciously critical, engaging the financial-intellectual complex and not simply working for or in it. And for this they will need to address and institutionalize accountability more broadly, both their own and that of the development advisory business.

Notes

1. As used here the term *education sector studies* refers to studies of African education initiated, commissioned, or supported by external funding agencies. In practice many of the studies address part of the education system, for example, primary education or textbooks, rather than the entire education sector. In a study commissioned by UNESCO for the Working Group on Education Sector Analysis of the Association for the Development of African Education (DAE; formerly, Donors to African Education), I develop an overview of both the scope and content of African education sector studies undertaken during 1990-1994, as well as an analytic review of their major themes and summaries of individual studies (Samoff & Assiç-Lumumba, 1996).
2. *Civilized* is one the code words in this story. Behavior that does not fit one's own moral code or even one's sense of good and bad is more easily disparaged if it is termed uncivilized. Over time, *civilized* has become the shorthand for good, progressive, modern, enlightened, humane, just, and democratic. *Uncivilized* is used regularly to relegate much of humankind to the trashcan. Were its consequences not so tragic, it would be amusing to note that countries that guarantee all their citizens access to health care resources or that have abolished the death penalty and corporal punishment in schools are considered uncivilized compared with the US.
3. Notwithstanding periodic efforts to reorient this perception, even for much of the black population of the US, the measure of the primitive, the unmodern, and the not-yet-fully-civilized is distinctly black.
4. It is less surprising that this premise informed research conducted at the end of the colonial era than that it is so pervasive in research undertaken more than three decades later.
5. It is striking that both the modernizationists and many of their critics agree on the critical role of this class. As early as the late 1950s, for example, Fanon (1963) asserted the importance of a modernizing middle class even as he argued that the African nationalist leadership would fail to become just such a class.
6. It is in this sense a perspective so deeply embedded in a society's institutions and practices that it is scarcely noticed, rarely examined, and hardly ever challenged that the ideology of modernization can be termed hegemonic.
7. Increased policy influence, both direct and indirect, is a significant and generally little remarked consequence of many structural adjustment programs. Samoff (1994b) summarizes relevant findings from five Third World country studies.
8. Senegal and Tanzania are cases in point: instructive case studies are summarized in Carton, Pape, and Comelieu (1994) and Samoff and Sumra (1994).

9. This research has included an analytic overview of nearly 240 Africa education sector studies: Samoff and Assiç-Lumumba (1996) was initiated by UNESCO, lead agency for the DAE Working Group on Education Sector Analysis. The observations and conclusions here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of UNESCO, DAE, the Working Group, or any of the agencies whose documents were reviewed.
10. Note that I am considering here the directly redistributive role of schooling. Education may also be redistributive indirectly, for example by narrowing the gap in income earning potential between children from more and less affluent families or by enabling a particular segment of the population to articulate more strategically and more effectively its policy preferences and demands for public services.
11. That most funding agency documents do not indicate clearly the sources that support their claims about what research shows compounds the problem: even careful and critical readers find it difficult or impossible to locate and assess the reliability and validity of the relevant research.
12. It is not in itself problematic that a bank commissions and publishes studies of African development. Nor is it necessarily problematic that those studies are widely cited. Rather, my argument here is that it is important to recognize the power, influence, and academic and developmental consequences of this historically unique combination of funding development projects and development research. (Note here the echoes of the early imperial era, when the metropolitan governments funded learned societies that in turn supported the field work of missionaries and adventurers who, like Livingstone, also saw themselves as geographers, anthropologists, and historians.) In this setting it is appropriate, indeed imperative, to address the World Bank not simply as a bank, but also as an institution whose basic policies are largely determined by the interests of a few affluent countries, whose lending program is justified by the extensive research it commissions, and whose own analyses and development agenda have come to constrain and shape the entire development discourse.
13. At its root, identifying the nature, characteristics, and behaviors of the poor as the causes for poverty necessarily devolves to a genetic explanation. If the circumstances in which they live lead the poor to behave in ways that perpetuate their impoverishment, then it is those circumstances (including leaders and their policies) local, national, global that cause poverty, not something inherent in the poor. To insist that the poor are poor because of who they are, however disguised, sanitized, beautified, and situationally conditional that claim may be, is to assert a genetic basis for differences in wealth and their consequences.

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Transformative Adult Education in an Age of Globalization: A Gramscian-Freirean Synthesis and Beyond¹

Introduction

In work I began at the University of Alberta under the supervision of Professor M. Kazim Bacchus (Mayo, 1988) and that I subsequently developed (Mayo, 1994a; Mayo, in press-a), I provided a comparative analysis of the ideas of Gramsci and Freire. I argued that such comparative work can lead to a synthesis that can be useful for developing theoretical signposts for transformative, and therefore emancipatory, adult education. In an age characterized by globalization, their work is still highly relevant not simply because of the strong sense of hope that it generates, especially Freire's work (1994) where there is an insistence on the progressive educator's task "to unveil opportunities for hope" (p. 9), but for other reasons as well. I feel that the need for politically charged adult educational processes intended to foster a critical reading of the world and a postcolonial politics (Giroux, 1988) becomes more urgent in this age of globalization, which "intrudes into and alters structures of day-to-day life" (Giddens, 1994, p. xxvii).

Concomitant with mobile global capitalism, characterized by the ever threatening "flight of capital" and by a production process involving a network of dispersed firms under decentralized management and computer technology control (Westwood, 1991, p. 46), is global "cultural invasion" and dependence (McLaren, 1994, p. xii). In this process, for instance, the mass media, vested in the hands of a few magnates, plays an important part in the development of collective and individual subjectivities. One must not overlook, though, the various forms of resistance both overt and covert that occur even among the economically most underprivileged groups. Resistance is especially evident in those industrially underdeveloped parts of the world where Freire was active as an adult educator (McLaren, 1994). In this regard, one can draw from Gramsci's theory of hegemony/counterhegemony and his writings on the role that cultural activity plays, as well as from Freire's writings on critical literacy. I see the work of Gramsci and Freire as equally pertinent in an age when multiple forms of oppression are being named and affirmed, forms that call into question orthodox socialists' projection of the oppressed as "unified subjects" and their articulation of an "essentialist" politics. In an age when a hegemonic force like the New Right in Britain, the United States, and elsewhere

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continues to make social class the target of its attack, it would be foolish to place class politics on the back burner (Meiksins-Wood, 1986).

Nonetheless, it would equally be foolish to focus solely on class politics without highlighting its intersections with other different forms of oppression. In highlighting these oppressions, one would do well not to lose sight of the "massive structuring forces" (Apple, Morrow, & Torres, 1991, pp. 28-29) that exist and of the need to explore possibilities for a Left paradoxically "unified in difference." Such unity in difference strikes me as being very much a feature of the inclusionary socialist politics called for in Britain during these "New Times," which are marked by the breakup of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Communist regimes in the rest of the Eastern Europe.

Gramsci is reputed to have had a considerable influence on the development of such politics, even though the use of Gramsci in this project has recently been the subject of a fine critique in the adult education literature (Allman & Wallis, 1995). The exploration of the elements that can contribute to such a politics of the Left, one that does not obscure the primacy of social class, has led me first to compare and now to attempt to synthesize ideas by Gramsci and Freire. The former projected the notion of a "Modern Prince" (a national-popular party) at the heart of an *historic bloc* (Hoare & Nowell Smith, 1971), characterized by the alliance of different social groups. The latter theorized oppression in a way that always has the concept of difference as its "guiding thread" (Giroux, 1988, p. 109).

Comparing Gramsci and Freire with respect to adult education, I note the following similarities (Mayo, 1994a):

1. Both emphasize the political nature of educational activity and on the role that institutions of civil society play in processes of social transformation.
2. There is a sense of agency in their works, coupled with the need to project educational programs in which human beings are transformed from object to subject.
3. The focus is on committed adult educators who themselves have to undergo a transformation to work with subaltern social groups, becoming *organic intellectuals* in the Gramscian sense or *experiencing their easter* in the sense advocated by Freire.
4. Both stress praxis as being at the heart of liberating education and the need to carry out such pedagogical work in the context of a larger movement or alliance of movements striving for change.

I also note differences, as follows (Mayo, 1994a):

1. Gramsci's focus is on the requirements of a particular social group that plays a leadership role in the process of social transformation. This is in marked contrast to Freire's nonreductionist/nonessentialist view of the struggle for democracy and the creation of a socially more just society.
2. There are differences in the range of social analysis provided. Gramsci presents a much wider spectrum, as his project was all-encompassing. The dynamics involved in teacher-learner encounters are accorded much wider treatment in Freire's work than in Gramsci's. This is understandable given that those dynamics are of central concern in Freire's work.

3. Gramsci provides a complex though undeveloped view of how ideas are taken up in the classroom, which is close to poststructuralist notions of how meaning is created, assimilated, and circulated. This contrasts with Freire's somewhat mechanistic description of what goes on in a situation of *banking education*.

I have argued that there is room for a complementarity thesis that will provide the basis for a synthesis. I now explore some of the ingredients for a Gramsci-Freire synthesis project focusing on this selection of themes: commitment, agency, adult educators, social movements, cultural production, and history. I broaden the theoretical base for this synthesis by drawing on ideas from other important figures in social theory and critical pedagogy.

Commitment

What emerges from Gramsci's and Freire's views about adult education is that radical initiatives in this area, which are destined to transform existing dominative power relations in society, require a strong commitment on the part of organizers and educators alike. The sense of commitment is implied in Gramsci's notion of the organic intellectual, which often entails a conscious commitment to a particular political movement. Popular educators in Latin America, as we see from the accounts of adult education experiences in Nicaragua before and after the 1979 revolution (Arnové, 1986; Horton & Freire, 1990), demonstrate the extent of such commitment by placing their lives on the line for the cause of social transformation.

Like all education, adult education is not neutral and is very much tied to hegemonic or counterhegemonic interests in a given society. A theory of emancipatory adult education would be borne out of a recognition of this point. It would be inspired by theoretical perspectives that highlight the strong relationship that exists between knowledge, culture, and power, rendering the kind of knowledge provided by mainstream institutions—and the manner of its dissemination—problematic. Emancipatory adult education initiatives developed on Gramscian-Freirean lines would therefore be sustained by a theory that is couched in a language of possibility, to adopt the Blochian terminology rendered so popular in critical pedagogical circles by Giroux (1988) and Simon (1992). The initiatives would emphasize a strong commitment to emancipating subaltern groups from hegemonic domination.

Gramsci focuses for the most part on the issue of class domination, whereas Freire's notion of oppression extends beyond the issue of class—and most particularly beyond the issue of the industrial proletariat—to a wider recognition of social difference and oppression. Freire does not provide sustained analyses of gender, race, sexuality, and even class issues, despite the 33 references to social class analysis that he claims to have made in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Freire & Macedo, 1993). Whether they focus on single-issue or multiple-issue politics, emancipatory educational initiatives would be rooted in a commitment to confront oppression in all its forms. Adult education initiatives directed toward the emancipation from oppression of a particular social group would be carried out in a manner that does not perpetuate the domestication and subordination of another. Feminist and antiracist criticisms of traditional working-class institutions for their white patriarchal structures

ideology (Taking Liberties Collective, 1989) and black feminist critiques of white feminist writers (Ball, 1992) immediately come to mind here (bell hooks, 1988, 1993; Lorde, 1984). Equally pertinent are the criticisms levelled at Freire and other central male figures in the area of critical pedagogy by Weiler (1991), Ellsworth (1989), and Gore (1993).

Agency

Adult education is perceived as an important element in cultural activity that can serve the purpose of either consolidating or transforming power relations. Radical adult education can constitute a vehicle whereby dominant ideologies are unveiled and dismantled. The realm of everyday experience characterized by taken-for-granted notions becomes part of the focus in an adult education process with emancipatory goals. In this age of global capitalism these notions would include the prevalent culture-ideology of consumerism (Sklair, 1995) and the marketplace, whereby even some of the most basic services are turned from a public good to a “consumption good.” This everyday experience evoked through a dialogical process constitutes the basis of the learning process, a process that entails the means of “extraordinarily re-experiencing the ordinary” (Shor, 1987, p. 93). However, this everyday experience would not be celebrated uncritically but would be interrogated. An attempt would therefore be made to convert common sense to “good sense” (Hoare & Nowell Smith, 1971, p. 323) to use the terms Gramsci borrowed from Manzoni’s *I Promessi Sposi* (*The Betrothed*), (Coben, 1994).

Furthermore, transformative adult education, with its emphasis on voices and on democratic social relations, constitutes prefigurative work. It attempts to prefigure (Allman, 1988) transformed social relations in the wider society. This was true of Gramsci’s *Factory Councils*, with their emphasis on radically democratic social relations of work, power sharing (including ownership of the work place itself), and education. It is equally true of Freire’s *Cultural Circles* with their emphasis on dialogue, critical interrogation of experience, the unveiling of social contradictions, and the promulgation of democratic social relations of education characterized by teacher authority but not authoritarianism (Horton & Freire, 1990; Shor & Freire, 1987). Both theorists provide an emancipatory education approach that confronts the kind of social relations traditionally prevalent in capitalist environments. I emphasize the word *traditionally* because elements of emancipatory educational practices are partly appropriated by management to provide a democratic facade for the process of extracting surplus labor, all part of the dynamic nature of hegemony, part of the “war of position” engaged in by the organic intellectuals of transnational capital.

Appropriation of Freire’s work occurs frequently. In Brazil his work was—amazingly—coopted by the same regime that banished him from his homeland (Kidd & Kumar, 1981). Furthermore, Freire’s work often becomes the target of liberal appropriation, with his *Method* being extricated from its underpinning political philosophy (Macedo, 1994), a process discussed by Aronowitz (1993). Worker management teams are a classic example of present-day capitalist appropriation of participatory educational experiences. Participation that entails power sharing, as was advocated in Gramsci’s factory council theory, and

that finds its common expression in cooperatives must be distinguished from that form of participation that occurs while management retains its prerogative over capital accumulation.

Social Movements

Judging from Gramsci's reflections on the isolation of the Turin factory insurgents during their occupation of factories (coordinated by the Ordine Nuovo Group in 1920; Adamson, 1980) and Freire's writings regarding *liberation theology* (Cooper, 1995; Elias, 1994; Freire, 1985) and the New Social Movements (NSMs), it appears that radical adult educational initiatives will not prove effective when carried out on their own. The message that comes through in Gramsci's notion of the historic bloc and throughout Freire's writings is that they are likely to prove effective only when sustained by a social movement, itself often conceived as a site of social revolutionary adult learning (Welton, 1993) or as an alliance of movements. Gramsci's notion of the historic bloc, signifying an alliance of social groups—nowadays including movements—becomes particularly significant in this age of global capitalism.

In my earlier work (Mayo, 1994b, 1994c), I asked if contemporary social movements, especially those with an international character, can serve as a vehicle whereby Gramsci's notion of the historic bloc can transcend its "national-popular" character (Hoare & Nowell Smith, 1971, p. 130) to signify an alliance of movements across national boundaries. I asked this in the context of the increasing mobility and globalization of capital. This is not to minimize the role that indigenous movements such as the revitalization movements of Conscientization and Sarvodaya (Zachariah, 1986) can play in this process. As Sklair (1995) argues, many resistance movements to global capitalism can be effective only when they disrupt the smooth accumulation of capital locally or, I would add, within a restricted sphere of influence. But Sklair also argues that such movements need to "find ways of globalizing these disruptions" (p. 507).

NSMs with a strong international character, like the women's movement and the environmental movement, strike me as being more likely to make headway in this respect. This said, I feel that we should be under no illusions. It would be foolish to romanticize NSMs and present them as some *deus ex machina* in an age when global capital holds sway. In the conclusion to his study, Sklair (1995) warns, "No social movement appears even remotely likely to overthrow the three fundamental institutional supports of global capitalism that have been identified, namely the TNCs, the transnational capitalist class and the culture-ideology of consumerism" (p. 507). Yet he affirms and illustrates some of the various resistances expressed by social movements in each of the three spheres. And these movements continually need to enhance their spheres of influence by engaging in alliances at the local, regional, continental and global levels, possibly by gaining access to and making effective critical use of electronic networking (Hall, 1993) to render such resistance more effective.

Emancipatory adult education can play its part in creating links between the movements themselves by promoting programs that do not encourage one voice at the expense of others, but that are socially inclusive in terms of curriculum, teaching personnel, and participants. A program of adult educa-

tion for work place democracy, such as the one I recently studied in Malta (Mayo, 1994a, in press-b), would seek to contribute to the democratization of the social relations of production both in the domestic and public spheres. In this regard, I have raised questions concerning Gramsci's factory council theory (Mayo, 1994c). People involved in such programs can work toward effective work place democracy by continually addressing issues that emerge from the intersections of class, gender, race, and ethnicity. Issues arising in my Malta case study that could have been addressed include day care, women on night shift, sexual harassment in the work place, and the sexual division of labor in the work place and in the home.

The issue of racism toward immigrant workers and other ethnic groups becomes ever more urgent in an age characterized by the continual global reorganization of capital across different geographical boundaries (Foley, 1994), a phenomenon commonly and problematically referred to as *Post-Fordism*. It is common knowledge that in this age we are witnessing the bifurcation of the labor market on racial, ethnic, and gendered lines (Ross & Trachte, 1990). Even conscientization processes developed on Freirean lines can contribute to fostering links between movements by increasing awareness of the different forms of oppression and the often contradictory intersections between them. Codification and decodification strategies would serve as a means of interrogating popular experiences to explore how one is implicated in, as well as suffering from, processes of structural oppression—how, for example, one is implicated in gender and racial oppression while being located in a subaltern position in the class structure. Programs developed on these lines might draw the support of different movements and make a contribution, however slight, toward bringing these movements together in something similar to an historic bloc. The relationship between radical adult education and social movements would be reciprocal in this context. Much of the impetus for the work carried out by radical adult educators is provided by the social movements, because of the various demands and issues that the movements raise. These issues would in turn become part of both the hidden and overt curriculum of the adult education program.

Emancipatory adult education can for its part help prepare citizens for such movements by increasing their awareness not only of the issues with which they are directly concerned, but also of issues affecting others, with a view to generating greater solidarity. Radical adult education initiatives, as well as radical adult educators, would prosper if sustained by a social movement or movements. Each movement would develop enough strength to sustain counterhegemonic efforts, including those of radical adult education, in as wide a range of civil society as possible. This ties in with Gramsci's notion of counterhegemonic action across the entire complex of civil society, an idea reflected in his own endeavors as activist and educator (journalism, cultural clubs, the work place, prison schools containing political detainees, etc.). This vision accords with Freire's recent exhortation to have one foot inside and another outside the system. Radical adult educators also need to be sustained by a movement. This is especially true for those educators working in the state system (Horton & Freire, 1990), carrying out their day-to-day tactical work in

the context of a long-term strategy for social transformation—in Freire’s words, “being tactically inside and strategically outside the system” (Freire, 1991).

Adult Educators

Gramsci’s views concerning organic intellectuals and Freire’s views regarding facilitators may be combined to project an image of the adult educator, working in the context of a radical adult education program, who is equipped with a theoretical understanding of the adult learners’ situation and engages in a directive form of adult education. It is directive in the sense that it is inspired by a vision of, and therefore directed toward, a society characterized by strong democratic social relations. The sense of authority that she or he possesses as an educator (Freire affirms this) does not degenerate into authoritarianism. On the contrary, every effort is made to promulgate democratic social relations and render the learners “subject” of the learning process (Freire, 1970, 1995). A genuine dialogical teaching process would provide the conditions for the learner’s culture to make its presence felt. The educator’s task is to facilitate the means whereby this culture is interrogated critically by the learners themselves, part of the process of moving from common sense to good sense. Freire’s codification/decodification process, which can be applied not only to literacy education but to different forms of knowledge dealing with different aspects of social life, can be one of the vehicles for the transition from common sense to good sense.

Through a dialogical process, it is not only the learners who begin to consider what they know in a more critical light, but also the adult educator who modifies his or her theoretical understanding through contact with the adult learners (Shor & Freire, 1987). This calls to mind Gramsci’s notion of the intellectuals testing their theories through a dialectical engagement with the masses (Hoare & Nowell Smith, 1971). Whatever knowledge the adult educator possesses at the outset of the learning process is relearned through dialogical contact with the learners (Shor & Freire, 1987).

Gramsci’s ideas on the instruction-education nexus (Hoare & Nowell Smith, 1971) combined with Freire’s dialogue do not preclude the possibility that a certain amount of instruction occurs when absolutely necessary (Horton & Freire, 1990). Instruction may be necessary in situations when the facilitator interrogates some of the opinions being expressed. It may also be necessitated by some of the dynamics at play in the learning circle. It would be naive to assume that adult learners readily accept processes of a dialogical education. There is sufficient literature (Gaber-Katz and Watson, 1991) to show that learners can be quite resistant to dialogue and can put pressure on the facilitator to resort to “tried and tested” methods. Years of exposure to banking education cannot be shrugged aside overnight. There will be moments when the facilitator will have to show discretion in the choice of teaching style. However, such teaching would be carried out in a manner that in no way undermines the spirit of democracy that should characterize the social relations of Freire-inspired education.

The image of adult educator that emerges from Freire’s insights is that of a person who seeks to remove obstacles preventing the learners from realizing their ontological vocation of becoming more fully human. Implicit in Gramsci’s

concept of the organic intellectual and Freire's insistence that the adult educator commits, in Cabral's terms, *class suicide* (Freire, 1978; Freire & Faundez, 1989) is their awareness that the process of emancipation can be severely undermined and can degenerate into one of domestication if the educator brings into play a "cultural capital" that is at odds with that of the learners. This is the sort of situation Gramsci criticized with respect to the popular universities (Broccoli, 1972). These centers are said to have provided *education for* rather than *education of/with* the working class. *Class suicide* is somewhat unattainable given that bourgeois-formed educators will probably find it extremely difficult to break away from their *habitus*, to borrow Bourdieu and Passeron's (1990) term (Mayo, 1994a, 1994c). It is extremely difficult for bourgeois educators to "jump out of their skin" in this respect. The best one can hope for is recognition on the facilitator's part of the gender, race, and class differences that might set her or him apart from the learner (Mayo, 1993). This recognition would constitute an important step in the direction of minimizing elements of domestication that can emerge from a position of privilege.

Cultural Production

The discussion concerning a Gramscian-Freirean synthesis has hitherto centered around questions of process. I now focus on content, and more specifically on questions of cultural production. Both Gramsci and Freire attach importance to popular culture in their writings. Whereas Freire uses the popular as the basis of the conscientization process, Gramsci provides little sustained analysis of this particular form of culture, except for the serial novel, in his writings. In fact Gramsci's analysis of popular culture is confined to the written word, and he eschews an analysis of the rich oral traditions of his native southern Italy and emerging forms of communication as cinema and the radio (Forgacs & Nowell Smith, 1985). I have argued that there exists in Gramsci a systematic and wide-ranging analysis of the dominant culture. Such an analysis is not to be found in Freire (Mayo, in press-a). For the purposes of developing a theory of radical adult education, it is possible to derive insights from a synthesis of Gramsci's ideas concerning the dominant culture and Freire's ideas concerning the popular.

For such purposes I would advocate a cultural studies program that is inclusionary and that avails itself of cultural products related both to the dominant established culture and the popular. Both can be critically appropriated for the subordinate group's ends. Popular forms of cultural production, ranging from oral activities such as popular narratives and ballads to forms of mass popular culture such as rock music and videos, can be the subject of critical interrogation. The same applies to forms of so-called high culture (Shakespeare texts that, one must not forget, have their roots in the popular). Taking the view that meaning does not lie solely in the texts (in his piece on the common school, Gramsci highlights the way people can derive different meanings from a single idea or fact), these works can be the focus of critical appropriation for transformative ends. They are "open to multiple readings" (Apple, 1992, p. 10) and can be read "against the grain" (Simon, 1992).

Learners in a radical adult education circle can generate discussions around the work in which they are encouraged to give voice to the different meanings

deriving from their particular locations in dominant regimes of truth and power. For example, Simon (1992) has demonstrated how one can go beyond a racist text to discover emancipatory possibilities emerging from multiple readings of it in his accounts of the Yiddish interpretation of Shylock, and Achebe's (1975) insurgent reading of *Heart of Darkness* is also quite revealing in this respect. Critical interrogation and appropriation would be the hallmark of such a cultural studies program carried out the public sphere (Giroux, Shumway, Smith, & Sosnoski, 1988). Cultural studies would thus be carried on outside the hallowed walls of the academy. It might be argued that in so doing, one would be taking cultural studies back to adult education as it originated in England (McIlroy & Westwood, 1993).

Once again, I would advocate a cultural studies program that is inclusionary. Apart from including elements of the popular and the so-called highbrow, including oral, visual, and written cultural products, it would be a program in which participants are always aware of and guard against the dangers of ethnocentrism, racism, and patriarchy. One has to go beyond Gramsci to avoid Eurocentrism (in his piece on the Common School, he advocates a classical curriculum) and beyond both Gramsci (Holub, 1992) and Freire to avoid patriarchal bias (Weiler, 1991). This applies not only to cultural studies programs, but to any other program developed with a transformative end in view.

History

Gramsci insisted on the need for the working class to engage in a study of history (Hoare & Nowell Smith, 1971). He argued that if workers were to provide another link in the chain of efforts for liberation from oppression, they must know about the preceding links. Workers also need knowledge of preceding social forms, institutionalized practices and beliefs, and of the historical contexts that contributed to the "invention of the traditions" (Hobsbawm, 1983).

Such an emphasis on macro-level history is not to be found in Freire. It appears that the emphasis in the cultural circles is on the present. I would argue however, that a critical analysis of a codified situation in the process of conscientization would be incomplete unless the situation is placed in its historical context. After all, the process involves a critical engagement with historically accumulated concepts and practices. The codification/decodification process offers the radical adult educator an excellent vehicle for enabling circle members to engage in *redemptive remembrance*. The relevance of Freire's pedagogy to processes of recovering collective memories is underlined by McLaren and da Silva (1993). This is an important area of inquiry and activity in adult education nowadays, with the focus on life history as a form of local narrative. Codifications can therefore be used not simply to facilitate viewing the present critically in order to obtain greater awareness of the contradictions underlying it, but also as a means of engendering a dialectical process. This process involves the juxtaposition of past and present with a view to providing a better future (Simon, 1992). Simon describes this particular kind of remembrance as "the practice in which certain images and stories of a collective past are brought together with a person's feelings and comprehension of their embodied presence in time and space" (p. 149).

At a practical level, an obvious “redemptive” historical exercise in the context of an adult education program would consist of the adult learners being encouraged to engage in reminiscences concerning their schooling experiences. The adult learners could be encouraged to bring photographs and items relevant to their schooldays (e.g., school yearbooks). Their accounts of their own school experiences could be interrogated by the “directive” facilitator for the purpose of underlining connections between the kind of school organization and pedagogy described and the power structures in the larger society. Furthermore, descriptions by the learners would also be interrogated to highlight and politicize absences, notably in terms of race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and disability. Such an analysis of one’s educational past would help throw critical light on current educational practices and suggest options for a transformed educational future. Furthermore, the analysis could set the learners in the critical frame of mind necessary for them to partake in a different, potentially transformative adult education program.

A combination of Gramsci’s and Freire’s ideas in this area would also include a process whereby the collective experiences of the learning group members are evoked, discussed, interrogated, and linked to the wider macro-level issues deriving from relevant historical research. This research would take into account different, insurgent perspectives on historical events. In the case of a workers’ program, this could involve the learners’ engagement in providing visual and other forms of documentation from their own as well as their families’ past. Ideally, these memorabilia would relate to the kind of work in which family members, possibly elderly family members, had been engaged. In the group discussion these work experiences are contrasted with group members’ own experiences. Through discreet but timely interventions by the facilitator, these experiences would be linked to a macro-level historical discussion concerning the working class, which should constitute an important component of the activity. Such a discussion might highlight not only the changing modes of capitalist exploitation throughout the ages and the degree of gender, racial, and ethnic segmentation involved in the labor process, but also indicate the “gains” made by labor organizations and other social movements during these periods. There would be an opportunity to point out the threat to these gains presently emanating from New Right quarters and the leverage over working-class organizations exerted by mobile capital. Emphasis on the gains made by labor could instill the sense of agency required for further transformative action in the world of work.

Of course, examples used in the adult learning process depend to a large extent on the context in which this process takes place. Where I come from, the developing micro-island state of Malta, one can avail oneself of the recent tendency to erect and unveil war memorials in various towns and villages. Radical adult educators working in such communities can use such a situation to engage in discussions concerning the country’s historical and economic connections with war—the *Fortress economy*—which would highlight the plight of the Maltese under British rule. This would also invite consideration of the perpetuation of colonial attitudes even during the postindependence period and the need to “decolonize the mind” (Freire, 1985, p. 187).

The discussion could be broadened in scope if juxtaposed against such images as war memorials are those pertaining to the present, notably recent images from neo-Nazi demonstrations in Germany. The connection between the images can be elicited through careful prompting and questioning, and this could open the discussion to incorporate the issue of race. This might lead to considerations of how we Maltese, as a people, are also implicated in racism. As a result, the group members will begin to see us, the Maltese, not only as an oppressed people owing to a long history of colonialism, but also as oppressors. This appreciation would attest to the many subjectivities involved in processes of oppression worldwide.

Conclusion: An Unfinished Canvas

In this article I explore elements for a theoretical framework for radical adult education on the basis of ideas expressed by Gramsci and Freire. In so doing I have borne in mind Gramsci's and Freire's respective "blind spots" (bell hooks, 1993; Mayo, 1994a) and have sought to compensate for them and to develop ideas borrowed from them by turning to some of the recent literature emerging from the fields of contemporary adult education theory, feminism(s), and critical pedagogy. These ideas have been developed within the framework of a broad democratic socialist politics. This politics speaks to the issues generated by the multiple forms of structural and systemic oppression worldwide. The nature of democratic socialistic politics is continually being affected by the changing processes of capitalist reorganization. I have limited myself to a few elements for such a framework in what is a synoptic version of a larger piece, a chapter in Mayo (1994a).

Other elements warrant extensive and possibly separate treatment, notably the issue of information technology. It is a double-edged sword in that as an instrument of capitalism it can constitute an effective process of domination, but can also offer counterhegemonic possibilities for fostering international alliances (Hall, 1993). One cannot hope to discover material on this issue in Gramsci's work given the time in which he lived, nor is there much reference to it in Freire's work, especially in his English-language publications (Mayo, 1994c). This and other areas warrant extensive treatment in exploratory works on transformative adult education. The same applies to each of the themes discussed in this article. Given its tentative and exploratory thrust, the article remains an unfinished canvas, the issues raised being far from settled. I believe they can never be settled in a project such as this.

Note

1. This article is an expanded version of a section in Mayo (1994b). It is a synoptic version of Chapter Six in Mayo (1994a).

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Empowerment of the People: Insights from the Philippines

In many educational systems worldwide, schooling and education have been motivated and relentlessly pursued by the desire for credentials, status, expert knowledge, and advanced technological skills. Emancipatory education in social movements, however, evolves from an unequivocal reverence for life, for human and planetary survival, and for a dignified quality of existence (Floresca-Cawagas & Toh, 1989).

Social and political events in the past two decades involved the unfolding of a generation of people power that achieved modest as well as radical reforms in different parts of the world. In the West, people power played an important role in tearing down the Berlin Wall and in dismantling the authoritarian regimes of the former Soviet Bloc. In South societies "small" people managed to stop powerful private interests and governments from completely destroying the environment, for example, in the case of the Chipko movement and the Narmada campaign in India (Shiva, 1986). In a number of societies the massive exercise of people power swept military dictators off their thrones of greed and oppression, as witnessed in the Philippines in 1986. Thus the last quarter of this century might well be remembered as a period when movements of diverse people came together for a common goal of transforming society to become more just and peaceful (Francisco, 1995).

Increasingly, many governments and quasi-governments have come to recognize the legitimacy, or at least tolerate the presence of, nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and people's organizations (POs)—two leaders on the front line of the social movement for change. Official international summits have been conducted with parallel gatherings of NGOs. For example, the 1992 Rio Earth Summit—the UN Conference on Environment and Development—had a simultaneous NGO Forum of more than 30,000 NGO representatives from around the world; the UN Summit in Social Development that met in Copenhagen was held parallel with an NGO Alliance for Social Development; the Vienna Human Rights Conference took place with a corresponding NGO Forum; and at the recently concluded Women's Conference in Beijing the official UN delegation and program was preceded by the women's NGO Conference. In addition to their increasing legitimacy as social actors in the eyes of governments, POs and NGOs are also called to play a significant role in peacemaking, from advocacy to mediation and the enforcement of peace ac-

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cords, as demonstrated in the Philippines (e.g., the Coalition for Peace and the Association of Major Religious Superiors), in El Salvador (e.g., the GSO and MSO), and in South Africa (e.g., United Democratic Front).

In the Philippines, POs and NGOs have been elements of the Filipino social and political movements for some time. During the Marcos regime (from the 1970s onward) sectoral groups of urban poor, laborers, peasants, students, and other cause-oriented groups courageously challenged the dictatorship despite risk to life, limb, and livelihood. When martial law was declared, some of the more militant frontline activists had no choice but to go underground, although a few could still work cautiously “above ground.”

As confirmed in the mosaic of Philippine people power in 1986 that deposed Marcos, social movements emerged to a position once solely dominated by political parties and formations. Not long after the 1986 people power demonstration, new alliances were formed among progressive social and political movements while some sectoral groups and NGOs managed to maintain their autonomy. Groups like the Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC), the Partnership for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development Services, the Urban Land Reform Task Force, and the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) have brought together POs, NGOs, and political blocs to achieve common goals: debt relief, agrarian reform, rural development, urban housing, and the right of people to development (Clamor, 1992; Francisco, 1995; Gatpatan, 1994). The National Peace Conference organized in 1993, which is now actively encouraging the peace process for a negotiated settlement of the armed conflict between government and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the Rebulosyunaryong Alyansang Makabayan (RAM, formerly the Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines), is a multisectoral network of indigenous groups, church-based organizations, urban and rural poor federations, and women’s groups (Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute [GZOPI], 1993).

Today we witness the makings of a maturing and enduring social and political movement in the Philippines, although it is a movement that needs to openly confront obstacles and challenges including an openness to interrogation for contradictions and authenticity.

Pedagogical Insights from the Philippines

One of the most significant contributions of the social movements in the Philippines to societal transformation has been their adherence to appropriate pedagogies and organizational processes. This is often not fully appreciated in academic communities where knowledge-production and dissemination has tended to adopt expert, top-down modes and approaches. Drawing from the visions and practices in the NGOs and POs in the Philippines, I construct four themes that have some relevance to the common quest for justice and peace in other places and regions. These are: critical consciousness and dialogue; conscientization-reflection and action; active nonviolence and transformation; and coalition-building. My insights are drawn from the community education efforts of NGOs and POs through my own personal involvement as far back as the harrowing days of the Marcos dictatorship, as well as my continuing research and communication with those who are now most actively engaged in

the movement. I have drawn insights from the work and the members of the Coalition for Peace; the Freedom from Debt Coalition; the National Movement for Civil Liberties; various sectoral groups representing women, peasants, labor, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous people, and youth; the Caucus of Development NGOs; the Basic Christian or Ecclesial Communities; and environmental action groups. This is not to imply that the Philippine experience has not benefited from theory and practice developed in other parts of the world. The influence of Freirean and other participatory, dialogical modes of awakening critical consciousness and praxis have made their imprint and are quite obvious in the Philippine experience.

Critical Consciousness and Dialogue

Through the educational activities of NGOs and POs, people are being helped to develop a critical consciousness toward issues that determine their quality of human life and their social, economic, political, and natural environments. Citizens are learning to overcome years of uncritical acceptance of top-down and authority-based knowledge and to ask sensible and sensitive questions about the root causes of societal problems. They continue to acquire the skills for gathering data to answer those questions as objectively as possible, albeit skills that are infused with ethics, reciprocity, and solidarity.

To achieve this aim of critical consciousness, the Freedom from Debt Coalition regularly disseminates facts and analysis about the debt and its repercussions for poverty, unemployment, and social disintegration through newsletters, monographs, comics, cartoons, posters, public fora, and other modes of communication. PILIPINA, a national federation of women's associations has a dynamic education component that provides rural women with access to facts and analysis about the role of women in development.

Popular education is based on dialogue rather than what Freire calls *banking*, and on teaching-learning processes that facilitate creative and open-minded inquiry, promote self-reliant understanding, and wean the people from blindly accepting leaders or community organizers as "experts." By empowering themselves to critically understand realities and to feel that they can meaningfully contribute to transformation, ordinary people will avoid the cult of *expertism* underpinning the dominant paradigm of development. This is not to deny the possible constructive contributions of expertise to problem solving, including societal problems. But the process by which knowledge based on expertise is offered for people's use clearly needs to be horizontal, participatory, and democratic.

Popular methods such as theater, role-playing, poster design, and group analysis are most consistent with dialogue. My experience in working with Filipino teachers and educators confirms that although initial responses to creative pedagogies are usually characterized with caution, the unfamiliarity usually turns quickly into enthusiasm. This receptiveness reflects in part the centrality of singing and dancing in Filipino cultures. Regrettably, too many formal and nonformal educational environments are divorced from such cultural realities, emphasizing only authoritarian teaching and passive learning modes. Formal schooling can learn some practical lessons in pedagogy from popular education.

Dialogue, by its very nature, also requires exposing people to a range of alternative world views on any issue so that they can come to their own conclusions and commitment. In discussions of human rights, the method of a mock trial is most useful for it allows people to critically consider the “defense” of the Philippine Government (i.e., the Human Rights Commission, the Philippine Armed Forces) against charges of human rights violations brought by NGOs like the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), the Philippine Alliance of Human rights Advocates (PAHRA), and the National Movement for Civil Liberties, and also by external observers like Amnesty International and visiting fact-finding missions. A mock trial strategy needs, however, to promote sensitivity and respect for due process and valid evidence. This allows the criticism engendered in a mock trial to be dialogical rather than an adversarial contest of positions.

In real-life situations, dialogue is most crucial in laying some consensual basis for a systematic discussion of the pros and cons, and rights and wrongs of a conflict. As the Coalition for Peace discovered during encounters between urban poor squatters facing eviction and government officials, police, and real estate developers, facilitating a dialogue is a complex and difficult task. Nevertheless, it is vital if low-level conflicts are not to escalate into bloody confrontations.

Conscientization: Reflection and Action

Social movements have unambiguously demonstrated that education cannot remain at the level of cognitive understanding or even emotional involvement. To educate for transformation is to catalyze the people to undertake action on the basis of their consciousness and self-realized responsibility. Such action includes both personal action and whatever an individual can do to make her or his personal and interpersonal environment more peaceful, and it includes social action or whatever individuals can do in solidarity with each other as groups, movements, institutions, citizens, and communities. In Freirean terminology, the process of encouraging critical reflection that leads to critical action in an ongoing dialectical spiral is *conscientization* (Freire, 1972).

One Philippine exemplar of conscientization through education is modeled by the environmental movement. NGOs such as Green Forum Philippines and the Kinaiyahan Foundation have contributed enormously to raising public consciousness about the ecological destructiveness of prevailing models of development. Educational activities are accompanied by campaigns to stop deforestation and unregulated pollution of all varieties and to persuade the government and politicians to enact and enforce laws for saving the rapidly disintegrating environment. Environmental activists work in remote missions in Mindanao, a major island in the southern Philippines, to reforest denuded mountains. They courageously criticize loggers, who are backed by local officials and military forces, and call for a new theology that cares for the earth (McDonagh, 1986). Starting from a nonviolent blockade of illegal logging trucks, residents of San Fernando, a small village in Mindanao, took their case to the country’s capital city where, by fasting outside the Presidential Palace, they eventually convinced the government to enforce a logging ban in their region (Gaspar, 1990).

Another internationally acknowledged demonstration of people's conscientization is the Filipino people's struggle to rid the country of all foreign military presence. In 1991, the Anti-Bases Coalition waged a determined educational campaign to conscientize public opinion about the military facilities that were being made available to the United States armed forces. The Anti-Bases Coalition and other antinuclear organizations succeeded in raising public awareness about the advantages of a nuclear-free, demilitarized Philippines because of the broadly based support demonstrated by educators, students, workers, peasants, intellectuals, religious, and some nationalist politicians and entrepreneurs. Forums, publications, television talk shows, rallies (including an international peace brigade in early 1989 to express solidarity for a nuclear-free and demilitarized Philippines) provided opportunities to discuss critically the pros and cons of hosting the bases. Although it was difficult then to predict the outcome of the campaign until the hour of decision, in the end the Filipino people once again affirmed the strength of people power in demystifying external military dependence and intervention. In September 1991 the Philippine Senate, in compliance with the will of the people, refused to renew the treaty for what had been the biggest US military installation outside the US, on Philippine soil for more than 50 years.

The reflection-action dynamics is practiced as well in the NGOs and POs as they regularly engage in self-reflection, continually revisiting their assumptions, goals, and strategies in light of changing political and social environments. Indeed, those engaged in popular education have to set positive role models for conscientization so that their educational activities are not blindly conducted in their uncritical pursuit of the movement's goals. In June 1994 over 30 leaders of the Philippine social development and NGO movements gathered for a reflection retreat (the fourth of a series of similar attempts) to take part in an introspective assessment and planning ("Have We Made a Difference?" 1994).

Active Nonviolence and Transformation

By catalyzing transformative action based on critical understanding of the root causes of conflicts and violence, the Philippine social movement endorses explicitly the assumptions, values, and methods of active nonviolence and other similar approaches to peaceful conflict resolution (Claver, 1985; GZOPI, 1992). This preference, echoed by most NGOs and POs worldwide, rests on a conviction that long-term sustainable, just, compassionate, and democratic futures are best created through an ethos and culture of nonviolence. Continuing the spiral of militarization and countermilitarization can only mean more deaths and maiming (whether the victims are poor soldiers or poor guerrillas), more refugees, the escalation of economic and ecological destruction, and the diversion of scarce resources to the military and away from the needy majority. The main beneficiaries in a protracted armed conflict are undoubtedly the external power interests and local elite minorities who still have enough space to prosper without conscience.

NGOs and POs toil in their various fields of concern to transform societal structures through active nonviolence. The Urban Poor Forum and the Philippine Urban Solidarity Organization, for instance, work with the urban poor to

meet their basic human rights to food, jobs, and shelter, and while organizing lobbying campaigns and educational symbols such as a tent city outside Congress. Similarly, the Congress for Peoples Agrarian Reform (CPAR), the biggest coalition of peasant federations in the Philippines, has persistently pursued active, nonviolent strategies in their struggle toward the goal of "land for the tiller" as a foundation for a civil society.

Despite growing harassment from anticommunist elements (the military, vigilantes, landlords), the Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace and the Basic Christian or Ecclesial Community movement are alive and well in the Philippines. In these movements, conscientizing villagers means developing a critical understanding of structural violence, or of the unjust social, economic, and political structures that underpin the villagers' marginalization. From this awareness the people are moved to cooperate and share resources to build more participatory, self-reliant, and just communities (Claver, 1985).

The Coalition for Peace, which is an umbrella organization for several NGOs, has initiated the concept of Zones of Peace as one active, nonviolent strategy to ban militarized conflicts in as many areas of the country as possible. Through the involvement and cooperation of community groups and institutions like the church and local councils, local villagers empowered themselves to call on all armed personnel from all the conflicting parties (except crime-control police) to refrain from entering the peace zones, which will be monitored by peace volunteers. Furthermore, the villagers have urged the government and all rebel forces to reopen peace negotiations, to disband anticommunist groups (e.g., vigilantes), and to stop human rights violations or terrorism from all sides. The initial success of 13 existing zones throughout the country has demonstrated a range of possibilities for a nonviolent process of structural transformation in the arena of militarized conflict (GZOPI, 1994).

Coalition-building

The fourth theme for pedagogical consideration is the concept and practice of coalition-building. Even when certain goals are achieved and operations seem to be unimpeded by major obstacles, experience has convinced NGOs and POs of the power and strength of coalitions. In the Philippines a variety of theoretical and methodological emphases are to be found among the numerous NGOs and POs that are involved in societal transformation. These range from, for example, social democrats to more radical political groups. Despite differences in ideological orientations, various development NGOs nationwide have come together under the aegis of the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) to forge a Covenant on Philippine Development, a contract that serves as a common foundation of the NGOs work and advocacy. For example, the CODE-NGO wishes to ensure that, as one of 10 other conditions, all foreign assistance directly benefits the majority of the Filipino people, especially those living in conditions of extreme poverty. This means that NGOs and POs should be consulted about Official Development Assistance (ODA)-funded development programs and projects (Clamor, 1992). Although not all ODA programs are faithfully referred to the people, there certainly has been a significant shift in official procedures; more authentic consultations are conducted at the insistence of the people themselves.

The coalition-building efforts of the Urban Land Reform Task Force in lobbying for the passage of the Urban Development and Housing Bill exemplifies further the need for and power of coalitions. Even since the enactment of the development and housing bill into law in 1992, the coalition continues to make advocacy for the implementation of the bill a priority (Gatpatan, 1994).

Under the present administration of President Ramos, NGOs and POs continue to assert their rights and responsibilities to advocate for social, economic, and political policies that will reverse the marginalization of the poor majorities. In particular, by being willing to participate in the government's social reform agenda, the coalitions and networks of NGOs and POs are determined to insert their principles and concerns for social justice and people-centered development into national policies. Clearly to avoid the possibilities for cooptation, the POs and NGOs will need to be vigilant with respect to the authentic practice of the social reforms that are claimed as important to the present government's overall direction.

Obstacles and Challenges

Although the social and political movements in the Philippines are thriving in a more democratic environment than has existed in the past, a number of NGOs and POs are now faced with difficulties and challenges requiring them to rethink and reconsider their directions, goals, and strategies. Some of these obstacles may not be grave enough to affect substantially the gains in the movement; nevertheless, they need serious assessment.

There are ongoing splits or schisms in some POs and NGOs, partly because a cadre of the volunteer workers were originally political activists with strong ideological positions. Because of realignments in the political blocs and the national democratic front as a response to major shifts in world politics, some POs are also being threatened by alliances with the so-called *reaffirmists* and *rejectionists*. During the Marcos and Aquino regimes, a strong united front was provided by the CODE-NGO, the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA), the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU or May 1st Labor Movement), the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP or the National Farmers' Federation), GABRIELA (the major women's group), BAYAN, and other major umbrella organizations. Today President Ramos' administration is enjoying the temporary absence of a formidable unified social force to critique and challenge its policies and programs for modernization. Past experience confirms that such splits in the movement could be exploited by powerful elites who would benefit greatly from a weakened populist movement.

While NGOs and POs are painfully resolving internal conflicts, another challenge comes in the form of alienation or isolation from the greater movement. A real obstacle to movement unity is the conflicting pedagogical paradigms of different groups. For example, where a social movement utilizes power in hierarchical, top-down structures, it will not be promoting transformation based on dialogue and critical democracy. Other groups practicing more dialogical and participatory organizational and pedagogical practices will resist a vanguardist, nondialogical character of leadership. Thus some

NGOs and POs have increasingly distanced themselves because of strongly held assumptions and principles that would be compromised by joining coalitions. Such situations could be easily fanned and exploited to create a seriously divided movement.

Another troubling issue in the movement is the possibility of cooptation due to the government's changing policies and strategies. For example, the government's Philippine 2000 economic blueprint is anchored in the rhetoric of sustainable development and people empowerment: key words much echoed by the social movement. There is evidence that Filipino NGOs and POs are fully vigilant regarding these cooptation possibilities. The NGOs have been outspoken about Philippine 2000 policies, charging that in practice these policies will only widen rich-poor gaps and deepen environmental degradation. However, the temptation to collaborate uncritically has been serious.

Finally, as is happening worldwide, every NGO and PO is faced with the perennial problem of limited resources. Except in those organizations operating on trust funds, hundreds of development workers exhaust their creative energies to "do more with less" as resources dwindle and ODAs suffer from cutbacks in their countries of origin.

The Underpinning of Peaceful Community-oriented Values

To conclude, I identify some common values underpinning social movements in the Philippines. For the better educated middle classes, the realities of marginalized existence in their own society are often distant, due to spatial-cultural separation and educational alienation. Hence pedagogies for stimulating empathy and a deep sense of *compassion* for the oppressed (which cannot be *pity* or mere *charity*) coupled with *justice* and *willingness to share* are vital in the movement. For instance, in cooperative groups participants enact through song, dance, poetry, and dialogue episodes that mirror the daily lives of poor fisherfolk, sugar cane laborers, tenant farmers, urban poor, and street children. The values of compassion, justice, and sharing are similarly emphasized when teaching about the need for cultural solidarity. Despite the cultural richness and diversity of the Philippines, dominant lowland groups are often sadly lacking in much understanding of and sensitivity to cultural minorities, including highlanders, non-Christians (notably Muslims), and tribal peoples (Toh & Floresca-Cawagas, 1990). Consequently, territorial and natural resources that comprise the domains of indigenous cultures are viewed as exploitable, while the cultures themselves are stereotyped as less "civilized" and dispensable. Learning exercises like theater of the oppressed and ethnic broadcasting are therefore used to awaken respect in citizens from the dominant groups for the rights of cultural minorities for self-determination and autonomy, to practice intercultural dialogue, and to value or even learn from other cultures (e.g., ecological wisdom of tribal peoples, reluctance to exploit for personal gain).

Last but not least, NGOs and POs always try to cultivate a sense of hope among the people. Given the enormous obstacles to the building of a just and peaceful society, it is easy to become pessimistic or even cynical about the prospects for change. Any movement has to be hopeful, not in an idealistic sense that the world will somehow get better, but in a dialectical sense of concurrently appreciating the grim realities, working as hard as possible to

transform unpeaceful structures, and passing on the spirit of hope to more fellow human beings (Floresca-Cawagas & Toh, 1989).

For those who are committed to social and political movements, whether Filipinos or visitors from abroad, it is impossible not to feel sadness that a land so richly endowed with natural resources, human talent, and diverse cultures of song and dance is afflicted by so much needless suffering. But as I attempt to portray in this discussion, there are also rays of hope amid this suffering. Despite the vested interests, obstacles, apathy, risks, and sacrifices, diverse groups, organizations, institutions, communities, and individuals have become conscientized toward the active, nonviolent transformation of unjust structures. Their individual and collective actions for justice and peace symbolize and actualize the hope that the available sum total of indigenous cultural, social, economic, and environmental resources can be creatively woven into a Filipino societal tapestry of peace, justice, sharing, and compassion.

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Partnerships and Emancipatory Educational Movements: Issues and Prospects

There is a need for partnerships—between universities in the North and the South and between universities and various agencies of civil society—to effect change. Such partnerships are crucial to the creation of models that would be alternatives to the current development paradigms propagated by the dominant neocolonial institutions of our time, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These institutions are the modern-day equivalents of past agencies of colonialism that conditioned the sovereignty of the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania. Various elements of neoliberal, structural-adjustment, and development policies have contributed to the increasing impoverishment of hundreds of millions of peoples over the past decade. The policies have also contributed to an increasing gap between the educational and other social services available to the rich and poor in and between countries; and to the erosion of the public school systems that have served as the means to confer citizenship rights, forge nation states, and prepare citizens for the practice of democracy.

After briefly discussing what these policies have meant for Latin America, the region with which I am most familiar, I discuss some alternative approaches to development that are rooted in partnerships that we might explore.

Dynamics and Consequences of the Dominant Development Paradigm

The introduction of neoliberal economic policies by international donor and technical assistance agencies is intended to address issues of hyperinflation, fiscal deficits, and balance-of-trade deficits. The term *neoliberal* is derived from neoclassical economic theories based on the work of classical economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who believed that the role of the state consisted in establishing the conditions by which the free play of the marketplace, the laws of supply and demand, and free trade based on competitive advantage would inevitably result in benefit to all. Government policies based on these notions have led to a drastic reduction in the state's role in social spending, to deregulation of the economy, and to the liberalization of import policies. They are intended to provide the conditions for economic stability initially and economic growth eventually, and as such enhance the prospects for achieving politically stable and democratic societies.

I argue that the opposite is occurring. The fiscal austerity and structural adjustment policies recommended by the World Bank, the International

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Monetary Fund, and national technical assistance agencies like USAID are conditions prerequisite to receiving favorable credit ratings and loans. Overall they have had deleterious effects on the economies and education systems of Latin America. These policies fundamentally advocate replacing a social and political rationality, the logic of the majority in cases like Nicaragua, with the logic of the marketplace. The role of the state in the economy as well as in the provision of basic social services (like education) is to be reduced in favor of market forces.

In education, as in the economy, decentralization and privatization are advocated to streamline the state apparatus and pass on the true costs of education to the users. To cut education costs, teachers' salaries are to be reduced relative not only to the private sector, but also to other public sector employees. Teachers are expected to teach larger classes for longer hours and less money. Because economic analyses indicate that the highest social rate of returns accrues to investments in primary education and the lowest to higher education, World Bank functionaries favor increased expenditures on the first four years of primary education and reduced public expenditures on higher education, with a concomitant introduction of user fees based on ability to pay for higher education.

The economic and educational consequences of these policies for the people of Latin America have been most unfortunate. Between 1980 and 1990 when these policies were introduced, the number of people living in poverty increased from 112 to 184 million. In countries ranging from Brazil to Nicaragua, 80% of the population does not earn enough to meet basic human needs. On average, Latin American per capita incomes fell 9% during the 1980s.

Not only has income fallen, but income disparities between the richest and the poorest sectors of society have widened, while the middle sectors have experienced a substantial decline in their standard of living. In metropolitan Buenos Aires, 25% of the poorest households lost 15% of their income, whereas 5% of the richest households increased their income by almost 20%. In the metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, 25% of the poorest households lost almost 13% of their income, whereas 5% of the richest gained approximately 25%. Furthermore, income losses were experienced not only by the poorest of the poor; 50% of the households located in the middle of the scale lost between 3% and 10% of their income (Comisión Económica para América Latina [CEPAL], 1991). As a result, class structures in Latin America have become more polarized, with the rich and poor sectors separated by an increasingly wide gap. This is also true in Mexico and Chile, which have served as models of structural adjustment for other countries in the region. Despite the apparent economic success of Chile in particular, and Mexico until recently, the poor are becoming poorer and more numerous, and the gap between the rich and poor is growing (Castaneda, 1993).

With the economic downturn, all Latin American nations experienced reductions in educational expenditures in terms of Gross National Product (GNP) and Total Governmental Expenditure (TGE). Under neoliberalism, significant improvements in educational spending made during the 1960s and 1970s were effectively negated by drastic spending cuts. According to Reimers (1991):

On average, [unweighted] per capita expenditures in education in Latin America increased by 4.29% per year between 1975 and 1980, while they decreased by 6.14% between 1980 and 1985. The progress in educational finance made in the seventies was undone in the eighties. (p. 332)

For example, in Bolivia between 1975 and 1980, per capita expenditure on education increased at an annual rate of 3.62%. But between 1980 and 1985, per capita expenditure on education decreased at an annual rate of 42.03% (Reimers, 1991, p. 323). In Ecuador both the GNP and the TGE were cut by nearly 50%, and the education percentage of the GNP fell from 5.6% in 1980 to 2.6% in 1991. The percentage of TGE fell from 33.3% to 17.5 for the same time period (UNESCO, 1993, Table 4.1).

The spending cuts in education in Latin America first affected recurrent expenditures like the purchase of teaching materials and the maintenance of school buildings. Due to lack of funding, reforms designed in the 1970s and early 1980s were not implemented. Thus in the late 1980s and early 1990s, teachers were working from curricula developed in the 1960s and with pedagogy designed to confront the challenges of the 1960s classroom.

At the same time, major reductions were made in teachers' wages. The real value of teachers' salaries decreased steadily as currencies were devalued and inflation increased during the economic turmoil of the late 1980s. It was not uncommon in many Latin American nations to pay teachers little more than was paid to domestic employees. On average, for all Latin American nations, teachers' salaries fell 34.8% between 1980 and 1989. For example, in 1989 in El Salvador, teachers' salaries had fallen 68.4% from their 1980 level, from \$7,980 to \$2,514 annually. In the Dominican Republic, teachers' salaries fell 60%, from \$2,432 to \$974 annually (Wolff, Schiefelbein, & Valenzuela, 1994).

Accompanying these cuts were moves by state authorities to charge matriculation and various user fees for textbooks, laboratories, and materials and services previously provided free of charge. In countries where the vast majority are living in conditions of poverty, even a minimal fee of one to two dollars a month may be prohibitive. It may be a choice between food or school supplies.

Privatization also has meant greater subsidies for private schools, which often cater to the more powerful groups in society, and fewer restrictions on their establishment and administration. In Latin America the most decisive moves to privatize education have taken place at the university level, particularly in Chile and Brazil. The promise of a higher education available to all regardless of ability to pay is a vanishing dream in many countries.

Although emphasis on the first four years of basic education may appear to be an egalitarian move that will favor the poor of a country, such a policy raises a number of concerns. As conceptualized by the World Bank, basic education does not include literacy and adult basic education. In Brazil, for example, the World Bank is spending \$700 million for improvement of primary education in the Northeast, the poorest region of the country; however, not a penny is being spent for the 35% of the adult population that is illiterate. In Nicaragua, where illiteracy is once again at 50% of the adult population (despite the highly acclaimed 1980 national literacy crusade), no World Bank funds go for this purpose. Indeed, the Nicaraguan Ministry of Education is relying on the

private sector and on agencies such as UNICEF and UNESCO, which have limited funds, to provide the means to address the needs of over one million illiterate youths and adults. The funding formulas derived from the cost-benefit analysis of World Bank economists call for writing off the present generation of adults as a poor educational investment.

Current neoliberal policies concerning higher education present a number of issues that need to be addressed. These policies have pitted universities against lower levels of an education system, particularly primary education. In some cases, as in Nicaragua, the policies have led to acrimonious debate between ministry of education officials and the presidents of public universities over how public funds are to be divided between levels of the education system—resulting, for example, in a two-month strike by university faculty and students in Nicaragua in 1992.

Those presenting the university case argued that it was unfair for the government to set higher education against primary and secondary education. Education should be viewed as a continuum. Although they agreed that support for primary education is critically related to the democratization of the society, there is a danger of falling into the trap of *primarización*, emphasizing this level of education to the neglect of higher education. To do so would be to condemn the country to peripheral status in the global economy and continued dependence on the scientific and technological knowledge of the metropolitan centers of the North. University leaders criticized the neoliberal agenda promoted by the World Bank, the IMF, and the Inter-American Development Bank for maintaining Nicaragua and other Latin American countries in the subservient position of exporters of raw materials (largely dessert goods), whose value has been constantly declining. In 1993, Gorostiaga, the rector of the Central American University in Nicaragua, countered government recital of World Bank cost-benefit studies. Citing recent publications of CEPAL (1990, 1991), he noted that in order for Latin American countries to achieve development with equity, it is essential for them to transcend the stage of income based on simple production (*renta perecible*, perishable revenue) and direct their energies instead to income based on technical transformation of natural resources (*renta dinámica*, dynamic revenue). What countries like Nicaragua need are world-class institutions of higher education generating the scientific and technological knowledge that will enable them to compete effectively in the global economy through sustained economic growth (Arnove, 1994).

As Gorostiaga (1991) has noted, the issue confronting the university community is how in a situation of economic depression to make a university education available to all students of ability while also constructing a quality university that would be a key agency for social change. Furthermore, there is the issue of how to democratize access to knowledge as part of a quest for academic excellence. In a visionary spirit, the Central American University has elaborated a blueprint to link “local know-how” to “university know-how” so as to invigorate teaching and research in higher education while supporting grassroots initiatives aimed at income and job generation and community improvement. Gorostiaga (1993) further contends that there is an enormous disconnection between the practical knowledge of individuals working in small- and medium-scale businesses, factories, and farms and the academic

knowledge of university graduates, who are precisely those who "feed the technocracies that govern the nation." Yet the locally based, small-scale sector of the economy produces one third of the Gross Domestic Product of Nicaragua and has the capacity to employ more than one half of the working population. In Latin America, the so-called "businesses of the poor" provide jobs for as much as 40% of the economically active population (Gorostiaga, 1993, pp. 30-32).

Gorostiaga proposes using existing university departmental extension programs along with research and development institutes that are affiliated with this university as nuclei for experimentation, training, and popular education. At the Central American University, the School of Agricultural Sciences and the Department of Ecology already have projects on the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts in ecological protection and self-sustainable development. Nitlapan (a research and popular education institute) has helped establish alternative credit institutions (known as *peasant banks*) and "peasant universities" in the departments of Masaya, Carazo, Matagalpa, and Jinotega, and an experimental project in land titling and legalization of cooperatives with law school students. In addition to undertaking pioneering linguistic research on the languages of the Atlantic Coast Region, the Center for Investigation and Documentation of the Atlantic Coast (CIDCA) has conducted studies of coastal ecology; the Juan XXIII Institute has worked in rural development with thousands of peasant families; and the Central American Historical Institute, in conjunction with the university and the journal *Envío* has organized rehabilitative education and production workshops with 3,500 war-disabled people and their families.

This blueprint for a New University of the South, taken from the article "New Times, New Roles" in the journal *Envío* (Gorostiaga, 1993) forms the kernel of a proposal on more egalitarian partnerships between the universities of the North and the South, and between universities and their societies. Such plans are similar to the bold initiatives supported by Bacchus (1992b) to link the University of Guyana to the development needs of that country.

Proposal

The proposed project involves a North-South dialogue between North American and Latin American universities, popular education, and alternative credit programs. It involves networking between the institutions involved in this dialogue and the design of an alternative development model based on empowering grassroots movements to shape their own destinies in accordance with their most pressing needs. The alternative model involves channeling resources to community-based organizations that have knowledge of local circumstances but that lack the capital and knowledge of national and international markets that would enable them to start successful economic enterprises and/or gain a livelihood. In a number of nonindustrialized countries, as well as in the United States and Canada, alternative credit programs have been initiated that provide small loans to low-income groups to start businesses. Examples of such successful programs include the Grameen banks in Pakistan, the Southside Bank project in Chicago, and the Good Faith Fund in Arkansas. There have been a number of initiatives in Central America such as Nitlapan, discussed above, FINCA in Costa Rica, and Katalysis in Honduras and El

Salvador to establish community banks. In recent years a number of solidarity groups and Sister City projects in the US have attempted to move away from a paternalistic model of meeting requests for material aid, which creates a vicious cycle of dependence, to creating revolving credit funds that would help generate jobs and income-earning communities. A number of these projects require that funds go to cooperative groups and to rural women in particular. Along with credit, however, there must also be educational programs that provide the knowledge and competences needed to establish democratic and effective community-based organizations. Information and skills are needed not only to manage credit successfully but to unite with other likeminded groups to gain access to national resources and services to which these citizens are entitled.

The Indiana University Center on Global Change and World Peace recently submitted a proposal based on these notions to various philanthropic foundations in an effort to obtain funds to initiate and sustain such a dialogue. Initially, the dialogue would take place separately in the North and the South. In the North, the dialogue would take place among scholars and researchers at a select number of public universities. The universities are distinguished by (a) their expertise in development studies, particularly rural and urban sectoral development (which is of special interest to researchers and extension agents working in Latin America); and (b) their involvement with solidarity groups and Sister Cities projects linking their university towns with communities in Latin America. A number of these projects involve the creation of revolving credit funds and popular education programs.

The dialogue between the universities would include participants from successful alternative credit programs in North America aimed at poor rural and urban communities. The time frame for dialogue and networking across these various institutions and agencies would be one to two years. The goal would be to achieve some coherent assistance efforts in which both knowledge and resources result in benefit to local initiatives. These initiatives would be designed to achieve sustainable development from below to generate jobs and income, to conserve natural resources, and to protect the environment. Only certain types of international cooperation in education favor the achievement of more just societies. As Bacchus (1983) noted,

An alternative approach towards development countries of the South must focus primarily on helping the total population and especially the poor from these countries meet their basic needs for clothing, education, medical care, etc.... Education must first be seen as a means which will help people utilize their own resources for development. Viewed from another angle education has to be seen as an important complementary input into the production efforts of these countries. (p. 52)

Similarly, in the South, funds from this project would be used to facilitate dialogue among universities in and across various Latin American countries, between universities and grassroots social and popular education movements, and between these community groups. Often community banks or revolving credit funds fail because of lack of experience and advice that could be provided by a neighboring, more established community group.

This was true in the case of a revolving loan fund project between my home town of Bloomington, Indiana, and our sister city of Posoltega, Nicaragua. It also should be noted that a severe drought in the country negatively affected the grants to farmers to plant new crops. An initial grant of over \$5,000 failed to generate jobs and income because of poor investment decisions that might have been avoided if the community organizations working with Nitlapan had provided timely technical assistance.

Following this first stage of dialogue occurring in the North and the South, a second, international stage is envisioned. At least one conference would be held in North America and one in Latin America (most likely in Nicaragua or El Salvador, where initial efforts would be concentrated). The first international conference would attempt to reach a consensus on the basic principles of an alternative development model. A working group would be constituted to develop a more detailed model that would serve as the basis for a second international conference to which major international donor agencies would be invited. The purpose of this meeting would be to develop a new agenda as a means for these agencies to channel their funds to regional and national networks representing grassroots communities. The goal is to combine needed international resources with local knowledge and initiative to create the conditions for sustainable development from below.

I am struck by the strong parallels between elements of this proposal, based on my experiences in Latin America, and those of my colleague Jack Hopkins (Director of the Indiana University Center on Global Change and World Peace), and the collected work of Bacchus (1980, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994), which I have had the happy occasion to review recently. Professor Bacchus' writings call for more equal, cooperative efforts between researchers in the North and South directed at meeting the needs of the most disadvantaged peoples of a society. He calls for the creation of education programs that build on local knowledge and efforts and equip the earlier victims of history to be the subjects of history transforming unjust social structures and for the establishment of university research and development programs in the North that are pertinent to the most pressing issues of the times.

Certainly we can begin to explore the possibilities of establishing collaborative efforts among ourselves and sister/brother universities in the South. Faculty and graduate students could engage in research and development efforts aimed at improving the status of rural women, meeting the needs of children at risk, and strengthening popular education and social movements intended to create more just and democratic societies.

Lessons from the Past, Possibilities for the Future

As a comparative educator, I frequently warn of the dangers of thinking there is a model society or a model education system that can be emulated and transplanted. Certainly the magisterial work of Kazim Bacchus on the history of education in the West Indies (1990, 1994), and Guyana (1980), as well as other areas of the world (1987) has underscored the importance of studying education systems in their specific social contexts. Instead of thinking of universal models, we should think of lessons to be learned, lessons of both success and failure (Eberstadt, 1979).

The problem is that major international and national donor or technical assistance agencies are promoting—indeed, attempting to impose—neoliberalism or “market monotheism” as a universal model to be followed by all countries. Instead, the recent international summit on social development in Copenhagen pointed to the need for various alternative models based on cultural identity and geocultural specificity. At the same time, the conference participants called for planetary-level collaboration and consciousness (Gorostiaga, 1995).

The present social and economic crises experienced by countries around the globe cannot be resolved by economic growth alone, nor by reducing society to market mechanisms and human beings to *homo economicus*. As the rector of the University of Copenhagen Kjell Mollgard noted, the solutions can only come from increasing knowledge and democratization: “Theory,” in his words, “is the most needed element in an epochal change” (Gorostiaga, 1995, pp. 44-45).

This theory must come from the joint efforts of those in the North and the South, from a fusion of local and metropolitan knowledge, and a democratic dialogue among all those concerned with the achievement of global justice and decency. We must view the role of education in development as a dialectical process characterized by tensions. These tensions arise out of recurring opposition between those who teach and those who learn, between those who would impose certain forms of knowledge for purposes of social control and those who seek knowledge for purposes of human liberation and social transformation.

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Partnership as Solidarity: Crossing North-South Boundaries

Introduction

In the broad field of international and comparative education, one crucial dimension of theory and practice lies in the area of educational assistance and cooperation between industrialized or North nations and the developing, Third World or South nations. Over the decades, especially in the post-1945 postcolonial era, the influence of predominantly "Western" nations in North America or Western Europe has been felt through multiple channels of North-South interactions. Whether through study programs abroad through which hundreds of thousands of South students are educated in North higher educational institutions; educational aid projects in infrastructure building, strengthening human resources capacity, curriculum development, and research; or volunteer and expatriate teachers at all levels of education, these North-South relationships have undeniably helped to shape the directions and framework of educational modernization in South regions. The plethora of actors in these kinds of North-South educational linkages add to the complexity of the interactions. What used to be largely the domain of bilateral aid agencies, UN bodies, or philanthropic foundations now also involves multilateral agencies like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and related organizations, entrepreneurial consulting firms, and nongovernmental organizations or NGOs. Any critical review of the progress, problems, and challenges of education and development, therefore, needs to draw lessons from the past and suggest future possibilities for North-South educational linkages.

In this article I would like to explore in a dialogical way some critical and problematic issues of such linkages. The raw material for these explorations is drawn both from my own experiences and reflections over the past two decades in various South and North contexts and from the analyses of scholars and practitioners in the field (Arnove, 1982; Bacchus, 1983; Barber, Altbach, & Myers, 1984; Fry & Thurber, 1989; Shive, Gopinathan, & Cummings, 1988; Toh, 1983; Toh & Farrelly, 1992).

Boundaries

To begin on a metaphorical note, the notion of *boundaries* in the fabric of life is clearly pervasive in our world today. Within a nation or society we have boundaries between regions or provinces that may sometimes fracture and

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disrupt with tragic social and political consequences. Our everyday lives take us through the boundaries of multiple institutional and social contexts of work places, bureaucracies, family, and the like. Certainly cultural spaces are filled with boundaries of ethnic, "racial", gender, and class identities and representations. Not least, boundaries mark the international and global levels of our world, boundaries that are crossed by an incessant flow of human beings: the millions of tourists, migrants, and refugees; the global and regional corporate and business personnel who run the engines of the world economic systems; the hundreds of thousands of consultants, "experts," diplomats and aid officials, expatriate workers, volunteers, international students, and visiting scholars or researchers who participate in various channels of knowledge transfers, cooperation, and exchanges; the missionaries who seek to evangelize and/or engage in outreach programs; and nowadays, the digital travellers on the so-called information superhighway. In terms of directions, the flow across international boundaries that used to be predominantly North-South is increasingly omnidirectional as the post-Cold War period integrates the former Eastern bloc and as South-South flows are facilitated. Most significantly, it is not only governments and official bodies who converge across boundaries for international and global forums. Rather, people's movements and NGOs are moving—sometimes freely, sometimes facing barriers—to connect with each other and to present alternatives that challenge and complement official summits such as the Rio Environment and Development Conference, the Social Summit on Development in the Netherlands, and the recently concluded Fourth Women's World Conference in Beijing.

The crossing of boundaries at international and global levels is thus pervasive and expanding, a sign that we are now living in a global village. Yet a functionalist approach to these crossings is in my view problematic and needs to be deconstructed. Functionalists regard such crossings as inevitable and useful outcomes of an evolutionary international and global order and problems as difficulties that can be sooner or later fixed in a technical way. What should concern us are the paradigms and quality of such crossings. What are the visions and assumptions that catalyze the act of crossing? What are the underpinning values of strategies and methodologies employed? What impact do the crossings have on the travellers and those they interact with both as individual and social beings, and on their respective national, social, economic, political, and cultural contexts? In sum, a meaningful understanding of the phenomenon of international border crossings must take into account the complex and sometimes conflicting motivations, interests, and paradigms among the multiple individual, organizational, institutional, and state actors.

From Paternalism to Partnership

When we look specifically at those boundary crossings that fall under the labels of educational assistance, technical cooperation, institutional linkages, study abroad, scholarly exchanges, and the like, it is fair to say that North-South relationships have generally evolved over some five decades of experience. In the earlier phase, the interactions between North and South tended to be hierarchical, with the North dictating the goals, content, pace, and methodologies. Some of us may have experienced or heard stories of the expert

or adviser who arrogantly professes to know everything and treats local counterparts as if they know little or nothing and are expected to implement passively the “expert” advice. Such unequal North-South interactions have also occurred in the context of volunteer agencies and nongovernmental organizations. We may have come across professors who see international (especially South) students as empty receptacles to be filled with the “valuable” knowledge of the North that is “indispensable” for economic growth and other facets of modernization. Some expatriates have been known to demand privileges that set them apart from local peers, living in comfortable and culturally isolated communities with impermeable boundaries and assuming an attitude of superiority vis-à-vis local cultures, knowledge, and traditions. Most problematically, the history of knowledge transfers and exchanges has included exemplars of manipulative political interventions. One example is the infamous Project Camelot designed to harness Latin American social science research to United States national security and intelligence interests (Horowitz, 1967). In more overt cases intellectual sponsorship has helped directly or indirectly to shape South political and economic policies favorable to Western world views (Berman, 1979; Weissman, 1974).

The paradigm of North-South relationships described above has led to such labels as the *ugly American*, *ugly Russian*, and *ugly Japanese*, and to criticisms of imperialism, neocolonialism, and dependency (Arnove, 1980, 1982; Shive et al., 1988). It can be said that in this authoritarian paradigm North-South boundaries may have been crossed physically, but mentally, affectively, and spiritually there has been no crossing. The knowledge and truth axis ran inexorably in a unilinear trajectory, from the North, which claims a monopoly of wisdom, to the South, which remains on the margins or peripheries of knowing. In those early days of North-South interactions, there were individuals, projects, and programs that refused to dominate or be dominated, but they were usually not strong enough to challenge the authoritarian paradigm.

As the decades went by, however, an increasing number of practitioners, analysts, and policymakers have been open to the lessons of both failed and positive interventions. Also, the tone of global political culture has been changing such that South nations and actors are no longer willing just to listen and follow. Postindependence maturity was accompanied in many cases by a heightened sense of national self-esteem and assertiveness. This was seen, for example, in the demands for a New International Economic Order and a New International Information Order at the United Nations and in other interventions initiated by the group of nonaligned nations or Third World bloc. In recent times we have also witnessed the powerful forces of global and domestic restructuring. The international competitiveness of formerly unchallenged Western industrialized economies depends increasingly on capturing markets and investment opportunities, including the commercialized transactions of knowledge, educational products, commodities, and services. There is a growing pool of competitors. As a result, North salespersons or sales agents, including state agencies, can no longer afford to ignore the needs and priorities of clients and consumers.

In short, there has been a perceptible shift from an authoritarian North-dominating-South paradigm of interaction to a paradigm encapsulated by a key word prevalent in today's international development literature: *partnerships*. By the late 1970s, for example, CIDA, as the official Canadian international development and aid agency, was strongly endorsing an Educational Institutions Program in which two-way partnerships between Canadian and developing-country institutions would facilitate transfers of technology and knowledge (CIDA, 1992). A decade later, in the Canadian government's new charter for official development assistance (ODA) found in the document "Sharing Our Future," one of the four pillars of Canadian ODA stated that "we must strengthen the links between Canadian citizens and institutions and those in the Third World—in short, partnership" (CIDA, 1987, p. 4). Most recently, the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Information Systems (1995) stresses

a commitment to strengthening partnerships. A wide range of development partners in Canada, along with a large number of international organizations and most importantly the people and institutions of developing countries, play a vital role in the development of policy and in the planning and delivery of Canada's ODA ... Canadian partners are a key source of the skills, know-how and technology that are needed to promote sustainable development ... Partnerships with developing countries are vital; most of the resources invested in development come from them. (p. 43)

In the case of CIDA support for institution-building projects, the newly revised program is now labeled University Partnership in Cooperation and Development (Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada [AUCC], 1996). For example, one major objective of the Tier 2 linkage projects is "to contribute to the establishment of linkages fostering sustainable partnerships between Canadian and developing country institutions" (p. 3). Among the criteria for preparing proposals are such items as: "the extent to which the project responds to the developing countries' priorities" (p. 1) and "mechanisms to ensure full and equal partnership in the ongoing planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project should be identified" (p. 28). The experience of the CIDA-funded Philippine Development Assistance Program (PDAP) through which Canadian official and voluntary funds are channeled to Philippine NGOs similarly illustrates the contemporary endorsement of principles of partnership (PDAP, 1995).

Drawing on these understandings and reflections of agencies, analysts, and practitioners, a partnership paradigm of North-South relationships would be underpinned by a number of key assumptions and strategies. Certainly there is the most basic requirement of intercultural sensitivity and understanding. Whether the interactions occur in the North or South, values and skills of intercultural communication, empathy, and respect are crucial for positive and harmonious relationships between participants (Fry & Thurber, 1989).

Second, there should be a sincere spirit and practice of mutual respect and collaboration whereby South partners are viewed as resource-rich and capable, bringing insights and skills to consensual goals and tasks. As CIDA's guidelines for UPCD Tier 2 projects stressed, "long-term sustainable partnerships between institutions must be based on common understanding, mutuality of benefits and a recognition of the contribution each can bring to the

partnership" (AUCC, 1996, p. 3). In the specific case of international students, no longer are they viewed as passive recipients of North knowledge and wisdom. They become, rather, an enriching presence in classes, motivated to share ideas and experiences as equals in the learning environment. In the words of the University of Toronto's Dean of Graduate Studies John Cohen, international students "challenge Canadian students and make them less insular. They enhance the environment in which learning takes place" (University of Toronto, 1995, p. 9). Similarly, the University of Alberta's Senate Task Force on International Dimensions (1994) recognized that foreign students provide "unique contributions to the fabric of the University. Diversity of perspectives and intellectual approaches provide an important element in the development of thought and ideas" (p. 31).

Collaboration in partnership also means the willingness of North partners to consult meaningfully on the priorities and concerns of recipient South partners. This is a requirement of CIDA-sponsored linkage projects from inception to completion, and it is an often declared strength of the current exemplars of partnerships between Canadian and other North higher education institutions/NGOs and their South counterparts (Kozolanka & Goldstone, 1996; Weeks, 1996). In the area of scholarly research, South states and scholars are increasingly insisting on equal access to data and the on importance of collaborative research projects (Crossley, 1992; Shive et al., 1988). In response, Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) has facilitated cooperative North-South research activities based on joint ownership, shared responsibility, and mutually developed problems. North scholars are no longer just researching the South or researching in isolation from South colleagues (Bernard, 1988; Lachance, 1995). It is also interesting to hear news that a powerful multilateral aid agency like the Asian Development Bank is beginning to respond to the advocacy efforts of the NGOs. They want the Bank to consult and collaborate more actively with NGOs and to respond to the strengths and contributions of NGOs toward sustainable, people-centered development (Hunt, 1995). Finally, some of the preferred principles of partnerships have been integrated by Fry and Thurber (1989) in an effort to enhance the professionalism of development consultants through a code of standards of professional conduct and practice. For example, in addition to the above-mentioned principle of intercultural sensitivity and respect, consultants should

accept only those engagements [they] are appropriately qualified to take ... which ... will provide real benefits to clients and related populations.... share credit and recognize the primary role of host country nationals in successes achieved ... readily accept blame for [their] failures or ineffectiveness without bitterness and rancour ... share all data and research results with host country clients ... seek to make ... clients more self-reliant and less dependent on [their] future services by acquainting [them] with all relevant principles, methods, techniques and technologies applied ... not recommend innovations or changes which may have risks adversely affecting human populations or the effects of which are uncertain. (pp. 191-193)

Thus in the partnership paradigm the boundaries between North and South are becoming more porous and permeable. Participants and partners in North-South linkages and relationships are conceived as trying to cross the boun-

daries not just physically, but also affectively, culturally, and socially. Mutuality of needs and interests, agendas, and benefits is deemed essential.

As an explicit corollary to the theme of partnership, some official North agencies such as CIDA have also articulated the importance of several objectives and priorities for development assistance. For Canada these include a concern with

basic human needs including building the capacity of the poor.... the full participation of women as equal partners in the sustainable development of their societies; infrastructure services with an emphasis on poorer groups ... democracy, good governance, respect for human rights, individual security, and the building up of civil society; private sector development which supports sustained and equitable economic growth; and assisting developing countries to protect their environments, and address global and regional environmental concerns.... [and] to contribute to .the internationalization of Canadian universities in all aspects of their mission ... [and] ... the development education of Canadian universities and the community they serve. (AUCC, 1996, p. 1)

As discussed below, these priorities and objectives ought to and can, in principle, strengthen a partnership paradigm of North-South relationships in education. However, in my view the specific interactions and contextualizations in actual projects and the theory and practice of partner participants will determine the authenticity and effectiveness of partnership relationships. Partnership, therefore, like the concept of sustainable development, needs to be problematized in order that its full potential may be visualized and realized.

Toward Partnership as Solidarity

In contrast to earlier phases of interactions, the partnership paradigm is clearly a more valid and effective framework for designing and practicing North-South relationships. However, my own experiences, as well as the analysis and practices of others involved in North-South interactions, still suggest the need to reflect on a number of critical questions. Is this conceptualization of partnership adequate? Does it take fully into account the complexities and dynamics of the contexts in which North-South relationships are located? Does it recognize the multiple interests, agendas, values, and understandings of what development means, and their intersections, possible contradictions, and influences on the intended goal of a better world for all partners? In the current context of global restructuring and the ascendancy of a neoliberal agenda, would it not be crucial to take into account what forces or barriers might be coming up to confront, dilute, or even coopt the worthwhile principles and practices of partnership?

Thus, although acknowledging the potential and realized values of current partnership theory and practice, I wish to explore and suggest in the remainder of this article four key criteria of adequacy for deepening the partnership paradigm into a paradigm of solidarity and transformation.

Acknowledging Values and Assumptions

First, partnership as solidarity calls on us continually to ask, What are the underlying values, assumptions, and goals of designing and practicing a partnership in North-South relationships? For example, if a central driving force is to maximize individual or group profit, as seen, for example, in the

activities of an increasing number of private consulting firms competing for projects and programs, then short cuts to achieving goals and objectives may be taken, sowing seeds for long-term or even short-term negativities. Not long ago, when exploring the feasibility of a bid for a multilateral bank project contract, a consulting firm executive began an orientation meeting with faculty members at a Canadian university with this exhortation: "Let's be open about it; the primary purpose of getting into this project is the bottom line." The possibility of undermining a project's integrity through a preoccupation with profitability may well assume greater potency in the current climate of deficit-cutting and restructuring constraints that faces higher education in virtually all North contexts. A vital lesson for universities or colleges pursuing partnerships and other dimensions of internationalization must be the moderation of desires or expectations about the earning power of such activities, so that the full spectrum of mutual benefits to all partners can be harnessed and realized. Stress on commercializing partnerships can also inadvertently skew linkages toward partners with more capacities and resources to "pay" (e.g., high growth or newly industrialized economies). This leads to a narrowing of the global window through which North participants can enter and enhance their internationalization.

Furthermore, we need to ask what is our underpinning value or assumption toward revisioning our truths. In the collaborative processes of partnerships, are we willing and able to be challenged hermeneutically and dialogically so that the directions of change are not purely an expectation or outcome of the South alone? Are we open to the possibilities that we may feel the need to question long-held assumptions about the validity of our knowledge bases? How prepared are we to engage in dialogue with and learn from the humanity of others including cultural and spiritual wisdom prevalent worldwide (Tobias, Morrison, & Gray, 1995)? Are we open to the possibilities that our familiar beliefs, attitudes, and interpersonal practices may, even if inadvertently, harbor cultural arrogance, ethnocentrism, or perhaps even racism (Kivel, 1996; Toh & Cawagas, 1995a)?

Paradigms of Development

A second problematic assumption that prevailing conceptions of partnership may still not address is an unexamined, taken-for-granted assumption about the desirability and transferability of North knowledge—that is, technological frameworks, skills, and strategies within the dominant modernization paradigm of development. The assumption is that by acquiring these forms of knowledge the South can move up the ladder of progress and thus emulate the industrialized leaders of the North. Holding this assumption of being a "neutral" apolitical helper and technical trainer can still be compatible with a partnership paradigm. But it is problematic because it does not necessarily pose deep-structure questions about the societal relevance in the South of a modernization paradigm of development that is embedded in the North experience. As seen from the discourse and evidence on underdevelopment and development realities in South regions since the 1950s, what constitutes successful and appropriate development depends on many values, assumptions, conceptions of human needs and wants, interpretations of culture, "progress" and the "good

life," and the root causes of poverty, hunger, and other manifestations of "underdevelopment" (Barnet & Cavanagh, 1994; Escobar, 1995; George, 1988; Gran, 1983; Toh, 1987; Trainer, 1985). An alternative paradigm of development has emerged to challenge the dominant modernization paradigm endorsed by North states, power centers of official aid agencies, and transnational corporations. It takes as its focus societal justice for marginalized groups, grassroots empowerment, nonviolent and authentic democracy, environmental care, and North-South relationships based on principles of equity, respect, and sharing (Archer & Costelo, 1990; Dankelman & Davidson, 1988; Korten, 1984; Timberlake, 1987).

Partnership as solidarity has a transformative dimension: It creates spaces for North and South participants to engage in critical dialogue about alternative paradigms of development rather than accepting as unproblematic the transfer of knowledge and technology in the service of modernization. That this can be done is shown by some exemplars of past or ongoing partnership projects, such as developing self-reliant economic and social programs that reach the poorest and marginalized in a South context, for example: literacy for the empowerment of women; primary health care services in urban and rural poor contexts; cultural survival of indigenous and First Nations peoples; environmental care (Clark, 1991; Conroy & Litvinoff, 1988; Kozolanka & Goldstone, 1996; PDAP, 1993, 1994, 1995).

Most of the CIDA priorities for guiding partnerships mentioned above (meeting basic needs of the poorest; participation of women; environmental sustainability; human rights; good governance) would be consistent with an alternative people-centered development paradigm. However, care must be taken with implementation when priority is given to developing the private sector, even if the stated objective is fostering equitable and sustainable growth. Although the modernization strategies of the past 50 years strongly and increasingly endorse the private sector, especially in today's global restructuring thrust, partnerships that stress privatization need to be held fully accountable for their potential negative impact on the marginalized sections of South societies. More growth, more business, and more exports do not automatically translate into redistributive and just development (Bello, 1994). Expanded investments and other entrepreneurial activities can continue to wreak environmental destruction and further reduce the support systems of already marginalized communities (Rich, 1994).

If partnerships are to address relevant issues, then all participants, whether from North or South, must have opportunities to critically interrogate alternative paradigms of development. This means not just an acknowledgment of principles such as equity, sustainability, and human rights in the project descriptions, but a conscious and concrete infusion of such principles as priorities in each phase of the partnership. For example, if it is an educational project centered on enhancing the teacher education capacity of South universities or colleges, the South scholars who come to North graduate schools would not merely become technical specialists in their subject area or field of concentration. Being able to improve mathematics, science, language arts, social studies education, educational psychology, educational administration, or foundational areas needs to be contextualized in the wider societal and trans-

formative issues of development. To accomplish this, North academic programs need actively to encourage and provide relevant spaces for South scholars to widen their horizons and exposure, including courses and mentors that may be outside home departments or even faculties. For example, it would be crucial for all education specialists in whatever field to contextualize their studies and research in the realities of South development rather than accepting an uncritical application of North perspectives and strategies. Conversely, North and South research supervisors must open up possibilities for South scholars to investigate problems of direct relevance to larger issues of societal development, rather than be constrained by the personal research agendas and priorities of North supervisors. Similarly, all North scholars involved in partnerships need to be willing to acquire preparatory grounding in issues, problems, and above all paradigms of development.

As one Central American South partner stated when commending partnerships established with a number of Canadian universities that focus on economically marginalized communities, "it is the social consciousness of our Canadian partners and their understanding of the Latin American context that are key to our partnerships' success" (Kozolanka & Goldstone, 1996, p. 1). Fostering social consciousness in the Freirean framework means appreciating the value-ladenness of any realm of knowledge, no matter how technical it may seem, to reveal the values underpinning "rational" frameworks of knowledge and science and to explore options for empowerment (Freire, 1994; McLaren & Leonard, 1993; Shiva, 1993). A socially critical interpretation of partnership leads in turn to the question of whether we position ourselves as collaborative diplomats or collaborative risktakers, stretching the boundaries of our relationships toward a better world. For instance, in one North-South partnership the South project administrators were troubled by the "critical" paradigmatic orientation developed by their South participants during the course of the project (e.g., education for social justice, environmental care) and even hinted at authoritarian "discipline" or "sanctions" should this critical stance be brought back to the home institution. Here, for partnership to be solidarity, the North partner would need to be prepared to assert the rights and indeed values of South participants to develop capacity for self-empowerment as critical professionals or workers sensitive to the relevance of their preferred development paradigms. In another instance, if there were a partnership based on solidarity South scholars would not be emerging from agricultural science programs in some Australian universities as technocrats unable and unwilling to pose critical questions about the relevance and validity of the modernization paradigm (Toh & Farrelly, 1992).

Representation

Another crucial question to ask in fostering North-South partnerships concerns the issue of representation. Who is involved in determining visions, goals, and strategies and in evaluating outcomes? From the discourse on power structures and relationships at local, national, and global levels, it is clear that a simple geographical representation of North and South categories will not suffice (Allen & Thomas, 1992; Escobar, 1995). Sometimes the South partner, whether a local counterpart or official, or an international student, may be even more

“North” than the participant from the geographical or industrialized North, in the sense of being closer to and empathetic with circles of power and privilege and the dominant modernization paradigm. Conversely, the North’s representative may well be working from a perspective that understands Southlike contexts such as those experienced by the economic underclasses of otherwise wealthy nations, discriminated social groups, or First Nations communities. If we are endeavoring to be culturally sensitive according to the partnership paradigm, then to whom are we being sensitive? To the powerful affluent elite families or groups, the relatively comfortable middle-class segment of South societies, or the poor, marginalized majorities? The culturally dominant groups, or the discriminated minorities or marginalized indigenous peoples? The males, who are often advantaged in social, economic, political, and cultural relationships, or the women marginalized by inequities and a lack of other human rights? Are these societal segments culturally alike? Whose priorities and what mix of emphases is the partnership responding to?

In the case of partnerships that require channelling and gatekeeping through state agencies (e.g., departments or ministries of education), there will be a need to transcend the potential for becoming alienated from grassroots participants. For instance, Monk and Dillon (1995) observed in the case of science education consultancy that the needs, concerns, insights, and voices of classroom teachers can go unheeded because the purchasing power of the consultancy often lies in centralized bureaucracies and ministerial mandates.

It is through this centralized mode of negotiation and delivery that the relationship of power and control between the science teacher and the science education consultant (as salespersons) remains untouched. Despite a language in science education consultancy that echoes the more strident phrases of the educational market place, the science teacher remains a passive recipient of aid. (p. 322).

Similarly, the logic of this argument can be applied to economic or social development projects in which the poor majorities have little participation in project planning and implementation, which remain the domain of North and South “experts” (Gran, 1983). As Samoff (1992) has shown through a detailed investigation of official assistance to Africa, North aid agencies have created an intellectual-financial complex that powerfully shapes research agendas and policy studies in South contexts. Clearly an implication for more authentic partnership is to design structures and processes whereby grassroots actors such as teachers, peasants or the urban poor, women, and indigenous peoples are brought directly into the conversation about the impact of partnership on the everyday lives and practices of the intended beneficiaries.

We urgently need to become more sensitive to the complexities and diversity in the worlds of our partners. A corollary to this principle is the need to challenge the belief that partnership means that one’s partners are somehow above criticism or, where funding is controlled by state bodies or aid agencies, we must guard against the tendency to provide maximum satisfaction to the clients who control the purse strings rather than serving the real clients: the people who are supposed to benefit from the development programs. If we fail to read partnership as a site for sharing constructive dialogue that can include

critical reflections, the space becomes open to the limitations of cultural relativism and the potential cooptation of the partnership for selective interests that are often structured by power inequities.

Global Citizenship

The fourth criterion that deserves to be brought into a solidarity paradigm is the vital contribution of a North-South partnership to the urgent problematic of global survival. As the new millennium comes closer, there is widening and deepening concern over the multiple crises affecting planet Earth and humanity. Among these crises are the unprecedented scale of ecological destruction; continuing abuse of human rights in all spheres of life; gender inequities; advancing militarization and militarized conflicts even in a post-Cold War era; social and personal violence; cultural conflicts often underpinned by political, economic, and historical roots; the debt squeeze that is hurting most the vulnerable groups (e.g., poor people, women, and children); pervasive hunger aggravated by global restructuring; the ever-widening chasm between rich and poor worlds; and a pervasive sense of alienation and personal peacelessness (Myers, 1993; Toh, 1995). How do partnerships infuse these concerns into their designs, including curriculum, pedagogy, and organizational structures?

Whatever the field, such infusion is feasible. For example, engineers or scientists of all specializations could perceive their technical tasks through prisms of environmental sustainability and local/global justice; teachers and educators could see their tasks as empowering and transformative; and health personnel can effectively synthesize local practices and wisdom with modern medical knowledge. Why, then, does it not happen more often? Can partnerships also be fostered that have autonomy from official sponsorship, so that individuals and groups exercise an act of self-empowering volunteerism and solidarity, contributing personal resources to bring a partnership forward? For instance, will more North scholars explore the value of sometimes spending their sabbaticals in South Africa or Guatemala rather than in California or Australia, or in the rural margins of the Philippines or India instead of on a famous European or North American campus?

Most importantly, partnership as solidarity challenges all participants to evolve as global citizens who are committed to global transformation for justice and peace and committed to personal transformation such as lifestyle choices (Adams, 1995; Roche, 1993; Toh & Cawagas, 1995b). For North participants especially, solidarity recognizes the inextricably connected nature of the web of life on our planet. Solidarity means not being defensive about critiques that appropriately identify the North as part of the problems of the South, whether that influence be from transnational corporations, official development assistance, trade, aid, or other channels. Partnership as solidarity helps to develop both North and South participants so that they will exercise their responsibilities and rights to influence and to demand accountability from large-scale agencies and forces. Certainly official North aid policies call on proposed partnerships to integrate the principles and priorities of North-South responsibilities as part of building a more peaceful, just, and sustainable world order. The challenge, however, will be to provide incentives, supports, and evaluative advocacy whereby North and South partners can enhance the sustained and

committed implementation of these principles. For instance, many North institutions are being attracted to certain high-growth regions in the South (e.g., the Pacific Rim) or newly industrializing economies to seek resource-rich partnerships, in contrast to economically marginal zones (e.g., much of sub-Saharan Africa). It is crucial to be sensitive to the human costs that may accompany such market-driven and consumer growth such as unfettered environmental destruction and human rights violations in the name of political stability.

Concluding Thoughts

In this article I try to clarify some distinctions between three paradigms of North-South relationships. These paradigms range from authoritarian North-South interactions, to an undifferentiated partnership paradigm, to a paradigm that problematizes partnership as solidarity. As we cross North-South boundaries, I suggest that there is an urgent need for us to reflect critically on these paradigms and on our positioning as human beings and global citizens vis-à-vis these alternatives.

To conclude on a note of personal experience, I have found that this process of clarification, self-reflection, and empowerment to act for transformation is a complex, difficult, and slow journey. In the Philippines and some other sites in South regions where I have tried to cross North-South boundaries, first from Australia and more recently from Canada, partnership as solidarity has meant a host of experiences. Among these experiences, I have been aware of:

- an active struggle to share and dialogically enrich perspectives, knowledge, and understandings that have their roots in both North and South and, increasingly, global spaces;
- the importance of willingness to take risks with partners in their inherently riskier societal contexts, whether it be to show solidarity in questioning human rights violations and building a culture of peace, or to advocate for active, nonviolent resolution of conflicts, or to support people-centered development;
- the challenge of examining and changing lifestyle choices;
- being the catalyst to engage in transformation in my own backyard in the North through global, development, and peace education advocacy;
- the constant need to be alert for potential cooptation while endeavoring to infuse practices with cherished principles;
- and, as Freire restated in his latest reflection, the need for us to try to support each other, living in and with the hope that the world should—and can—be a dignified and compassionate, just, and peaceful habitat for all beings on this earth.

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